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Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
Tytuł:
Godność człowieka a prawa człowieka
Human Dignity and Human Rights
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1873047.pdf
Data publikacji:
1980
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The author narrows down his subject to consider whether the idea of human dignity as found in the documents of the United Nations Organization is inspired by the Christian doctrine. The article also sets out to clarify the relation between natural law and human rights. Human rights are all those rights that follow directly from human dignity; they are for that reason universal, inviolable and inalienable; they are adequate to human dignity and they protect it. Dignity is indicated to be the source of human rights by the entire philosophical tradition regarding natural law as developed within the doctrine of the Church, and also by the documents of the United Nations Organization, in particular the Pacts of Human Rights. Human rights can appear in the form of non-positivized natural law or in the form of positive law, laid down in state or international documents. The author shows the terms „human nature” and „human dignity” to be synonymous. Pacem in terris employs them interchangeably, and the United Nations documents use the term „human dignity”. Much attention is devoted to human dignity in the Scripture, ancient philosophy, patristics, the philosophy of the Middle Ages (Thomas Aquinas), the Renaissance (Picco della Mirandola), the Enlightenment (I. Kant), and in modern thought (J. Messner). Human dignity is considered from theological and philosophical viewpoints. From the point of view of theology it is defined in terms of man’s creation in the image of God and of his adoption as a son of God by grace. From the philosophical, viewpoint, it is defined in terms of reason, conscience and freedom. Dignity is a value that is innate, permanent, inalienable, universal and dynamic, proper only to man. Since human rights follow directly from human dignity, they share its attributes. The contemporary ideas of human dignity and human rights are inspired by the Christian doctrine, as has also been pointed \it by non-Christian thinkers, e.g. E. Bloch and L. Kolakowski. In the author’s opinion, the connection between the idea of human dignity as found in the United Nations documents and the Christian doctrine is manifested by the fact that both make use of the same elements to define human dignity within the natural order. Man, man’s dignity, is the central value for Christianity. Pope John Paul II writes in Redemptor hominis: „In reality, the name for that deep amazement at man’s worth and dignity is the Gospel, that is to say: the Good News’\ That deep amazement, he says, „is also called Christianity”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1980, 8; 19-48
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Godność osoby ludzkiej jako wartość absolutna
Dignity of the Human Person as an Absolute Value
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1861513.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The author analyzes the relations between various values and he establishes their ultimate criterion and hierarchy. He is of opinion that an incorrectly established criterion of values and an incorrectly constructed and accepted hierarchy of them leads to what Carl Schmitt called − in reference to Nikolai Hartman − the tyranny of value (die Tyrannai der Werte). The author critically appraises the views of those who maintain that there is a conflict, a dilemma or tension between freedom and equality (justice). He shows that the dilemma is not immanent in the mentioned values but in the incorrect conception of freedom as presented by the liberals on the one hand, and in the erroneous (objective) conception of equality as explicated by the Marxists. In fact the dilemma occurs between those philosophical-social trends. Secondly, the dilemma always appears where these values are confronted with each other in the wrong way and separated from other values − especially from the truth about dignity of the human person. And thirdly, in all the views in which it is admitted that there is a conflict between freedom and equality there is a „methodological” error. It consists in the fact that the conflict of interests of individuals or social groups is reduced to tensions between humanistic values − freedom and equality. Egoistic interests are sought to be hidden behind the screen of the values. Freedom without equality (justice) and the truth about dignity of the human person becomes freedom of élites whereas it is a tyrannizing value for most other classes. The situation is analogous in the case of equality without freedom and the truth dignity of the person. The author shows that dignity of the person is the central, absolute value, as the person is related to the Absolute; it is created in God's image and is redeemed by Christ (supernatural dignity). The author also writes about natural dignity to which the mind, conscience and freedom point. All other values, even objective and universal ones − moral norms and human rights − have an adpersonal (relative) character. Accepting freedom or equality as an absolute value without the truth about dignity of the human person lies at the foundations of all forms of totalitarian systems. According to the author dignity of the human person creates an obligation. He formulates the rule: persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam. He shows that dignity of the human person integrates nations as well as the international system of human rights. In the introduction to the United Nations Chart belief in dignity and value of the human person is expressed. In the introductions to both Human Rights Pacts (1966) it is recognized that human rights follow from the inborn dignity of the human person. The notion of dignity of the human person is also found in the constitutions of many countries, e.g. of West Germany (1949). In West German commentaries it is said that dignity of the human person (Art. 1 p. 1) is the highest value (der oberste Wert), it is the norm of norms (Norm der Normen). Dignity of the human person should be − as it not always is − the criterion of all programs and social economic and political systems.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1993, 21, 1; 261-271
