Temat: Game Theory - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Zero-sum games on a product of staircase-function finite spaces
Autorzy:: Romanuke, Vadim
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2052382.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021
Wydawca:: Politechnika Rzeszowska im. Ignacego Łukasiewicza. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:: game theory
payoff functional
staircase-function strategy
matrix game
teoria gier
funkcja schodkowa
gra macierzowa
Opis:: A tractable method of solving zero-sum games defined on a product of staircase-function finite spaces is presented. The method is based on stacking solutions of “smaller” matrix games, each defined on an interval where the pure strategy value is constant. The stack is always possible, even when only time is discrete, so the set of pure strategy possible values can be continuous. Any combination of the solutions of the “smaller” matrix games is a solution of the initial zero-sum game.
Źródło:: Journal of Mathematics and Applications; 2021, 44; 75-91
1733-6775
2300-9926
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Mathematics and Applications
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Finite Approximation of Continuous Noncooperative Two-person Games on a Product of Linear Strategy Functional Spaces
Autorzy:: Romanuke, Vadim
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1818647.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020
Wydawca:: Politechnika Rzeszowska im. Ignacego Łukasiewicza. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:: game theory
payoff functional
linear strategy
continuousgame
finite approximation
Einstellung effect
teoria gier
strategia liniowa
efekt Einstellung
Opis:: A method of the finite approximation of continuous non-cooperative two-person games is presented. The method is based on sampling the functional spaces, which serve as the sets of pure strategies of the players. The pure strategy is a linear function of time, in which the trend-defining coefficient is variable. The spaces of the players’ pure strategies are sampled uniformly so that the resulting finite game is a bimatrix gamewhose payoff matrices are square. The approximation procedure starts with not a great number of intervals. Then this number is gradually increased, and new, bigger, bimatrix games are solved until an acceptable solution of the bimatrix game becomes sufficiently close to the same-type solutions at the preceding iterations. The closeness is expressed as theabsolute difference between the trend-defining coefficients of the strategies from the neighboring solutions. These distances should be decreasing once they are smoothed with respective polynomials of degree 2.
Źródło:: Journal of Mathematics and Applications; 2020, 43; 123--138
1733-6775
2300-9926
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Mathematics and Applications
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: A minimax approach to mapping partial interval uncertainties into point estimates
Autorzy:: Romanuke, Vadim
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/357702.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2019
Wydawca:: Politechnika Rzeszowska im. Ignacego Łukasiewicza. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:: game theory
interval uncertainties
decision-making
pure strategy
point estimates
teoria grup
niepewności przedziałowe
podejmowanie decyzji
strategia czysta
oszacowania punktowe
Opis:: A problem of simultaneously reducing a group of interval uncertainties is considered. The intervals are positively normalized. There is a constraint, by which the sum of any point estimates taken from those intervals is equal to 1. Hence, the last interval is suspended. For mapping the interval uncertainties into point estimates, a minimax decision-making method is suggested. The last interval’s point estimate is then tacitly found. Minimax is applied to a maximal disbalance between a real unknown amount and a guessed amount. These amounts are interpreted as aftermaths of the point estimation. According to this model, the decision-maker is granted a pure strategy, whose components are the most appropriate point estimates. Such strategy is always single. Its components are always less than the right endpoints. The best mapping case is when we obtain a totally regular strategy whose components are greater than the left endpoints. The irregular strategy’s components admitting many left endpoints are computed by special formulae. The worst strategy exists, whose single component is greater than the corresponding left endpoint. Apart from the point estimation, irregularities in the decision-maker’s optimal strategy may serve as an evidence of the intervals’ incorrectness. The irregularity of higher ranks is a criterion for correcting the intervals.
Źródło:: Journal of Mathematics and Applications; 2019, 42; 147-185
1733-6775
2300-9926
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Mathematics and Applications
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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