- Tytuł:
- Fenomenologia jako filozofia mniejsza. Rozważania wokół sporów o metodę Husserla
- Autorzy:
-
Płotka, Witold
Gniazdowski, Andrzej
Krokos, Jan - Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/books/2116621.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2019
- Wydawca:
- Wydawnictwo Liberi Libri
- Opis:
- Phenomenology as a Minor Philosophy. Considering the Controversies over Husserl’s Method Phenomenology is first and foremost a method, i.e., an analytical device which serves to investigate into what and how is given. One can expect that as any reliable method it contains a set of clear rules how to implement the method to achieve the same result every time — despite particular time, place, and personal preferences of a philosopher. However, this is not the case. Of course, Edmund Husserl did present many examples of how to use his method, e.g., in the context of intentional consciousness, the world, and a community of subjects. He also devoted hundreds of pages of his works, research manuscripts and lecture notes to the problem of how to understand different steps of his method. Nonetheless, this impressive intellectual work seems to be pointless since, paradoxically, he was not clear enough in his descriptions. The main problem lies in the fact that Husserl did reinterpret his method many times to redefine and to establish new understanding of phenomenology itself. In result of these perennial changes and corrections, if one considers his discourse of the method as a whole, it seems to present a series of different, sometimes contradict formulations. Given this plura- lity of formulations and reformulations, it is not surprising that Husserl’s method became a cornerstone of many disputes on how to understand the method. In any case, our understanding of phenomenology as a method is rather a subject of interpretation, than a clear presentation. The book is an attempt to consider phenomenology as a method in the context of selected disputes of its understanding. Questions that I offer to ask are: how to understand a phenomenological method? What motivates a philosopher to use the method? How to understand concrete steps of this method? How, if at all, one can define its limits? What is its subject matter, and its purpose? Is it justified to speak of one, or rather many methods of phenomenology? If many, are different forms united? To put it bluntly, what is the essence of the method? All these questions define a framework for reflections presented in the book. Therefore, one can understand this work as a study rather in “phenomenology of phenomenology”, i.e., a subdiscipline of phenomenology which concerns the question of a method, its subject matter, structure, aims, and presuppositions, than as a systematic analysis of a given phenomenon. It can be also classified as a study in meta-pheno- menology. In any case, its main purpose is a presentation and a discussion of different understandings of Husserl’s method, also with regard to his students and commentators. I do not want to reconstruct in detail different so-called ways which lead to phenomenology. This problem was considered by other scholars. An ultimate aim of the book is a presentation of Husserl’s method as a specific philosophical way of thinking and analysis. I try to show that this method serves to describe systematically of what is given. My main thesis is that this critical though rigorous aspect of Husserl’s method expresses its understanding as a minor philosophy. An elucidation of phenomenology as a “minor philosophy” comes from Nicolas de Warren. For this reason, in the Chapter 1 I refer to his work to present a sketch of how to understand a minor philosophy, namely as a cri- tical method of thinking which is an attempt to think beyond narrow limits of natural thinking by defining new region of analysis, and by suspending any claims which unify a philosophical discourse. Then, I try to compare this understanding of a “minor philosophy” with a “major philosophy”. The latter I bind with the Cartesian motif of phenomenology. In my opinion, the Cartesian reading of Husserl has limited range of application since it reduces philosophy to a kind of foundationalism which aims to justify our knowledge adequately. This reading, however, reduces phenomenology to dogmatic thinking. In contrast, phenomenology as a minor philosophy is an attempt to overcome preliminary naivety. I consider the problem of relation of Husserl’s method to naivety also in the Chapter 2 where I refer to the controversy over the beginning of the method. In addition, I rise the question of motivations of reduction. I show here that reduction is completely unmotivated. But if within natural attitude one cannot find any motives to do reduction, one should understand reduction rather as an expression of philosopher’s free will. Here a philosopher wants to take responsibility for his philosophical thinking. By referring to the analogy between reduction and questioning, I aim at a description of reduction as a methodological step that has to be repeated again and again. In the Chapter 3 I consider the dispute on a unity of the method. It is clear that Husserl refers to two analytical approaches: static and genetic analysis. Inasmuch as the former serves as a tool to describe consciousness’s achievements, the latter can give explanations of the habitual backgro- und of the achievement. Both analytical attitudes are linked, and for this reason one can claim that Husserl understands experience as a complex process of sense-giving, the process which is essentially connected with a given situation that is constituted historically and in the intersubjective context. In the next chapter, given a description of subjectivity embedded in the world, I consider a controversy over the subject matter of Husserl’s method. If the world indeed co-constitutes subjective experience, how, if at all, the world can be a subject of a philosophical reflection? With this regard, I claim that reduction is justified only if it is global, so if it concerns the world as a whole. While considering the issue, I refer to Jan Patočka’s philosophy, and I try to show a liberating function of reduction. After all, reduction enables a phenomenologist to question the world by a problema- tization of the natural attitude. From this point of view, an ultimate subject matter of phenomenology understood as a minor philosophy is givennes of the world itself. In the Chapter 5 I ask the question of consequences of Husserl’s method. Here I refer to the realism-idealism controversy. I focus mainly on the dispute between Roman Ingarden and Husserl. I defend a thesis that phenomenology as a minor philosophy adopts an attitude of the ontological neutrality. To show this, I reinterpret a thought experiment of the annihilation of the world as presented in Ideas I. The main topics of the chapter I attempt to deepen in the next chapter by considering the question of the limits of Husserl’s method. Here I consider the question of a possibility of phenomenology of God, and the question of Husserl’s understanding of metaphysics. I try to show here that there is no necessary link between phenomenology and me- taphysics. If this is the case, there is neither a necessary link between a “mi- nor” and a “major philosophy”. In the Chapter 7 I try to describe a practice of the phenomenological movement which adopts postulates of the minor philosophy. In my opinion, such an application has practical meaning since Husserl’s method requires to take a responsibility for thinking.
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
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