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Godność osoby ludzkiej i obiektywne normy moralne jako reguły w działalności gospodarczej
Dignity of the human person and objective moral norms as rules in economy
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1852622.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
osoba ludzka
godność
normy moralne
prawa człowieka
wartości uniwersalne
wartość pracy ludzkiej
bezrobocie
human person
dignity
moral norms
human rights
universal values
value of human work
unemployment
Opis:
The author subjects to revision the economic liberalism supporters’ views, according to which there is no room for universal moral norms in the area of economy. The conception of homo economicus accepted in economy and the exclusive rule of profit are a manifestation of reductionism. The conviction that the free competition – free market – acts mechanically and impersonally and solves all economic-social problems in the best way is basically incorrect. In free competition there are positive and negative elements. Free competition – “yes, but what kind?” In the article a possibly complete picture of man is shown. Man is a reasonable creature, he is internally free and able to recognize good and evil (owing to his conscience) and owing to this he is the most perfect being in the created world. In his nature, man is a social being (ens sociale); a spiritual-bodily unity; he is not completely actualized but he is open to development; he is a religious and working creature (laborem exercens, homo economicus); he is able to do good, devote oneself to others, to build just – albeit not ideal –systems: legal, cultural, social and economic. But man is also able to do evil: to kill others, to steal, to lie, to wage wars, to commit acts of terrorism and of genocide, to build concentration camps, to manipulate the needs and mentality of whole societies and to enslave others by means of mass media – that is to form a one-dimension man. In the theological-biblical language this is called sinfulness of the human nature. And finally, man is capable of – as H. Marcuse writes – “scientific idiotism”. The highest value is the inborn, n a t u r a l, dignity of the human person, which is pointed to by his mind, inner freedom and conscience. Man is created in God’s image (imago Dei). Christ’s incarnation and redemption of man show his s u p e r n a t u r a l dignity. This is theological-biblical justification. Also philosophical (rational) justification is given. The former one is binding for believers, and the latter is for unbelievers. In the Catholic social teaching both justifications are given. The ontic structure of the human person in itself gives rise to obligations, it is the highest norm. It is defined in the following form: the human person should be respected for himself, because he is a person, and not for any other reason (persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam). The very human person, his dignity, is the fundamental norm of morality that is searched for. The Decalogue, objective and universal moral norms as principles show how to respect and protect the human person. It is not recognizing and complying with moral norms and human rights for themselves that is meant here – art for the art’s sake (pure formalism) – but protection of one’s own dignity and the dignity of every other person. Both moral norms as principles and human rights have been discovered slowly, step by step, but regressions also occur; this especially happened in the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century. Human persons are the subjects of all communities – the family, the nation, the universal human society (familiae humanae), production and service institutions. The communities do not exist by themselves, but human persons are their foundation. Human persons, and not various systems, are the subject of any activity, for the systems are not persons or super-persons – Super Ego. Hence the thesis put forward by some economists that the system is ruled by an invisible hand is absurd. In human rights three elements are distinguished: their source, contents and protection. These constitute an integral whole. However, identifying a part with the whole (pars pro toto) is a logical mistake. The debate about man’s right to work can be solved after removing this logical mistake and introducing a new term: “the right for work”; showing that work is one of man’s fundamental needs, that it is a universal phenomenon, has a multi-aspectual dimension of values. Work is an anthropological (personal), moral, social, cultural, historical and economic value. Together with the multidimensional value of work the multidimensional evil of unemployment can be seen. There have been various economic models, even in capitalism. After the fall of socialism the thesis is proclaimed that capitalism is the only alternative (logical quantifier). Recognizing the priority of the real capital over work treated as a tool and commodity bought in the so-called work market is the essential feature of capitalism. John Paul II perceives numerous positive elements in capitalism, but he also sees a few negative ones: “We have found out that the thesis saying that after the defeat of real socialism capitalism remains the only model (logical quantifier) of economic organization is unacceptable.” He does not suggest another model, but generally he states that it is “… a society in which there are: freedom of work, enterprise and participation” that is meant here. He adds: “Economy that does not take into consideration the ethical dimension and does not attempt to serve the good of man – each man and the whole man – in fact does not even deserve the name of «economy» understood as reasonable and benevolent management of material resources”. Although he sees positive elements in the process of globalization, he puts forward an imperative demand to base it on the principle of the dignity of the human person and his rights, and the good of the whole human family (familiae humanae). In the area of economy “ … in the field of economy nobody may insult the human dignity without a punishment, which dignity God himself respects greatly” (Leo XIII).
