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Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 36
Tytuł:
Zasady mereologicznego esencjalizmu
Principles of Mereological Essentialism
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/963969.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
Mereologcal essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine formulated and defended originally by Roderick M. Chisholm. The main principle of mereological essentialism states, that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). The principle may also be put by saying, that every object has the parts that it has necessarily. In the paper the above mentioned doctrine is reconstructed and analysed. Some consequences of the theory in question as well as many variants of it are examined. The main purpose of the text is to provide a critical analysis of mereological essentialism in order to make this radical doctrine more acceptable.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2007, 15, 3; 27-40
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Reistyczna koncepcja czasu
The Theory of Time According to Reism
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964887.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2004, 12, 2; 111-126
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Eliminatywizm i artefakty
Eliminativism and Artefacts
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965679.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The paper provides an answer to Paweł Garbacz's article Problem of Artefact's Existence, which is a critique of eliminativistic views presented in my book Identyczność i trwanie. Studium ontologiczne (Identity and Persistence. An Ontological Study). In the text crucial objections formulated by Garbacz are reconstructed and carefully discussed.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2010, 18, 3; 135-140
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem rozumienia sporu absolutyzm-relacjonizm
The Problem of Understanding of the Absolutism/Relationism Debate
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966592.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The text presents a response to Gołosz’s critique of my reconstruction of the absolutism/relationism debate, set out in the article Trwanie w czasie (Persistence through Time). I specify the objections I agree with and those about which I remain sceptical. I suggest that the main source of the controversy between Gołosz and me is, on the one hand, the traditional and somewhat schematic way of presentaion – on my part – of the positions in the dispute (dictated in part by the subject matter of the discussed article), and on the other hand, a persistent lack of a suitable, exhaustive analysis of the notion of ontological dependence which lies at the heart of the debate.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2013, 21, 4; 125-129
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Criteria of Identity and Two Modes of Persistence
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966881.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The purpose of this paper is, first, to present an alternative account of persistence of objects in time, as opposed to the dominant ones in the current philosophical literature, and second, to spell out an alternative role for criteria of identity. According to the proposed account, persistence is not ontologically homogeneous in nature and can be reconstructed two-sidedly either in terms of being fully present and identity, or by means of the notion of genidentity. In the latter case, objects persisting in time are described as invariants with respect to equivalence classes over certain occurrents under suitable relations of genidentity, that is, under a family of spatiotemporal and causal relations among timeslices of constitutive parts of those objects. The diversification of persistence coincides with the traditional dichotomous division of entities into entia per se and entia per aliud. There are also good reasons to be sceptical about the approach which regards criteria of identity as semantic-cum-metaphysical principles providing, in an informative and non-circular way, an ontological basis for statements about identity (i.e. as principles specifying truth-conditions of those statements). On the alternative account proposed in the paper, those criteria are regarded either as purely evidential (and individuational) or as criteria of genidentity in the metaphysical sense.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2016, 24, 2; 17-29
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Criteria of Identity and Two Modes of Persistence
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966883.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The purpose of this paper is, first, to present an alternative account of persistence of objects in time, as opposed to the dominant ones in the current philosophical literature, and second, to spell out an alternative role for criteria of identity. According to the proposed account, persistence is not ontologically homogeneous in nature and can be reconstructed two-sidedly either in terms of being fully present and identity, or by means of the notion of genidentity. In the latter case, objects persisting in time are described as invariants with respect to equivalence classes over certain occurrents under suitable relations of genidentity, that is, under a family of spatiotemporal and causal relations among timeslices of constitutive parts of those objects. The diversification of persistence coincides with the traditional dichotomous division of entities into entia per se and entia per aliud. There are also good reasons to be sceptical about the approach which regards criteria of identity as semantic-cum-metaphysical principles providing, in an informative and non-circular way, an ontological basis for statements about identity (i.e. as principles specifying truth-conditions of those statements). On the alternative account proposed in the paper, those criteria are regarded either as purely evidential (and individuational) or as criteria of genidentity in the metaphysical sense.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2016, 24, 2; 17-29
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O czasoprzestrzeni
On Specetime
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966904.pdf
Data publikacji:
1998-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 1998, 6, 1; 101-113
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aksjomatyczne definicje genidentyczności
Axiomatic Definitions of Genidentity
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967145.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The main aim of the paper is to revive Zdzisław Augustynek’s attempts to define the relation of genidentity. The text embraces the following issues: (i) a presentation of three axiomatic definitions of genidentity; (ii) a reconstruction of the definitions in question in the language of the predicate calculus; (iii) a supplementing the above reconstruction by appropriate proofs; (iv) an analysis of the selected methodological and ontological assumptions of the discussed systems; (v) a comparison of Augustynek’s systems with Eugeniusz Żabski’s proposal; (vi) an outline of the definition of a thing as an abstractum (equivalence class, invariant) over the set of all punctual events under a relation of genidentity.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 1; 25-37
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ewentystyczna definicja rzeczy w świetle argumentu Adriana Kuźniara
An Eventistic Definition of a Thing in the Light of Adrian Kuźniars Argument
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967188.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
Kuźniar’s argument against the point-eventistic definition of a thing rests on the fact that its two important conditions - namely the spatial extension condition and the temporal continuity condition - cannot be jointly satisfied. The paper provides a detailed analysis and an assessment of Kuźniar’s objection and offers some strategies in order to overcome difficulties generated by it.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 1; 53-56
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Leśniewski przeciw powszechnikom
Leśniewski Against Universals
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968108.pdf
Data publikacji:
2000-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The author contrasts two arguments against the existence of universal objects formulated by Stanisław Leśniewski and indicates the possible directions for the critique of these arguments. The paper contains also some historical and bibliographical remarks which throw new light on the role that Leśniewski played in the controversy over universals in the Lvov-Warsaw School. The paper has the following structure. The first part is a historical outline which pictures Leśniewski against the background of the above mentioned controversy. The second part is devoted to the first Leśniewski's argument against universals (1911) and to the critical analysis of this argument. The third part deals with the proof against the existence of universals formulated by Leoniewski in 1927 and to the limitations of this proof.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2000, 8, 3-4; 109-125
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
'Four-Dimensionalism' - analiza i interpretacja
'Four-Dimensionalism': An Analysis and Interpretation
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968520.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and future objects (and times) are just as real as currently existing ones. Finally it can mean the thesis that all objects are in fact four-dimensional i.e. they are in every case a filling of some subregions of space-time. The author examines some varieties of 4D-ism and tries to formulate both a precise meaning of those doctrines and an evaluation of them.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2007, 15, 1; 105-120
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Modalny argument na rzecz dualizmu w ujęciu Uwe Meixnera
Uwe Meixners Modal Argument for Dualism
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966764.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The paper provides a critical analysis of Uwe Meixner’s modal argument in favour of psychophysical dualism. It delivers, first, a formal reconstruction of the proof which was originally presented by Meixner in 2004, second, a detailed scrutiny of some premises of the argument in question, and third, a careful assessment of the whole reasoning. My analysis aims at justifying the belief that although the version of the modal argument invented by Meixner is formally valid and represents a significant progress when compared with the original version, it is still based on two disputable premises which make the whole reasoning difficult to regard, in a completely collision-free way, as a materially sound one.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2016, 24, 4; 129-147
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Genidentyczność a metafizyka persystencji: endurantyzm, perdurantyzm i eksdurantyzm
Genidentity and the Metaphysics of Persistence: Endurantism, Perdurantism and Exdurantism
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909870.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
change
genidentity
persistence
Opis:
The metaphysical explanations of genidentity are very important both for scien-tific researches and for everyday human activities. Endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (stage view and point-eventism) are the standard metaphysical theo-ries, which provide descriptions and explanations of relations of change and persistence. The descriptions and explanations in question give simultaneously the truth-conditions for statements about an identity of objects, which persist and undergo changes in time. The main aim of the paper is to formulate the above-mentioned metaphysical stances and to give the general account of the relation of genidentity within a conceptual framework of these theories. The second aim is to provide a suitable reconstruction of criteria of genidentity, which are appropriate for the three metaphysical doctrines.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 2; 87-102
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
W obronie mereologicznego esencjalizmu
In Defence of Mereological Essentialism
Autorzy:
Grygianiec, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909936.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
chisholm r.
entia per se
entia successiva
essentialism
mereology
Opis:
The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via entia per se and entia successiva. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defence of the theory and the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way in doing so is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects qua occurrents or only to objects qua continuants or only to persons.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 3; 57-69
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 36

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