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Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
Tytuł:
What Kind of Politics Do We Need? Toward Freedom as Responsibility in Habermas’s and Rorty’s Visions of Democracy
Autorzy:
Kilanowski, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1996909.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-06-30
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Tematy:
pragmatism
Habermas
Rorty
democracy
responsibility
freedom
Opis:
Isaiah Berlin said that it is part of the human condition to make choices between absolute values. Obviously, this choice cannot be easy. To be well informed, it has to be made in full awareness of the contingency of our criteria. This ability to make choices between absolute values in the light of contingencies is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian, says Berlin, following Joseph Schumpeter. Similar ideas can be found in the philosophy of Richard Rorty, who believes that our liberal societies create more people who understand the contingencies of their vocabularies, but at the same time are still faithful to them. He calls this “freedom as acknowledgement of contingency.” This freedom is bound by the existence of a plurality of voices, which does not mean that it is bound by the existence of chaos. In such a spirit, Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the fact that in spite of the plurality of contingent views, we can find a unity of reason. In spite of plurality of views, we can still come to an agreement thanks to dialogue. The close analysis of Rorty’s and Habermas’s philosophy allows us to see that they share a common stance: thanks to disenchantment of the world, as Rorty says, or thanks to decentralization of the world, as Habermas says. Both are seeing such stance as a precondition to use our freedom in a way to be more tolerant, more open to dialogue and responsible for it. Further analysis allows us to see that there is a possibility to present a new understanding of the notion of freedom – freedom conceived as responsibility.
Źródło:
Kultura i Edukacja; 2017, 2(116); 50-68
1230-266X
Pojawia się w:
Kultura i Edukacja
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/653156.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
stakeholder theory
pragmatism
facts and values
Freeman
Rorty
Opis:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory-which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics-are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2018, 21, 7; 75-84
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Czy prawnicy powinni być pragmatystami?
Should lawyers be pragmatists? Few words on legal education from the perspective of R. Rorty’s noepragmatism
Autorzy:
Rakoczy, Filip
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2003062.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
edukacja prawnicza
pragmatyzm
Richard Rorty
legal education
pragmatism
Richard Rort
Opis:
W swojej pracy poruszam zagadnienie akademickiej edukacji prawniczej, korzystając w tym celu z narzędzi zapewnionych przez neopragmatyzm Richarda Rorty’ego oraz juryscentryzm Artura Kozaka. Rozważam możliwość opisu edukacji wyższej i kultury prawniczej za pomocą tych dwóch koncepcji, a także staram się formułować wnioski dotyczące przyszłego ukształtowania tego procesu. Próbuję wykazać, że współczesna edukacja prawnicza oparta jest głównie na mechanizmach socjalizacji i treningu zawodowego, które polegają raczej na przekazywaniu reguł rozumowania prawniczego i dyskusji wewnątrz wspólnoty prawniczej, niż na przekazywaniu konkretnych umiejętności. W związku z tym rozważam, w jakim stopniu proces ten powinien zostać uzupełniony o metody indywidualizujące kształconych, umożliwiające im autokreację, co, zdaniem Rorty’ego, powinno stanowić główne zadanie studiów wyższych. W dalszej części pracy zastanawiam się, w jaki sposób tego rodzaju mechanizmy wpłyną na ukształtowanie przyszłych prawników, a tym samym wspólnoty prawniczej oraz jakie ewentualne korzyści możemy w ten sposób osiągnąć.
In my paper I would like to analyze the topic o academic legal education, using for that purpose tool granted by Rochard Rorty’s neopragmatism and Artur Kozak’s juriscentrism. In this article I consider the possibility of describing higher education and legal culture using both of those concepts, and to form some proposals for future shaping of this proces. In my text I aim to prove, tha contemporary legal education is basem mostly on the mechanisms of socialisation and professional training, which base rather on transfer of rules of legal reasoning and discussion within legal community, than on transfer of actual skills. Therefore I consider to which extent this process should be suplemented by methods which individualise students, and which allow the autocreation, which is, according to Rorty, should be the mian task of higher education. In the further parts of my paper I consuder, how those mechanisms will impact shaping of future lawyers, and by that, the legal community itself, and what benefits could we achieve this way.
