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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
The Practice of ὀνοματοποιεῖν: Some Peculiar Statements in the Ancient Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle
Autorzy:
Granata, Daniele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633546.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Categories
Rethoric
actuality and potentiality
Neoplatonism
Aristotle
Opis:
This paper shows the role of ὀνοματοποιεῖν in Neoplatonism and how this practice is ruled by an onto-logical canon. While ὀνοματοποιεῖν itself means the making of a brand new name, its usage is manifold. As Aristotle explains in Rh. III 2, poets take advantage of ὀνοματοποιεῖν to catch the undefined and give it a recognisable image, by means of a metaphorical name. In science, this practice, codified by Aristotle, is twofold: ὀνοματοποιεῖν meant both to re-semanticize words wellknown and to create names ex novo for things not discovered or studied yet. After analysing ὀνοματοποιεῖν’s recurrence in Aristotle, I illustrate that, according to Neoplatonic Commentators, impositio can be, both natural and technical, only of things in actuality, having a solid consistency. Intermediates between contraries, presumed relatives and powers as qualities are nameless – as  Philoponus notices in his In Categorias – since they haven’t an independent status and aren’t  definable. This bond between the original rhetorical practice and the ontological perspective, sketched in Int. 1, was strengthened by Alexander, who filled Aristotle’s gaps, stating that names signify things’ being, i.e. the form acquired in actuality.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 217-228
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The alleged activity of active intellect: A wild goose chase or a puzzle to be solved?
Autorzy:
Kamińska, Sonia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690658.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
nous
nous poietikos
nous pathetikos
soul
intellect
God
Deity
actuality
potentiality
philosophy of mind
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Franz Brentano
Victor Caston
Opis:
Trying to describe the activity of Aristotle’s active intellect, we will sooner or later realize that we cannot find its right description, because Aristotle did not provide for one. He left us with many irreconcilable statements and questions with no answers. In the famous text Aristotle’s Two Intellects: a Modest Proposal Victor Caston claims that Aristotle did not describe the activity, because there simply is no such activity and we should therefore identify nous poietikos with God, because God too does nothing. Trying to find this lacking description is like going on a wild goose chase – Caston argues. In my text I will show that his solution, albeit tempting, is in fact a kind of “dissolution” and that a wild goose chase, although for many doomed to failure, can be fruitful. I will do so by presenting three groups or clusters of views on active intellect which – I believe – are philosophically significant. Caston’s proposal will be one of them, but not the privileged one. These three types of interpretations will hopefully provide us with an imagery that will help us somewhat come to terms with Aristotle’s succinctness.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2014, 54; 79-126
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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