- Tytuł:
- Między światem dostępnym zmysłom a transcendencją. Kanta krytyka rozumu jako próba nowego ufundowania metafizyki
- Autorzy:
-
Banaszkiewicz, Artur
Miodoński, Leon - Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/books/22444286.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2013
- Wydawca:
- Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
- Opis:
- The aim of the following work is to present the critique of reason as a tool for defending metaphysics but above all for founding it on new, formally-subjective grounds. Despite how much has been said about the problem of metaphysics in Kantian philosophy, about his critique of the „traditional” metaphysics and about his idea of a „new” metaphysics, we are still left with a lot of questions. What conception of metaphysics did Kant inherit? What was his understanding of the metaphysics? What was the metaphysics he was lecturing on? Is his critique indeed limited to a historically determined conception of this science? What are the results of this critique of reason for the metaphysics? Was the metaphysics to be banished, or merely reformed or reestablished? These are but a few of the most important questions I am trying to answer in this work. I argue that neither was Kant an eradicator of metaphysics nor that he ever claimed that metaphysics could be substantiated whether by validating contemporary physics or the image of the world built upon it, or only by presenting the theory of constitution of the world of possible experience. The most important issue for Kant is not the validation of natural sciences, but the ultimate solution to the problem of metaphysics. In my opinion one of the most significant results of the Critique of Pure Reason is the thesis that the metaphysics as a speculative and objective science is impossible. It does not mean, however, that it is entirely impossible. Even in Kant’s private notes and glosses there is a certain tension that defines – perhaps in the best possible way – the distinctive character of his philosophy. On the one hand Kant is aware that in the field of theoretical cognition and objective knowledge it is impossible to transcend the boundaries of experience; on the other hand he is also aware of the actual necessity of transcending them, or at least that such attempts are inevitable, since they emerge from the nature of reason itself. I argue that this is the source of an ambiguity that characterises the very outcome of the Critique of Pure Reason. I also claim that this is why the theoretical-speculative transition to the supersensible, typically held by „dogmatic” metaphysics, was insufficient for Kant and that the new transition was to be sought for. There are standard and commonly accepted interpretations of the Kantian critique of metaphysics, which either emphasise the negative results of this critique or even reduce it to these results. Contrary to the above interpretations I think that the Kantian critique has also its positive outcome, which is much more important than the negative one since it captures the very essence of the endeavour known as the critique of reason. From this belief comes the main thesis of this work that the critique of reason is not the destruction of metaphysics but rather it is its defence, which is based on the formally-subjective foundation of metaphysics. In my work I discuss the actual mechanism of this defence. In general I believe that in Kant’s case we are dealing with providing a new foundation of metaphysics rather than founding of a new metaphysics (hence the subtitle of this book) because even for Kant metaphysics was primarily scientia transcendens. Granted, former metaphysica specialis and ontology both change their status and character in the process of searching for these new foundations, but also a substantial novelty appears called metaphysics of morality. The Kantian emendation or the reform of metaphysics can be summarized in the following manner. The ontology remains the theory of formal, apriori-subjective mechanisms of the constitution of the world of possible experience and at the same time it is the ground for natural sciences (Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic), whereas the proper metaphysics, based solely on the subjective grounds, can be either metaphysics of nature or of morality. The traditional – theoretical-dogmatic – transition from the sensible and conditioned to the intelligible and unconditioned is replaced with the practical-dogmatic transition and the rational faith. The major concerns of this work are the Kantian conception of the metaphysics, the outcome of the critique of metaphysics and the idea of a new metaphysics following the critique of reason. In the analyses and reconstructions below I always attempt to grasp in the most accurate manner the inner logic of the Kantian critique of metaphysics, the actual intentions of this critique and its outcome. I introduce Kant’s conception of metaphysics and I answer why the metaphysics was a problem for him (Introduction), I discuss how Kant was preparing to solve that problem and what kind of metaphysics he was teaching his students (Part I) and I also analyse the very core of his critique (Part II). Finally I argue that the critique itself is not the final word in this philosophy and that there are certain interpretative perspectives allowing one to grasp its positive outcome, which is often either ignored or even disregarded (Conclusion). In order to achieve the above goals I analyse the issue of Kantian metaphysics exclusively on the grounds of his own philosophy, with no interpretative patterns or presuppositions, so that the possible clarity of this issue would not be distorted by some foreign views. I do not oppose the variety of interpretations of the problem of Kantian metaphysics, nor do I take the side of any of them and this is why I hardly ever discuss them in my work. The most important question for me is the very problem of metaphysics: its introduction, solution and the conditions of both. Above all, however, I am interested in the conditions immanent to Kantian philosophy and not the transcendent ones, which can be found in other philosophical systems and whose influence on Kantian thought might perhaps be proven. In this work I explain the actual meaning of the Kantian critique of metaphysics. I argue that the critique alone is not the aim in itself of this philosophy since there is also its positive part, the one that the critique makes possible (the idea of the metaphysics of nature, metaphysics of morality, ontology understood as the theory of the constitution of the world of experience, the conception of rational faith and the practical-dogmatic transition). My aim here is not to provide a comparison between a variety of different historical approaches to Kantian philosophy. I believe that relating certain conceptions to one another in order to discover supposed influences among them has a rather poor explanatory power, which is what makes it an inadequate tool for understanding the inner logic of given philosophy. I do not make a review of all of the opinions that have emerged in the over two hundred year long history of Kantian scholarship. My intention is to present my own standpoint which is the result of my own independent studies of Kant’s works. I precisely define the problem and a certain framework within Kantian philosophy where its solution can be looked for, I specify Kant’s perspective and finally I explain Kant’s view in the most approachable manner along with pointing out its possible consequences. This is why my research concentrates on the source texts (works of Kant), which determines its rather immanent character. I focus here on the problem of Kantian metaphysics, not on the history of reception and interpretation of its solution, therefore the references to the so called secondary texts are rather scarce and they only appear where I find them entirely indispensible. I am not even trying to hide that my perspective is not external. I do not wish to analyse critical philosophy as if it was a specimen from a museum of history of intellectual peculiarities. Instead, I try to enter its inner dynamics and logic, to understand it on its own ground free from relations to other philosophies or exegetic patterns, to look for the actual sense and meaning of the Kantian teaching itself. This is an analysis and interpretation of Kant’s works, not works about Kant’s works. It stems from a fertile – though perhaps a little naive – belief that Kant’s works are meaningful on their own and that their sense can successfully be exposed and explained.
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
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