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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    Realism: Philosophical and Scientific
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1038081.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    realism
    anti-realism
    philosophical realism
    science
    scientific realism
    metaphysics
    Opis:
    What kind of realism - if any - are we allowed to endorse? It is often stated that, in order to provide realism with a solid foundation, we need having recourse to a reality that is totally independent of thought (and let alone of language). This is taken to be the key thesis of realism. But many philosophers reply that, even when we imagine a world totally devoid of human presence, we must use human concepts. From this point of view, conceptualization does not seem to be an optional we can get rid of, but rather a built-in component of the nature of human beings.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2020, 21; 53-58
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A Limited View of Realism
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1035861.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    Realism
    Anti-Realism
    Ontology
    Epistemology
    Conceptual Apparatus
    Nature
    Opis:
    In the paper we argue that no neat border line between ontology and epistemology can be drawn. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is rather fuzzy, and the world is characterized by a sort of ontological opacity which makes the construction of any absolute ontology difficult. Our ontology is characterized by the fact that the things of nature are seen by us in terms of a conceptual apparatus that is inevitably influenced by mind-involving elements, and all this has important consequences on both the question of scientific realism and the realism/anti-realism debate. Conceptualization gives us access to the world, while, on the other, it is the most important feature of our cultural evolution. While the idealistic thesis according to which the mind produces natural reality looks hardly tenable, it is reasonable to claim instead that we perceive this same reality by having recourse to the filter of a conceptual apparatus whose presence is, in turn, connected to the development of language and social organization. Our science is essentially relational, and not absolute. The information with which it provides us is appropriate, but from our point of view. Science provides reliable information on the world, but this information is always relative to a particular framework, and it is a mistake to think that the limits of our cognitive capacities only have an aprioristic character. Science constantly attempts at providing answers to our questions about how things stand in the world, and thus purports to offer reliable information about it. But it should also be recognized that the extent to which science succeeds in accomplishing this task is disputable. What kind of realism, thus, can we actually endorse? Despite what many relativists claim, realism still is an arguable and defendable position. If one asks what difference is made to our knowledge claims if we accept the existence of an extra-conceptual world, the answer is the following: such recognition undermines the diffused anthropocentric stance which identifies reality with our limited knowledge of it.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2012, 06; 20-34
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Philosophical Doubts about reality
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2232465.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023-07-17
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    metaphilosophy
    epistemology
    metaphysics
    science
    realism
    Opis:
    There are many pragmatisms, and it is a litle misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce's and James' philosophy, while C.I. Lewis' views on logic were quite diefrent from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in contemporary neo-pragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display diefrent opinions on most subjects. I shall draw some comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. As a maetr of fact there are many pragmatisms, so that it is a litle misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce's and James' philosophy, while C.I. Lewis' views on logic were quite diefrent from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in today neopragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display diefrent opinions on most subjects. In the present section we shall draw some sketchy comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. Rescher views the contrast between himself and Rorty as a continuation of the struggle between an objective pragmatism (or “pragmatism of the right”) which includes the triad Peirce-Lewis-Rescher, and a subjective one (or “pragmatism of the left”) 1 which comprises James, the early and middle Dewey, and Rorty. The later Dewey assumes, in this picture, a middle-of-the-road position. While Rorty must certainly be praised for both overcoming the linguistic turn and making pragmatism popular again in American philosophy following several decades of relative forgetfulness, Rescher argues that the Rortyan interpretation of pragmatism is too partial. In particular, by taking Rorty too seriously one is led to believe that pragmatism implies relativism. 1 Marsonet, Michele. “Diefrent pragmatist reactions to analytic philosophy.” New Perspectives on Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy, edited by Rosa M. Calcaterra, Studies in Pragmatism and Values, 2011, 101-107
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2023, 14, 28; 219-223
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pragmatic Objectivity
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036331.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    Objectivity
    Pragmatism
    Realism
    Idealism
    World
    Rationality
    Opis:
    Nicholas Rescher writes that “objectivity is not something we infer from the data; it is something we must presuppose. It is something that we postulate or presume from the very outset of our dealings with people’s claims about the world’s facts”. Such definition is just the opposite of objectivity conceived of in classical terms, but it cannot be equated with an idealistic viewpoint according to which objectivity is something that our mind simply creates in the process of reflection. It is, rather, a sort of cross-product of the encounter between our mind-shaped capacities, and a surrounding reality made up of things that are real in the usual meaning of the term. Science itself gives us some crucial insights in this direction, since it shows that we see, say, tables and trees in a certain way which, however, does not match the image that scientific instruments are able to attain. Does this mean that our commonsense view of the world is totally wrong and that nature deceives us? This is not the case. The difference between the commonsense and the scientific image of the world is explainable by the fact that we are evolutionary creatures. Nature has simply endowed human beings with tools and capacities that enable them to survive in an environment which - at least in remote eras - was largely hostile. Our way of seeing tables and trees is what is requested for carrying on a successful fight for the survival of the species: nothing more - and nothing less - is needed for achieving this fundamental goal. Turning once again to the problem of ontological objectivity, the picture has now gained both strength and clarity. If we recall that human endeavors, although occurring in a largely autonomous social and linguistic world, are nevertheless limited by the constraints that natural reality forces upon us, we begin to understand that the social-linguistic world itself is not a boat freely floating without directions. If the boat is there, it means that an explanation of its presence is likely to be obtained if only we are patient enough to look for it. Some kind of hand must be on the wheel, giving the boat indications on Contrary to other pragmatist-flavored positions popular nowadays, this approach maintains that universality has a fundamental and unavoidable function in our rational endeavors. This is due to the fact that “presupposition” and “hypothetical reasoning” are key ingredients of our very capacity to rationalize the world in which we live. Indeed, there can be no rationality without universality.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2014, 09; 43-54
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pragmatism and Science
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036147.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    Pragmatism
    Science
    Scientific Realism
    Ideal Science
    Final Theory
    Relativism
    Opis:
    Logical empiricism gave rise to a powerful paradigm and it took some decades to overthrow it, even though it should be judged respectfully since, after all, philosophy of science and logic as we know them stemmed from that ground. The basic assumptions on which the paradigm of the “received view” rested are essentially the following. In the first place, verificationism seemed almost a truth of faith. Secondly, logical empiricists never offered good arguments in support of their thesis that assertive discourse must be preferred to more pragmatic forms of language. Thirdly, they too easily assumed that something like “objective truth” really exists. Last but certainly not least, the logical empiricists did not fully recognize the historical dimension of the scientific enterprise, which subsequently turned to be something different from the “universal science” they were talking about. In the paper it is argued that scientific realism (and the nature of scientific knowledge at large) is a theme where the originality of pragmatist positions clearly emerge. Nicholas Rescher, for example, claims - against any form of instrumentalism and many postmodern authors as well - that natural science can indeed validate a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. Scientific conceptions aim at what really exists in the world, but only hit it imperfectly and “well off the mark”. What we can get is, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality itself. This means that the scientific knowledge at our disposal in any particular moment of the history of mankind must be held to be “putative”, while its relations to the truth (i.e. how things really stand in the world) should be conceived in terms of tentative and provisional estimation. Even the optimistic visions that see science as growingly approaching the “real” truth have, at this point, to be rejected on pragmatic grounds.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2013, 08; 101-109
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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