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    Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8
    Tytuł:
    On the key exchange and multivariate encryption with nonlinear polynomial maps of stable degree
    Autorzy:
    Ustimenko, V.
    Wroblewska, A.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/106224.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
    Tematy:
    key exchange
    polynomial mapping
    stable degree
    Opis:
    We say that the sequence gn, n≥3, n→∞ of polynomial transformation bijective mapsof free module Kgn over commutative ring K is a sequence of stable degree if the order of gn is growing with n and the degree of each nonidentical polynomial map of kind gkn is an independent constant c. Transformation b = τgnkτ−1, where τ is the affine bijection, n is large and k is relatively small, can be used as a base of group theoretical Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm for the Cremona group C(Kn) of all regular automorphisms of Kn. The specific feature of this method is that the order of the base may be unknown for the adversary because of the complexity of its computation. The exchange can be implemented by tools of Computer Algebra (symbolic computations). The adversary can not use the degree of right handside in bx = d to evaluate unknown x in this form for the discrete logarithm problem. In the paper we introduce the explicit constructions of sequences of elements of stable degree for the cases c = 3 and c = n+2/4 for each commutative ring K containing at least 3 regular elements and discuss the implementation of related key exchange and multivariate map algorithms.
    Źródło:
    Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio AI, Informatica; 2013, 13, 1; 63-80
    1732-1360
    2083-3628
    Pojawia się w:
    Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio AI, Informatica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (RRRT-KLJN) Key Exchange
    Autorzy:
    Kish, L. B.
    Granqvist, C. G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/221212.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    KLJN key exchange
    information theoretic security
    unconditional security
    Opis:
    We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.
    Źródło:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems; 2016, 23, 1; 3-11
    0860-8229
    Pojawia się w:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    On the “cracking” scheme in the paper “A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott
    Autorzy:
    Chen, H.-P.
    Kish, L. B.
    Granqvist, C. G.
    Schmera, G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/221413.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    KLJN key exchange
    information theoretic security
    unconditional security
    Opis:
    Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA’s mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA’s cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, it provides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier (Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack [Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys. Lett. A 374:2140-2142 (2010)], while it offers no information in the case of a lossy cable. We also investigate GAA’s claim to be experimentally capable of distinguishing - using statistics over a few correlation times only - the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less than 10-8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. We identify several potential experimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA’s assertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components caused by ground loops, DC offset, aliasing, non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the timederivative nature of GAA’s scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts.
    Źródło:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems; 2014, 21, 3; 389-400
    0860-8229
    Pojawia się w:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Unconditional security by the laws of classical physics
    Autorzy:
    Mingesz, R.
    Kish, L. B.
    Gingl, Z.
    Granqvist, C.-G.
    Wen, H.
    Peper, F.
    Eubanks, T.
    Schmera, G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/220876.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    information theoretic security
    unconditional security
    secure key exchange
    secure key distribution
    quantum encryption
    Opis:
    There is an ongoing debate about the fundamental security of existing quantum key exchange schemes. This debate indicates not only that there is a problem with security but also that the meanings of perfect, imperfect, conditional and unconditional (information theoretic) security in physically secure key exchange schemes are often misunderstood. It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with enhanced Johnsonnoise and a Kirchhoff-loop - i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol . for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic security levels superior to those of today's quantum key distribution. This issue is becoming particularly timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum communicators, as shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. The KLJN system is briefly surveyed here with discussions about the essential questions such as (i) perfect and imperfect security characteristics of the key distribution, and (ii) how these two types of securities can be unconditional (or information theoretical).
    Źródło:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems; 2013, 20, 1; 3-16
    0860-8229
    Pojawia się w:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
    Autorzy:
    Chen, H.-P.
    Mohammad, M.
    Kish, L. B.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/220991.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    KLJN
    current injection attack
    secure key exchange
    unconditional security
    privacy amplification
    Opis:
    The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system’s unconditional security.
    Źródło:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems; 2016, 23, 2; 173-181
    0860-8229
    Pojawia się w:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The problem of information leak due to parasitic loop currents and voltages in the KLJN secure key exchange scheme
    Autorzy:
    Melhem, Mutaz Y.
    Kish, Laszlo B.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/220471.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    unconditional security
    key exchange
    parasitic loop currents and voltages
    information leak
    Opis:
    The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme offers unconditional security, however it can approach the perfect security limit only in the case when the practical system’s parameters approach the ideal behavior of its core circuitry. In the case of non-ideal features, non-zero information leak is present. The study of such leaks is important for a proper design of practical KLJN systems and their privacy amplifications in order to eliminate these problems.
    Źródło:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems; 2019, 26, 1; 37-40
    0860-8229
    Pojawia się w:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme
    Autorzy:
    Melhem, Mutaz Y.
    Kish, Laszlo B.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/221184.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    unconditional security
    secure key exchange
    parasitic loop currents and voltages
    information leak
    Opis:
    A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC-voltage sources at both Alice’s and Bob’s ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single-end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc-voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice’s and Bob’s terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.
    Źródło:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems; 2019, 26, 4; 607-616
    0860-8229
    Pojawia się w:
    Metrology and Measurement Systems
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Password-authenticated group key establishment from smooth projective hash functions
    Autorzy:
    Bohli, Jens Matthias
    González Vasco, María Isabel
    Steinwandt, Rainer
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/330206.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
    Tematy:
    group key exchange
    password authentication
    smooth projective hashing
    uzgadnianie klucza
    uwierzytelnienie hasła
    haszowanie rzutowe
    Opis:
    Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow users sharing a password to agree upon a high entropy secret. Thus, they can be implemented without complex infrastructures that typically involve public keys and certificates. In this paper, a provably secure password-authenticated protocol for group key establishment in the common reference string (CRS) model is presented. While prior constructions of the group (PAKE) can be found in the literature, most of them rely on idealized assumptions, which we do not make here. Furthermore, our protocol is quite efficient, as regardless of the number of involved participants it can be implemented with only three communication rounds. We use a (by now classical) trick of Burmester and Desmedt for deriving group key exchange protocols using a two-party construction as the main building block. In our case, the two-party PAKE used as a base is a one-round protocol by Katz and Vaikuntanathan, which in turn builds upon a special kind of smooth projective hash functions (KV-SPHFs). Smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs) were first introduced by Cramer and Shoup (2002) as a valuable cryptographic primitive for deriving provable secure encryption schemes. These functions and their variants proved useful in many other scenarios. We use here as a main tool a very strong type of SPHF, introduced by Katz and Vaikuntanathan for building a one-round password based two party key exchange protocol. As evidenced by Ben Hamouda et al. (2013), KV-SPHFs can be instantiated on Cramer–Shoup ciphertexts, thus yielding very efficient (and pairing free) constructions.
    Źródło:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2019, 29, 4; 797-815
    1641-876X
    2083-8492
    Pojawia się w:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8

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