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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    The Accuracy of Symmetric Negotiation Support Based on Scoring Systems Built by Holistic Approach and Direct Rating
    Autorzy:
    Wachowicz, Tomasz
    Roszkowska, Ewa
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/578602.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
    Tematy:
    UTASTAR
    Wsparcie negocjacji
    Negotiation support
    Opis:
    In negotiations, the parties can be offered decision support based on formal scoring systems. These systems can be determined by means of various preference elicitation techniques and multiple criteria decision aiding (MCDA) approaches. In most situations the simplest tool is used, namely the direct rating technique (DR). In this paper we analyze to what extent the scoring system obtained by means of a mix of MARS (Measuring Attractiveness near Reference Solutions) and UTASTAR (Utilités Additives) holistic preference elicitation approaches accurately reflects the negotiator’s preferences; and how much its potential inaccuracy may affect the symmetric support given to the parties. We compare the differences in the recommendation of Nash bargaining solutions offered to the parties when the bargaining analysis is determined by means of holistic and DR approaches and analyze which of them misrepresent the actual negotiation situation more. The results show that there are no significant differences when the quality of average recommendations are compared, yet the DR-based scoring system recommends the true Nash bargaining solution for more negotiation instances than the holistic one does.
    Źródło:
    Multiple Criteria Decision Making; 2018, 13; 167-190
    2084-1531
    Pojawia się w:
    Multiple Criteria Decision Making
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Application of UTA Method for Support Evaluation Negotiation Offers
    Autorzy:
    Roszkowska, Ewa
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429422.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    UTA method
    holistic judgments
    support negotiation
    preference analysis
    scoring function
    Opis:
    The MCDA technique has been extensively and successfully applied for supporting decision making in negotiation processes. The mostly used techniques SAW, AHP or TOPSIS are based on direct preference information which requires from negotiator a clear and precise definition all the parameters of the preference model (e.g. issue weights, option rates, aspiration and reservation values etc.), so those techniques can be successfully applied in well-structured negotiation problems. But, many real negotiation problems are illstructured, that means that the negotiation space is imprecisely defined, and the negotiator’s preferences the vagueness or imperfect. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the potentials and the applicability the UTA method, one of the techniques based on indirect preference information, in evaluation of negotiation offers, especially in ill-structured negotiation problems. The UTA (Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos, 1978, 1982, 2001) is a multicriteria decision making method which is based on the linear programming model for inferring additive utility functions from a set of representative decision data. The example is also presented to elaborate and demonstrate the holistic judgment and the usefulness UTA approach for evaluation negotiation offers.
    Źródło:
    Optimum. Economic Studies; 2016, 2(80)
    1506-7637
    Pojawia się w:
    Optimum. Economic Studies
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Sociological Game Theory: Agency, Social Structures and Interaction Processes
    Autorzy:
    Burns, Tom R
    Roszkowska, Ewa
    Corte, Ugo
    Machado, Nora
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429649.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    Game Theory
    social theory
    norms
    institution roles
    interaction
    communication
    negotiation
    Opis:
    Game theory can be viewed as an important contribution to multi-agent modeling, with widespread applications in economics and other social sciences. This paper presents two distinct approaches to extending – sociologizing – classical game theory: firstly, a system/institutional approach – social science game theory (SGT), and secondly, Erving Goffman’s interactionist approach (I-game theory). The two approaches are presented and compared; they are also contrasted with the classical theory. The article ends by concluding that due to the social science game theory, sociologists and social scientists are no longer forced into the classical straightjacket with its hyper-rationality, anomic players, and the absence of any social fabric (institutional and cultural formations). Moreover, the new game theory offers a reliable toolbox of social science concepts and methods for describing, analyzing, and explaining highly diverse interaction phenomena. We claim that those two approaches have already proved themselves useful for investigating and modeling a variety of interaction processes including cooperation, conflict, and negotiation.
    Źródło:
    Optimum. Economic Studies; 2017, 5(89)
    1506-7637
    Pojawia się w:
    Optimum. Economic Studies
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Macbeth Approach for Evaluation Offers in Ill–Structure Negotiations Problems
    Autorzy:
    Roszkowska, Ewa
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430033.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    MACBETH
    M-MACBETH
    qualitative judgments
    support negotiation
    preference analysis
    scoring function
    Opis:
    This paper described the main idea of the MACBETH approach and M-MACBETH software to multicriteria negotiation analysis. The MACBETH is based on the additive value model and requires only qualitative judgments about differences of attractiveness to help a decision maker quantify the relative value of options or criteria. The main goal of this procedure is to support interactive learning about evaluation problems and to provide the recommendations to select and rankordering options/criteria in decision making processes. We proposed to use MACBETH methodology as well M-MACBETH software to support ill-structure negotiation problems, i e. evaluation of negotiation offers in an environment with uncertain, subjective and imprecise information and not precisely defined decision makers preferences. An numerical example showing how M-MACBETH software can be implemented in practice, in order to help a negotiator to define numerical values of options/criteria based on verbal statements and next build a scoring system negotiation offers taking into account different types of issues in negotiation problems is presented. More detail we describe the main key points of M-MACBETH software related to structuring the negotiation model, building value scales for evaluation negotiation packages, weighting negotiation issues and selected elements of sensitivity analyzes.
    Źródło:
    Optimum. Economic Studies; 2014, 5(71)
    1506-7637
    Pojawia się w:
    Optimum. Economic Studies
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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