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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Idea of the Good in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633559.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    Aristotle’s criticism of Plato
    Plato’s Idea of the Good
    praxis
    prakton agathon
    phronēsis
    Opis:
    In Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, Aristotle directs his criticism not only against the Platonic Idea of the Good but also against the notion of a universal Good. In this paper, I also examine some of the most interesting aspects of his criticism of the Platonic Good and the universal Good in Eudemian Ethics 1.8. In the EN, after using a series of disputable ontological arguments, Aristotle’s criticism culminates in a strong ethical or rather practical and, simultaneously, epistemological argument, from which a dialectical postulatum emerges. This argument aims to show that we have to discover the dialectical stages or grades which constitute the relation between the ultimate End, i.e., the Good simpliciter or the absolute Good, and the relational goods till the last prakton good in which each specific praxis ends. According to the present reading, Aristotle sets out to establish a kind of Dialectic of the ends (Dialektikē tōn telōn) or Dialectic of the goods (Dialektikē tōn agathōn), which puts emphasis on the descent to the specific good, which is appropriate to and cognate with each individual, be that a person, praxis, science or craft. It is also suggested that this might be relevant to Aristotle’s tendency to establish a separation of phronēsis, i.e., practical wisdom, from sophia, i.e., wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 309-342
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dialectic, Drama and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Charmides
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507272.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-03-30
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    dialectic
    drama
    self-knowledge
    Plato
    Charmides
    Socrates
    Opis:
    Charmides is a dialogue highly indicative of the importance that the prologues to Plato’s works have for our understanding of the whole spirit and philosophical content of each dialogue as a whole. It is representative of the Platonic tendency to always combine philosophical content with dramatic form through narrative and drama, in order to enhance the reader’s and audience’s insight into the inquiries of his philosophical work. Following this line of presentation, the prologue of Charmides prefigures the understanding of the central themes of the dialogue; focusing on the depiction of Socrates as a therapist and of Dialectic as a therapy or a kind of remedy, which through the process of dialectical engagement and interaction reestablishes the relation of each interlocutor to his own self. The Apollonian ideal of self-knowledge (know thyself) is construed as a “greeting” of the god to worshipers who enter the temple, not as a moral counsel or as a piece of advice. This distinction implies the difference between a knowledge conveyed from without and a knowledge discovered by insightful inner search of one’s self. Within the passages 165c to 175a, sōphrosunē is presented and examined as “the knowledge of what one knows and what one does not know.” It has been claimed that in this part of the dialogue, the Socratic model of self-knowledge is subjected by Plato to the Socratic elenchus, where he attempts to make a criticism of it. I believe that this section of the dialogue is an extended excursus, aimed towards introducing and examining a model of self-knowledge different from that of Socrates, Critias’ model of self-knowledge. This model of self-knowledge poses a whole series of philosophical problems; the relation between the subject and the object of knowledge, the possibility of their identification or the distinction between them, the possibility of the existence of an internal and external object of knowledge, the relation of this model of self-knowledge with other kinds or domains of knowledge, and the question whether external knowledge or knowledge of other knowledges is a constituent of knowledge of knowledge. The question of the possibility of knowledge of knowledge is not definitely rejected, especially if we consider that in all of this discussion there is a hint towards the way in which philosophy works and relates to other kinds of knowledge. I believe, however, that in the last part of the dialogue, where the knowledge of good and bad emerges, Plato again meets Socrates and becomes reconciled with him. The only knowledge that is useful and beneficial is knowledge of good and bad. In this way Plato chooses to put forward a self-conscious model of self-knowledge, which does not presuppose, as Critias’ model does, the critical examination of knowledge or the critical distance from knowledge. This self-conscious model of self-knowledge is connected with the knowledge of good and bad. On the one hand doing of good presupposes knowledge of good and bad and on the other, “doing one’s own things” presupposes self-knowledge. The possibility of knowing good and bad is ensured by each person, either through looking deep within himself or by orientating towards the Idea of the Good itself.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2016, 5, 1; 179-194
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Olympiodorus and Damascius on the Philosopher’s Practice of Dying in Plato’s Phaedo
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633492.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Plato
    Phaedo
    Neoplatonism
    death
    soul
    purification
    separation
    Opis:
    This paper presents Olympiodorus’ and Damascius’ explanations of the philosopher’s practice of dying in Plato’s Phaedo. It also includes a presentation of Ammonius’ exegesis of the practice of death (meletē thanatou). The Neoplatonic commentators discern two kinds of death, the bodily or physical death and the voluntary death. Olympiodorus suggests that bodily death is only an image of voluntary death and cannot be recognized as an original death, because original death presupposes the preparation for death and the constant effort for the purification of the soul during the philosopher’s life-time. Only preparation for death and purification can ensure the complete separation of the soul from the body. Relative to this distinction is that between apothnēskein and tethnanai; these infinitives denote the dual meaning of death: death as an event or a process and death as a state. Our study examines thoroughly the subtle distinctions made by Olympiodorus and Damascius and offers a comparative analysis of the two definitions of death as well as that of purification. It reaches the conclusion that apothnēskein is a necessary condition of tethnanai, i.e. of a definitive release and parting of the soul from the body. On the other hand, the process of eventual purification, a notion which betrays the religious character of purification, can be identified with apothnēskein, which is the practice of dying by the true philosopher. Finally, our study also emphasizes and explains the difference between the voluntary philosophical death and the voluntary unphilosophical suicide; the latter guaranteeing only bodily or physical death.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2014, 5, 1; 177-198
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Syrianus on the Platonic Tradition of the Separate Existence of Numbers
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633625.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Syrianus
    Neoplatonism
    Plato
    Aristotle
    eidetic number
    mathematical number
    monadic number
    Opis:
    This paper analyzes and explains certain parts of Syrianus’s Commentary on book M of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which details Syrianus’s response to Aristotle’s attack against the Platonic position of the separate existence of numbers. Syrianus defends the separate existence not only of eidetic but also of mathematical numbers, following a line of argumentation which involves a hylomorphic approach to the latter. He proceeds with an analysis of the mathematical number into matter and form, but his interpretation entails that form is the constituent of number, which has the status and role of a Platonic Form. This solution allows him not only to explain and justify the unity of number, but also to apply the Platonic thesis of the separate existence of numbers, to the mathematical or monadic numbers themselves. It also betrays its tendency to combine theses of the Platonic Ontology with fundamental Aristotelian doctrines. 
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2015, 6, 1; 167-194
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Forms as Causes in De Generatione et Corruptione II 9. A Reading Based on Philoponus’ Exegesis
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633462.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    Plato
    De Generatione et Corruptione
    Phaedo
    criticism
    Forms
    causes
    efficient cause
    Opis:
    In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation and corruption into two groups: i) those which offered an explanation by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philoponus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aristotle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the secondary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s thinking, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristotelian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 123-148
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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