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    Tytuł:
    The Liar, Contextualism, and the Stalnakerian View of Context
    Autorzy:
    Rudnicki, Jakub
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/973299.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
    Tematy:
    contextualism
    Stalnaker
    liar paradox
    context
    semantics
    Glanzberg
    Opis:
    My aim in this paper is to amend the Stalnakerian view of context in such a way that it can allow for an adequate treatment of a contextualist position regarding the Liar Paradox. I discuss Glanzberg’s contextualism and the reason why his position cannot be encompassed by the Stalnakerian view, as it is normally construed. Finally, I introduce the phenomenon I call “semantic dissonance”, followed by a mechanism accommodating the Stalnakerian view to the demands of Glanzberg’s contextualism.
    Źródło:
    Studia Semiotyczne; 2019, 33, 1
    0137-6608
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Semiotyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective
    Autorzy:
    Gomułka, Jakub
    Wawrzyniak, Jan
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/561372.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
    Tematy:
    compositionality principle
    context principle
    intelligibility
    liar paradox
    nonsense
    Wittgenstein
    Opis:
    Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
    Źródło:
    Studia Semiotyczne; 2017, 31, 2; 179-199
    0137-6608
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Semiotyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The ‘Verdict Paradox’ and the Liar Paradox: How Logic Can Defend the Rule of Law. A Study of the Polish Constitutional Crisis
    Autorzy:
    Mazurkiewicz, Szymon
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2200450.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Projekt Avant
    Tematy:
    Polish constitutional crisis
    Constitutional Tribunal verdict of 9th March 2016
    amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December 2015
    verdict paradox
    Liar paradox
    logical contradiction
    constitutional contradiction
    political
    freedom guarantees
    Opis:
    This paper aims to present how logic may undermine a parliamentary assault on democratic institutions (representing legal guarantees of the rule of law and political freedom) based on the analysis conducted with reference to the so-called Polish constitutional crisis. I analyse whether a law can be reviewed on the basis of this law itself. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal faced such a problem while passing the verdict of 9th March, 2016, regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December, 2015. This problem, called a ‘verdict paradox’, was claimed to be a type of the Liar paradox. I argue that, contrary to the common view, the problem of the verdict paradox is not based on the Liar paradox; for this purpose, a logical analysis is applied to four variants of a reasoning with regard to the constitutionality of the said amendment. The distinction between two levels of analysis concerning emerging reasonings, namely an abstract (logical) level and a concrete level placed in the context of the legal system, is also introduced. This paper demonstrates that although only two variants of the reasoning concerning a law’s judicial review based on the law itself involve logical contradiction, the possibility of employing reasonings from other variants must be excluded, albeit due to alternative reasons. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to avoid the verdict paradox by passing over the reviewed provisions in the review process was correct and might be perceived as an example of how logic and reason can defend the institutional guarantees of political freedom.
    Źródło:
    Avant; 2019, 10, 1; 173-187
    2082-6710
    Pojawia się w:
    Avant
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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