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    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
    Tytuł:
    Hey Robot, the Mind Is Not Enough to Join the Moral Community! The Effect of Assigning a Mind and a Soul to a Humanoid Robot on Its Moral Status
    Autorzy:
    Fortuna, Paweł
    Gut, Arkadiusz
    Wróblewski, Zbigniew
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31341021.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    moral status
    mind perception
    soul perception
    humanoid robot
    artificial intelligence
    Opis:
    Current research explored the link between beliefs about the mind, the soul, and the moral status (MS) of humanoid robot (HR). Determining the conditions for the assignment of MS to artificially intelligent agents is important from the point of view of their inclusion in the moral community. The indication of the role of beliefs about the mind and the soul is consistent with the tendency to distinguish these two incorporeal entities observed in folk psychology. In an online study, participants (N = 223), who believed in the existence of the mind and the soul, assessed the MS of the HR Sophia and assigned attributes to it; based on this, two dimensions of the mind perception (MP) were distinguished: Experience and Agency. As expected, we found that the participants attributed the mind more than the soul to the robot, and these projections significantly affected the MS of the robot. Path analysis revealed that the dimensions of MP acted as a mediator in the mind-MS relationship, while the soul-MS relationship was direct. The analysis of the obtained results leads to a more general conclusion that the soul attribution is a diverse and parallel condition to the mind attribution in individuals.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Psychologiczne; 2023, 26, 2; 115-133
    1507-7888
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Psychologiczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge
    Autorzy:
    Stokes, Dustin
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2199956.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Projekt Avant
    Tematy:
    memory
    imagery
    self-knowledge
    perception
    mind
    Opis:
    One distinct interest in self-knowledge is an interest in whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one’s veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given the robust psychological and phenomenal similarities between episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: “Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?” After critical analysis of the application of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne [2010], following Evans [1982]) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive sensory-access account of Carruthers [2011]). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind.
    Źródło:
    Avant; 2019, 10, 2
    2082-6710
    Pojawia się w:
    Avant
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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