Źródło:
Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem; 2016, 8, 3; 118-135
2080-1084
2450-7938
Pojawia się w:
Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O współczesnych problemach z prawdą. Refleksje w świetle eseju Harry’ego G. Frankfurta O wciskaniu kitu (On Bullshit)
On Modern indifference to Truth. Some thoughts in the light of the essay On Bullshit by Harry G. Frankfurt
Autorzy:
Warzyński, Sylwester
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2035389.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-03-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Harry G. Frankfurt
On bullshit
postprawda
wciskanie kitu
chrzanienie
prawda
metafizyka
Ryszard Rorty
pragmatyzm
On Bullshit
post-truth
bullshit
talking crap
truth
metaphysics
Richard Rorty
pragmatism
Opis:
This article is an attempt to present one of the vital features of modernculture, namely indifference to truth. In the context of proclaiming the expression “post-truth” the Word of the Year 2016, the author shows how thismodern indifference should be understood. It is explained by recalling theessay of Harry G. Frankfurt entitled On Bullshit. This short text presentsa certain characteristic trait of modern times, that is, a certain attitudeto truth typical of the contemporary man. What is interesting is that it isconvergent with the meaning of the very expression that has recently madesuch a spectacular career and became the Word of the Year.In the first part of the article the author presents the history of the term“post-truth”, its basic meaning and the context in which it was created andis now used. The term “bullshit” is then treated in a similar way. In the thirdpart of the article the main thoughts of Frankfurt’s essay are referred to. It ispointed out that this short essay, written already in the 1980s, proves to bestill valid up until today. For in his essay Frankfurt does not describe anypolitical reality, social or medial one, saturated with dishonesty, disinformation, lies and manipulation. He does not attempt to present various types of examples of “bullshit”. Instead, as befits a philosopher, he goes deeper and attempts to reach the essence of this phenomenon. In this way he draws an unusually accurate image of the modern man for whom truth has lost its significance, for whom there has grown between truth and lies – contrary to any logic – a whole sphere of bullshit, or otherwise post-truth. In the fourth part of the article the author points out the sources of such a situation. He talks about the rejection of the realistic, classical way of understanding truth and, in relation to it, about turning away from reality, that is from facts.In the last part the author explains that in modern times in place ofreality (as an important point of reference) the criterion of coherence anddemocratic consensus has been introduced, or – what fits well into theculture of “bullshit” – the criterion of practicality and usefulness. Insteadof thinking in terms of objective order, it is therefore proposed that oneshould think and act in terms of subjectively perceived advantages. At thispoint the author refers to Richard Rorty’s philosophical conception andshows that Rorty’s end of philosophy, the abandonment of the search forthe ultimate foundations of cognition, for the discovery of truth, for thedominant idea of „contingency” and usefulness, and his „language games”are all excellent illustrations of what a man of the era of post-truth, the eraof indifference to truth, nourishes.
Źródło:
Collectanea Theologica; 2017, 87, 3; 135-162
0137-6985
2720-1481
Pojawia się w:
Collectanea Theologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Realizm Charlesa Sandersa Peirce’a i antyrealizm Richarda Rorty’ego
Charles Sanders Peirce’s Realism and Richard Rorty’s Antirealism
Autorzy:
Koronkiewicz, Małgorzata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31342340.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
Charles Sanders Peirce
Richard Rorty
realizm
antyrealizm
pragmatyzm
neopragmatyzm
realism
antirealism
pragmatism
neopragmatism
Opis:
W tekście analizuję elementy realizmu i antyrealizmu w tradycyjnym pragmatyzmie Charlesa Sandersa Peirce’a i w neopragmatyzmie Richarda Rorty’ego. Stanowiska realizmu i antyrealizmu są tu rozpatrywane głównie w odniesieniu do kwestii znaczenia, prawdziwości oraz obiektywności.
The paper analyses some elements of realism in Charles Sanders Peirce’s traditional pragmatism and of antirealism in Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. Realism and antirealism are discussed here mainly in their relations to the problems of meaning, objectivity and truth.
Źródło:
Filozofia i Nauka; 2015, 3; 317-331
2300-4711
2545-1936
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia i Nauka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Filozoficzne trudności teorii interesariuszy
Philosophical Difficulties of Stakeholder Theory
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965198.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-09-15
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
stakeholder theory
pragmatism
facts and values
Freeman
Rorty
A13
L21
M14
Opis:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory – which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics – are connected first of all with questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism, which in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood at the same time as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. To the assumptions belongs a false dilemma taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, as a result of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a return to a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2016, 19, 3
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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