Temat: voting power index - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Proximity in Coalition Building
Autorzy:: Reynaud, Julien
Lange, Fabien
Gątarek, Łukasz T.
Thimann, Christian
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/483361.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2011
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:: voting power index
coalition building
International Monetary Fund
linkage
proximity
Opis:: Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. Using this proximity index, we introduce a notion of relative linkages among coalition participants as determinant of coalition building. We propose an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by bilateral volumes of trade between voters. The results are able to explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be useful for other applications in international politics.
Źródło:: Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics; 2011, 3, 3; 111-132
2080-0886
2080-119X
Pojawia się w:: Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: National and ideological influence in the European Parliament
Autorzy:: Turnovec, F.
Mercik, J. W.
Mazurkiewicz, M.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970600.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2008
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:: a priori voting power
European Parliament
European political parties
power indices
Shapley-Shubik power index
Opis:: In this paper we address the following question: Taking as decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of "national" coordination of voting and in the case of "partisan" coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations) in the EP. In both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a party group), difference is only in dimension of aggregation (European parties versus national representations). Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.
Źródło:: Control and Cybernetics; 2008, 37, 3; 585-606
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:: Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems
Autorzy:: Carreras, F.
Freixas, J.
Magaňa, A.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/969069.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2016
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:: voting systems
simple games
weighted majority games
Shapley–Shubik power index
dimension
egalitarianism
decisiveness
Opis:: An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.
Źródło:: Operations Research and Decisions; 2016, 26, 2; 31-52
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:: Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Fairness and squareness: fair decision making rules in the EU Council?
Sprawiedliwość i metoda pierwiastka kwadratowego: sprawiedliwe reguły podejmowania decyzji w Radzie Unii Europejskiej?
Autorzy:: Turnovec, František
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/907202.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2009
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:: fairness
indirect voting power
Penrose–Banzhaf power index
optimal quota
Shapley–Shubik power index
simple voting committee
square root rule
sprawiedliwość
pośrednia siła głosu
indeks siły głosu Penrose’a–Banzhafa
optymalny próg większości
indeks siły głosu Shapleya–Shubika
proste głosowania
reguła pierwiastka kwadratowego
Opis:: In this paper we analyze the following problem: assuming that the distribution of voting weights in a simple voting committee is fair (whatever this means), how should we set up a voting rule to guarantee that the distribution of influence (relative voting power) is as close as possible to relative voting weights.
Źródło:: Operations Research and Decisions; 2009, 19, 4; 110-124
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:: Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Informacja