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Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8
Tytuł:
ON JEST. Metafizyka a język. Parmenides - Wittgenstein - Barańczak
HE IS. Metaphysics and Language. Parmenides - Wittgenstein - Barańczak
Autorzy:
Wiertlewska, Małgorzata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/607442.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
metaphysics
language
reality
experience
sense
Opis:
The aim o f this article is to look from an existential point of view at the metaphysical argument from language to reality. The main questions are as follows: does language reflect the structure of reality? or is it rather a tool that enables us to perform certain actions, like the action of proving a thesis? and can we, by investigating the nature of language arrive at truths about extralinguistic reality? Those issues are taken up with respect to insights gained by Parmenides, Wittengenstein and Barańczak, a contemporary Polish poet and translator. For Parmenides language is not an autonomous domain but is conjugated with external reality, so by discovering the rules that govern the attribution of meaning to linguistic utterances we can reach beyond phenomena towards the nature of the world as such. Contradictory statements are then seen to result from the aspectuality of particular accounts, whereas in being conceived in its entirety there is no self-contradiction but only degrees of properties. Parmenidean metaphysics is of interest to us here in connection with his concept of the relationship between a word and its referent, whereby it is possible to infer the essence of the thing picked out by a word from the established rules of its correct usage. Ludwig Wittgenstein is a philosopher whose impact on thinking about the metaphysical consequences of language is not to be overlooked. His position concerning the very possibility of metaphysical claims splits into two standpoints, expressed in his two basic works: Tractatus logico- philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. Tractatus is Parmenidean in its presupposed isomorphism between the structure of language and the world, as well as in assuming that the substance of the world determines the logical space of all possibilities and that it is eternal and unchangeable. On the other hand, however, we do not have an access to the comprehensive state of things denoted as «the world» in its material mode, and therefore we have no basis for deciding which metaphysical statements are its true formal representations. That is why on the level of logic people can arrive at mutually exclusive metaphysical claims, as shown by Plato in the ending of his Parmenides. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein considers, among others, the role of prototypes in the process o f transmitting/learning the meaning of words whereby the objects of experience can be categorized. He also reflects on language as an act governed by autonomous rules which are accepted by users, a theory which he called language games. What underlies both these issues is the question of an element o f identity between language and extralingustic reality. The answer that this element consists in the logical form of an utterance whereby reality is supposed to be mapped by a sentence becomes problematic in the light o f the discovery o f the ambiguity of an image when it is placed in two different contexts that contain different prototypes of reference for the sign under consideration. In reading a particular notation as a mapping of a specific state of things, one’s knowledge of the rules of notation plays an important role as it enables one to recognize the content that one already knows. The rules that impose interpretation on reality constitute a broadly understood grammar. They are autonomous relative to reality so when we utter a sentence the words obtain their meaning depending on how they are used. This does not translate into a referentially understood meaning, because what turns out to be important is the sense of the word, i.e. the way in which it is used by the speaker. Self-aware poetry seeks sense in links between the word and the world, not just within the domain of language itself. Conscious of grammatical rules, it employs them as a tool in overcoming the autonomy of language. This approach is analyzed on the example of an essay on the essence of poetry titled Tablica z Macondo [The Macondo License Plate] by Stanisław Barańczak. He talks in it about a personalized license plate he would devise for himself in order not to forget the most vital truth that enables him to navigate his life. Such a plate would read in Polish ON JEST [HE IS], where - owing to the specificity of the Polish grammar - the third person masculine singular pronoun can stand for the reader (or more generally “the other”), the world, and God (or transcendence). The intended ambiguity of this pronoun makes us realize that although pronouns are substitutes for the noun phrase in a sentence, they are in fact a sort of mental abbreviations that encapsulate more abundant content than a mere 1:1 correspondence with a single noun. Of the two basic functions of pronouns in interpersonal communication: anaphoric and deictic, the latter proves to be more basic as it introduces new objects into the universe of discourse shared by the participants of a conversation. One cannot speak about the meaning o f the pronoun «he», but about the sense in which it is used, and this sense pertains to extralinguistic reality indicated directly by the speaker. The sentence HE IS does not tell us anything about reality unless reality itself is included into the utterance as one of its constituent elements. The triple encounter (the other, the world, transcendence) spelled out by Barańczak in terms of an inclusive unity of experience represented by a single sentence is a manifestation of the metaphysical.
Źródło:
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne; 2008, 22; 235-251
0209-3472
Pojawia się w:
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Moc sterowania matematycznego
Autorzy:
Janusz, Robert
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429147.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
matehamtics
mathematical language
reality
significance of mathematics
Opis:
One can speak about mathematics too simplistically. On the one hand, school programs are such examples. On the other hand, the function of mathematics in elementary physics very much indicates the profound philosophical significance of mathematics: the author claims that mathematical language is a kind of command language, i.e. it is not just a description, but a control which has a specific power (lat. virtus) to manage the reality. This language has its proper hierarchy and structures which humans only are just starting to understand and to use in basic ways, not without errors. Therefore some ethics regarding human mathematical thinking are needed: the affirmation of life.
Źródło:
Semina Scientiarum; 2011, 10
1644-3365
Pojawia się w:
Semina Scientiarum
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rorty on Language and Social Practices
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036401.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
language
social practices
metaphysics
linguistic turn
reality
holism
Opis:
Richard Rorty wrote on many occasions that called the linguistic turn was an attempt to keep philosophy an armchair discipline. “The idea - he said - was to mark off a space for a priori knowledge into which neither sociology nor history nor art nor natural science could intrude”. Linguistic analysis, in short, has become with the passing of time a sort of first philosophy, aimed at replacing metaphysics (which the founding fathers of logical positivism gave up for dead). Two opposite conceptions of language are at stake here. The first says that language is something self-explanatory which, in turn, explains everything else. This means postulating type A objects, i.e. unexplained explainers in terms of which type B objects - the explananda - can be accounted. The second conception claims, instead, that there is no actual distinction between type A and type B objects. All objects are on a par, but in a particular sense. Rorty resorts in fact to the Quinean-flavored simile of the net and its nodes. Rorty’s is an intelligent move. Since there is no longer ineffability and unavailability, all problems seem to be solved. Is this true? We have good motives to be suspicious because, after all, Immanuel Kant must have adopted that kind of model for some reason, and Ludwig Wittgenstein himself struggled with the old problem of the gap between reality itself and our representations of it. Rorty proclaims his faith in holism. In contrast to the assumption that there can be entities which are what they are totally independent of all relations between them, a Davidsonian (and also Quinean) holism claims that “all entities are merely nodes in a net of relations”, which gives us a picture of the following kind: “No intrinsically simple objects, no pictures, and no language. For if analysis could not end with such objects, then whether a sentence has sense would depend upon whether another sentence were true - the sentence which specifies that two simpler objects making up a composite stand in the relevant compositional relationship”. The great issue at stake here is the relation between ontology and epistemology. Most interpreters would answer that such a distinction is untenable in Wittgenstein’s thought, and in particular if we take into account the second phase of his philosophical parabola. But, notwithstanding this common opinion, we are confronted with a great problem, namely, that of determining what really is the reference framework about which Wittgenstein so often talks, and which is supposed to be shared by all human beings as such. He frequently says in his works that skepticism raises doubts when no questions can be asked, while Monk correctly describes his endeavor in On Certainty as one aimed at showing “The point at which doubt becomes senseless”. The question to be asked is, obviously, the following: What does this mean? Wittgenstein is right when he says that some questions cannot be asked because they do not even make sense, but in my view we may interpret him in a way different from the traditional ones that have been thus far put forward. We may accept Wittgenstein’s statement that the existence of the world, for instance, cannot meaningfully be questioned. But this means, in turn, that the linguistic games cannot go on forever. Sooner or later we run into a “hard rock” which is ultimately non-linguistic and whose existence is the original fact from which everything else stems, including language, linguistic games, conceptual schemes, social practices, etc. Everything, in sum, can be questioned, but nature. And when someone does question it, like the pupil mentioned in On Certainty, who will not let anything be explained to him by his teacher, for he continuously interrupts him with doubts concerning the existence of things, we are somehow forced to answer his questions as Wittgenstein’s teacher does: “Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don’t make sense at all”.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2014, 10; 30-38
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Andere Sprache – anderes Denken: Eine Reflexion über die Beziehung von ‚sprachlich determinierter Weltansicht‘, ‚sprachlichem Relativitätsprinzip‘ und ‚Konstruktivismus‘
Other language – other thinking: A reflection on the relationship of ‘language deterministic world view’, ‘linguistic relativity principle’ and ‘constructivism’
Autorzy:
Ros, Gisela
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1596913.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
Wirklichkeit
Denken
Sprache
Weltansicht
worldview
language
thinking
reality
rzeczywistość
myślenie
język
postrzeganie świata
Opis:
Ausgehend vom sprachlichen Determinismus, nach dessen Auffassung Denken und Weltansicht von der Sprache bestimmt werden, führt die Entwicklung zum Prinzip des sprachlichen Relativismus, das besagt, dass verschiedene Sprachen zu unterschiedlichen Arten des Denkens bzw. verschiedenen Weltansichten führen. Konstruktivistische Theorien hingegen vertreten die Meinung, der Mensch habe gar keinen unmittelbaren Zugriff auf die Wirklichkeit, sondern das Individuum konstruiere sich diese selbst. Allen Ansätzen sind aber die Fragen gemeinsam, ob und wie Sprache und Denken interagieren, ob und welche Weltansichten Sprache ermöglicht. Zudem besteht Einigkeit in der Ablehnung universaler Prinzipien.
Starting from the linguistic determinism, be determined which considers thinking and worldview of the language, leading the development of the principle of linguistic relativism, which states that different languages lead to different ways of thinking and different world views. Constructivist theories however are of the opinion that man has no direct access to reality, but the individual is construct them yourself. All approaches but the issues are common to interact whether and how language and thought, whether and what kind of world views allows language. In addition, there is agreement in the rejection of universal principles.
Punktem wyjścia jest determinizm językowy, zgodnie z którym myślenie i postrzeganie świata są determinowane przez język, następnie dyskutowany jest model relatywizmu językowego, według którego różne języki prowadzą do odmiennych rodzajów myślenia czy odmiennych sposobów postrzegania świata. Teorie konstruktywistyczne natomiast głoszą, że człowiek nie ma bezpośredniego dostępu do rzeczywistości, lecz sam ją konstruuje. Dla wszystkich tych ujęć wspólne są pytania, czy i w jaki sposób język i myślenie oddziałują na siebie, czy język ma wpływ na postrzeganie świata oraz jaki jest to wpływ. Modele te łączy ponadto odrzucenie pryncypiów uniwersalistycznych.
Źródło:
Colloquia Germanica Stetinensia; 2016, 25; 121-149
2450-8543
2353-317X
Pojawia się w:
Colloquia Germanica Stetinensia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pirandello, czyli jak nie dowierzać swojej rzeczywistości
Pirandello, or how not to trust your reality
Pirandello, dunque come diffidare della propria realtà
Autorzy:
Sławek, Tadeusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/16729576.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-03-22
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Tematy:
letteratura
dramma
lingua
realtà
razionalismo
literature
drama
language
reality
rationalism
literatura
dramat
język
rzeczywistość
racjonalizm
Opis:
Szkic pragnie przedstawić estetykę Pirandella jako finezyjne dziedzictwo estetyki ruin, której świetnym przedstawicielem we włoskiej tradycji był Giovanni Battista Piranesi. Pisze o tejże estetyce Umberto Eco, że to, co dostrzegamy w pisarstwie włoskiego dramaturga: „zmienia ona radykalnie koncepcję doskonałości formalnej i całkowitości dzieła sztuki”, co więcej – „dopuszcza znajdowanie przyjemności w dziele sztuki mimo tego (a może dzięki temu), że przedstawia ono zniszczenie”. A wszystko sumuje na tej samej stronie cytat z Diderota: „dlaczego piękny szkic urzeka nas bardziej od skończonego obrazu? Bo więcej w nim życia, a mniej formy. Kiedy pojawiają się formy, zanika życie”. Ten sąd francuskiego filozofa mógłby posłużyć jako ważny szlak interpretacyjny dzieła Pirandella. Instytucja literatury sprawuje władzę nad formą, a więc i nad językiem. Ale jak wynika z rozważań Pirandella, literatura jest instytucją zimną. Litera nie jest w stanie utrzymać ciepła życia, racjonalność nie radzi sobie z „mętami” życia. A ponieważ historia powierza się literze, przechowuje się i przekazuje za jej pośrednictwem, przeto życie zawsze wymknie się z jej jurysdykcji. Dzieło Pirandella to ważny epizod w wielkiej historii zachodniego racjonalizmu, akcentujący to, iż historia to dzieje wysiłków, na ogół niezbyt udanych, do skonstruowania świata wedle zaleceń rozumności.      
Il testo è un tentativo di presentazione dell'estetica di Pirandello come sofisticata eredità dell'estetica delle rovine nella tradizione italiana, di cui Giovanni Battista Piranesi ne fu un grande rappresentante. Così, come afferma Umberto Eco, attraverso l’estetica è possibile osservare il cambiamento radicale del concetto di perfezione formale e completezza di un’opera d’arte nella scrittura del drammaturgo italiano. Inoltre, l’estetica permette di far provare piacere pur rappresentando la distruzione. La citazione di Diderot, in cui il filosofo francese sostiene che una bozza possa essere più bella di un dipinto già completato, poiché in esso vi è più vita e meno forma, potrebbe fungere da importante via interpretativa per l’opera di Pirandello. Così, una bozza diventa più interessante di un’opera finita. La letteratura ha il controllo sulla forma, e dunque sul linguaggio, ma come dimostra Pirandello, la letteratura è una fredda istituzione incapace di contenere il calore e il palpito della vita che sempre sfugge alla giurisdizione letteraria. L’opera di Pirandello è dunque un episodio importante nella storia del razionalismo occidentale, che critica i tentativi falliti della storia di costruire un mondo secondo i principi del funzionamento della razionalità e del buon senso.
The essay attempts to present Pirandello’s esthetics as an heir of Piranesi’s esthetics of the ruin. As Umberto Eco claims, a turn towards fragments allows for abandoning the idea of the work of art as an accomplished whole, what is more, it locates the esthetic pleasure in a contemplation of a whole destroyed and fragmented. Thus, a draft becomes more interesting than a finished work. Literature holds control over form, that is over language, but – as Pirandello demonstrates – literature is a cold institution unable to contain the warmth and pulsation of life which always slips out of literature’s jurisdiction. Hence Pirandello’s work is an important episode in the history of Western rationalism and aims its critical edge against the failed attempts to construct a world according to the working principles of rationality and common sense.
Źródło:
Fabrica Litterarum Polono-Italica; 2022, 4; 1-32
2658-185X
Pojawia się w:
Fabrica Litterarum Polono-Italica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Miłosz w sporze z formą poetycką
Miłosz in a Dispute against Poetical Form
Autorzy:
Kluba, Agnieszka
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1534029.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012-01-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Czesław Miłosz
poetry
form
convention
world-view
meta-reflection
antynomy
asystematic thinking
subjectivity
lyricism
self-representation
distance
crisis of language
pure poetry
involved poetry
reality
truth
Opis:
Czesław Miłosz accompanied his poetry with an extensive body of self-reflective writings, developed over many years. It is characterised by, on the one hand, a relative constancy of recurring motifs, and on the other, an equally constant tendency to juxtapose the motifs in variously defined binary systems. The analysis of connections that occur not so much between the elements of specific antinomies, but, on a higher level, between separate antinomies (especially between values ascribed to poles of the oppositions), makes it possible to notice that many of the antinomies cannot be subjected to easy reconciliations, but rather exclude each other. This makes it possible to understand why Miłosz’s thought seems to be systematic. Above all, however, it allows us to look, in a new way, at the feats of Miłosz’s constant struggle against poetic form – immanent contradictions and inconsistencies of Miłosz’s reflection become interesting only when they are referred to the order of creation and its disturbing metamorphoses.
Źródło:
Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Literacka; 2012, 20; 53-70
1233-8680
2450-4947
Pojawia się w:
Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Literacka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dwaj ludzie z szafą w perspektywie genologicznej
Two People With a Wardrobe in a Genological Perspective
Autorzy:
Hendrykowski, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/918057.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-06-13
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
short film
art of film
genre
film of fiction
reality
construction
composition
condensation
language of moving images
narrator
narrative
story
plot
continuity
discontinuity
heroes
conflict
coincidentia oppositorum
Opis:
Parabola is the essence of the short film Two Men and a Wardrobe (and likewise Mammals and The Fat and the Lean). Parabola is dominant of the genre, not merely an occasional and distinguishing attribute. In its interior, we find traces of other genres. These include noir comedy, slapstick burlesque, existential drama, the thriller, and drama of the absurd, grotesque and macabre. The poetic dimension of Polanski’s short film, in which reality confronts and permeates the skilfully constructed and captivating fantasy presented by the artist, allowing all the elements of the genre to be combined into a common whole.
Źródło:
Images. The International Journal of European Film, Performing Arts and Audiovisual Communication; 2014, 15, 24; 171-180
1731-450X
Pojawia się w:
Images. The International Journal of European Film, Performing Arts and Audiovisual Communication
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
THE NATURE OF COMMON SENSE AND HOW WE CAN USE COMMON SENSE TO RENEW THE WEST
Autorzy:
Redpath, Peter A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507346.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
aim
analogy
anarchy
art
body of knowledge
cause
common sense
communication
comprehensive understanding
concept
contemporary
contrary
contrariety
culture
demonstration
demonstrative
disorder
education
equality
emotion
end
enlightened
enlightenment
excellence
existence
explanation
fear
fundamentalistic
genus
God
habit
happiness
harmony
hierarchically ordered
history
hope
human
humanist
inequality
inspiration
inspired
judgment
justice
knowledge
language
leadership
logic
mathematics
memory
metaphysics
modern
multitude
nature
Nietzschean
operational
opposite
order
part
person
philosophy
physical
poetry
power
principle
provocative thought
quality
reality
reason
receptivity
relationship
renaissance
resistance
rhetoric
science
scientism
skeptic
sophist
soul
species
strength
success
system
truth
utopian
West
Western civilization
unity
universe
values
virtue
whole
will
wisdom
wonder
World War
Opis:
Since most pressing today on a global scale is to be able to unite religion, philosophy, and science into parts of a coherent civilizational whole, and since the ability to unite a multitude into parts of a coherent whole essentially requires understanding the natures of the things and the way they can or cannot be essentially related, this paper chiefly considers precisely why the modern world has been unable to effect this union. In so doing, it argues that the chief cause of this inability to unite these cultural natures has been because the contemporary world, and the West especially, has lost its understanding of philosophy and science and has intentionally divorced from essential connection to wisdom. Finally, it proposes a common sense way properly to understand these natures, reunite them to wisdom, and revive Western and global civilization.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3: supplement; 455-484
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8

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