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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Philosophy and Logical Positivism
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1037952.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
logical positivism
metaphysics
vienna circle
analytic philosophy
Opis:
Logical positivists claim that the whole of human knowledge can be reduced to analytic and synthetic sentences, and this means that the only possible knowledge is provided by science. Metaphysics is thus meaningless, because its sentences do not comply with the rules set forth by logical analysis of language. What, then, is the philosopher’s job? The members of the Vienna Circle answer that his task is to clarify the concepts used within empirical and formal sciences, while analytic philosophers stress instead the importance of ordinary language’s analysis. But the outcome is in both cases clear: philosophy is linguistic analysis. Howeber, by reducing the whole of reality to empirical reality, logical positivists do metaphysics. We do not have the “elimination” of metaphysics, but just the proposal of an empiricist brand of metaphysics.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2019, 19; 32-36
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Post-Empiricism and Philosophy of Science
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1037876.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
science
philosophy of science
logical positivism
post-empiricism
pragmatism
methodological anarchism
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to provide some sketchy remarks on the post-empiricist phenomenon in philosophy of science, taking into account the themes of the relationships between language on the one side and reality on the other, and the parallel problem of the alleged elimination of metaphysics. Unlike the logical empiricists, Popper believes that a clear separation between (i) analytic and synthetic sentences, and (ii) between theory and observation, is an impossible task. According to his view, theory and observation are intimately linked to each other, and no pure observation is ever possible. A position very similar to Popper’s was endorsed by the American pragmatists in the last two centuries with Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. There also are important similarities between what Popper says and William James’ theses. It is clear that if we recognize that the theoretical dimension precedes observation, and if we claim furthermore that scientific theories have a creative character, then we may explain the “jumps” that often take place in the history of science. Later on Feyerabend and his followers have turned philosophy of science into something mysterious and not easily classifiable in philosophical or scientific terms. The anything goes undermines the meaning itself of the discipline. If science is equated to any other dimension of spirit - art, religion, or even witchcraft - the specific and cognitive character of scientific rationality is eliminated. It follows that philosophy of science loses any meaningful role within the field of human knowledge, while even philosophy as such becomes more similar to a joke than to a serious endeavor.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2018, 18; 26-33
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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