- Tytuł:
- Logical Connection Argument from the Perspective of Exploratory Behaviors
- Autorzy:
- Michalska, Anna
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451459.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2019-04-30
- Wydawca:
- Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
- Tematy:
-
Logical Connection Argument
meaning
content
means of expression
goal-directed action
performativity - Opis:
- In the most general terms, the Logical Connection Argument (LCA) states that theory and practice are two inseparable aspects of the same thing. Every action (or practice), linguistic or otherwise, is an indivisible unity of content and the means by which it is expressed. Alternatively, we may talk of the inseparability of content and form, meaning and act of expression, goal and method or means of its realization, and so forth. The argument was meant to prove that intentions cannot be treated as causes in social scientific explanation, but it did it at the cost of making any meta-analysis, and hence, critique, highly problematic. My position is that the LCA is indeed logical, and hence irrefutable. Nonetheless, we can distinguish between “raw” and “refined” versions of the argument. The refined version maintains that while ultimately and ideally, the content and means of expression presuppose one another in the sense that a content is inconceivable without a form, and vice versa, in reality there is never a perfect match between aims and methods. In typical circumstances, we do not have a precise sense of what we are doing; the meaning of our actions is gradually discovered in the course of exploratory behaviors, of which (immanent) critique is an indispensable part. In this contribution, I venture to examine the problem from a neuropsychological perspective with the view to showing in exactly what sense and to what extent explorative behaviors and associated motivations preside over other activities. I argue that content is always underdetermined with respect to its form (and vice versa), and hence the alleged internal connection between them is not a given, but rather amounts to a regulative principle which motivates mutual adjustments.
- Źródło:
-
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2019, 3, 1(7); 78-91
2544-302X - Pojawia się w:
- Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł