Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "Fichte" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
The Aesthetic Implications of Fichte on Feeling
Autorzy:
Lohmann, Petra
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2141932.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-07-28
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Opis:
The article discusses the connection between art and emotion in Fichte’s work and its contemporary reception by the architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel. For the latter, not only selected architectural theoretical studies but also Schinkel’s ideal architectural designs are consulted. Schinkel knew Fichte personally and held him in high esteem. This is evidenced by some of Schinkel’s verbatim references to various forms of the Wissenschaftslehre and its sub-disciplines, as well as his extremely precise transcripts of lectures around the Berlin versions of the Wissenschaftslehre (around 1800). Schinkel was not only interested in the political and religious implications of Fichte’s theory of a cultural history of humankind, but his engagement with Fichte is also characterized above all by the theory of consciousness. This aspect plays a central role in the article. In recourse to the aesthetic emotion of the mind, a main concern of Fichte’s philosophy is to be placed in the horizon of architecture, which manifests itself in these questions: how does one convey a realisation in such a way that the recipient reconstructs it almost independently and it becomes a practical value for him as a criterion for his orientation in life? And furthermore – related to the research discourse on Fichte, which has only recently taken note of his aesthetic position and in particular his comments on architecture – how can this model of cognition be applied in his work from an architect’s point of view? In the investigation part on Fichte for this, first the feeling is reconstructed within the framework of the scientific-systematic philosophy as the reason of consciousness, in order to show with it the instance of the question relevant for Schinkel about the pedagogical effectiveness of a life-practical cultivating architecture. In the examination section on Schinkel, it is shown how Schinkel, in the horizon of Fichte, undertakes a determination of the relationship between feeling and ratio, with which he, for his part, establishes architecture as an instrument of cultivation.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2022, 13, 1; 57-79
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Humble Reason. On Education in Kant and Fichte
Autorzy:
Scaglia, Lara
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2141922.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Opis:
In this paper I will focus on education as the core function of reason in Kant and Fichte. The notion of reason carries an intrinsic tendency to universality, which is difficult to be reconciled with its local (cultural, historical, anthropological) background and actualisation. I believe that the stress on the importance of learning, which can be seen in the works of both Kant and Fichte, might provide useful clues to approaching the relation between universality and particularity. I will start by focusing on Kant’s narration on the genealogy of human reason in the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, and then move on to the critical writings and selected lectures in order to focus on the role of human dignity and ethical education for the moral appraisal and the practice of virtue. Later, I will consider Fichte’s lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, the Vocation of Man and The Characteristics of the Present Age, which are crucial to understanding the social, ethical and political role of the scholar. For Fichte, education is the best instrument to eradicate selfishness, regarded as a historical phenomenon which can lead a nation to ruin. I will then provide some conclusions concerning the two accounts and their implications.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2021, 12, 2; 26-45
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Striving for Freedom. Some Notes about Fichte’s Idealism
Autorzy:
Alessiato, Elena Paola Carola
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2141921.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Opis:
Moving from Fichte’s assumption that “the essence of the I is its activity”, this paper tries to analyze the meaning and implications of the idea of “activity” [Tathandlung] in order to explicate the peculiarities of Fichte’s critical, transcendental, and moral idealism. Fichte’s idea of activity will be examined with reference to such basic concepts as collision [Anstoss], interaction [Wechselwirkung], inter-determination [Wechselbestimmung], and striving [Streben]. However, it is freedom which frames and connects the core components of Fichte’s thinking and sets up the goal of his philosophy of action. What freedom accounts for, can be identified both at the transcendental level, in the internal dynamic of infinity and finitude constituting the subjectivity of the I, and at the moral and social levels of Fichte’s thought, as the goal of the human action in history and in the society. In assuming the unitary character of Fichte’s philosophical system, concluding remarks are developed concerning the moral meaning of the act of striving for freedom and, conversely, the immorality of attitudes and feelings such as fear, resignation, and fatigue.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2021, 12, 2; 46-60
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies