Temat: Control theory - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Indirect control and power
Autorzy:: Bertini, C.
Mercik, J.
Stach, I.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406544.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2016
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:: game theory
indirect control
corporations
power indices
Opis:: To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.
Źródło:: Operations Research and Decisions; 2016, 26, 2; 7-30
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:: Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations
Autorzy:: Stach, I.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/375977.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2017
Wydawca:: Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Tematy:: corporate shareholding analysis
cooperative game theory
direct and indirect control
financial and economic modeling
power indices
Opis:: This paper is devoted to the concept of indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor’s power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors has been proposed. We focus in particular on a game-theoretical approach; specifically the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program „Control Sharing Simulation”.
Źródło:: Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services; 2017, 11, 1-2; 31-51
1896-8325
2300-7087
Pojawia się w:: Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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