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2006, 34, 1; 19-53
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pojęcie godności człowieka. Historia i miejsce w projektach konstytucji III Rzeczypospolitej
The Concept of Mans Dignity. History and Place in the Drafts of the Constitution of III Republic
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1872273.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-10-25
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The paper seeks to show the ethical standpoint to account for the Constitution's regulations. These problems have been discussed from the viewpoint of the philosophy of natural law in the approach of Christian personalism. From this point of view the author has put forward a critical analysis of the drafts' texts in the Polish Constitution submitted to the Constitutional Commission.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych; 1996, 6; 5-41
1507-7896
2544-5227
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Godność osoby ludzkiej czy prawo naturalne podstawą praw osoby ludzkiej w ujęciu Jacquesa Maritaina
The Dignity of the Human Person or Natural Law as the Basis of the Rights of the Human Person According to Jacques Maritain
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1860754.pdf
Data publikacji:
1997
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
It is true that Maritain writes that natural law (la loi naturelle) is the foundation of human rights, yet he proves that rights are natural rights in the strict sense of the term, whereas others are necessarily bound with it, and yet others are bound only in a contingent manner. The French philosopher considered natural law at two levels: ontological and cognitive. The human being possesses, likewise all other living creatures, a unique structure and goals, a normal way of its functioning (normalité de son foncionnement) - law. The goals are as follows: maintenance of existence and development. For man this law bears a moral character, for man is person, i.e. a rational, free being that has conscience, and he is the master of his own acts. Maritain calls this right a non-written law (la loi non écrite). Now in the ontic fabric of man reside goods which are his due: existence (life) and freedom. Apart from these goods he is entitled to the rights: to life and freedom. In this ontic fabric resides a natural inclination to maintain life, to give life, and to develop. One may maintain one’s existence and reach integral development by acquiring other goods and fulfilling good deeds (working). He, too, has the duty to do good, without which he will fail to maintain his existence and will not reach his goal. Following St Thomas, Maritain lays down the first principle of natural law: do good and avoid evil acts. In this principle reside the most fundamental rights and duties of the human person. It is characteristic of its interpretation that it puts rights before duties. Either of them has a personal and social aspect. The foundation of natural law is the dignity of the human person. Dignity is a metaphysical absolute value, residing in the ontic fabric of person. The core of dignity is in the soul of man, who was created in the likeness of God (imago Dei). Maritain writes: „The dignity of the human person is a word which denotes nothing, if it does not mean that the person of his or her own natury possesses [...] rights”. To know natural law - its gnoseological aspect - is a different problem. It is known spontaneously, in a nonreflective manner, and progressively as regards the degree of civilizational development of mankind, which is pinpointed by ethnology and history of societies. It was exposed to the hazard of errors just as in all other affairs, due to the fact that human reason is imperfect. However, the sound line of moral experience of the binding power of natural law was still developed and will further be developed. Following St Thomas, Maritain lists natural law, the law of nations (ius gentium), the positive revealed Divine law and (established) human law. He incorporates natural law known by way of reflection, and not spontaneously by inclination, within ius gentium and calls it the common law of civilisation (la loi commune de la civilisation). Now ius gentium is linked with natural law in a necessary manner, whereas human law is linked with it only conditionally and contingently. The author of paper proposes to call human law the law of culture. Following the above division, Maritain gives three groups of human rights: rights which belong to natural law, to ius gentium and to positive law. The rights of the human person which belong to natural law and ius gentium are inalienable, unforfeitable - absolute, yet in the aspect of their being granted to human beings. In the aspect, however, of their application they do not have the character of absolute rights, for the human person is a little god. Maritain has also given a different division of human rights: the rights of the human person as such (droits de la personne humaine comme telle), the rights of the civil person (droits de la personne civique), and the rights of the social person, in particular the working person (droits de la personne sociale, et plus particulièrement de la personne ouwrière). Speaking about the rights of the social person, he lists the rights of the people fulfilling some social, economic and cultural functions: producers, consumers, technicians, creators of culture and science. There is still a debate about the right to work, and some Catholic authors negate it, yet Maritain recognizes this right as a basic right and ranks it first among the rights of the person-labourer. He predicted that along with the progress of economic organization a new right to the title of labour (au titre de travail) would be read out, a right which he also called the title of labour (le titre de travail). Not only does the title of possessing property entitle one to manage enterprise, but also to have the title of labour. He pointed to the necessity to take up reform of capitalism and to shape a new socio-economic order. This order should be an order of the aristocracy of labour, that is such in which social, economic and political life will be run by people who are best in their job. To put this regime into effect requires a „moral revolution”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1997, 25, 1; 33-61
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wkład Stolicy Apostolskiej w ochronę prawa człowieka do wolności sumienia i wolności religijnej w Konferencjach Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie (KBWE i OBWE)
The Holy See’s Contribution to the Protection of the Right to Freedom of Conscience and the Religious Freedom in Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE and OSCE)
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1835193.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-05-12
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
prawa człowieka
wolność sumienia
wolność religijna
Stolica Apostolska
godność osoby ludzkiej
human rights
freedom of conscience
religious freedom
Holy See
dignity of the human person
Opis:
The article is the first part of a discussion of the issue of the part taken by the Holy See in the Conferences of Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the analyses the origin and the motives for participation of the Holy See in the international discussion on protecting human rights for the freedom of conscience and the religious freedom are presented. In the area of documents concerning human rights a special attention is paid to the significance of John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem in terris. Also, the Holy See’s postulates and suggestions that deal with the question of the value and dignity of the human person are discussed. The final analyses include the issue of the personal dimension of the right to the freedom of conscience and the religious freedom.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2008, 36, 1; 45-72
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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