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Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7
Tytuł:
“I Have Slightly Pessimistic Picture Of Things...” Interview with Professor Jan Szumski, Senior Researcher of the Historical Research Office of the Institute of National Remembrance and Professor at the Institute of the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw
Autorzy:
Szumski, Jan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108333.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
Soviet Union
politics of history
Great Patriotic War
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2021-2022, 3; 43-75
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Preserving the Myth, with the Politics in the Background: the Great Patriotic War in the Politics of History of Belarus
Autorzy:
Kłysiński, Kamil
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108329.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
Great Patriotic War
Belarus
Alyaksandr Lukashenka
politics of history
Opis:
Respect for the achievements of the USSR was one of the foundations of Belarusian politics of history even before the rule of Alyaksandr Lukashenka; this was also reflected in the identity of most Belarusians, who perceived themselves as “Soviet people”. A special place in the narrative about the Soviet period was occupied by the Great Patriotic War, which was also presented from the perspective of the enormous demographic and material losses that affected the territory of today’s Belarus. The timid attempts undertaken in the early 1990s to demythologise the cult of the war period did not lead to any significant changes in the narrative, especially since Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s rise to power in 1994 effectively blocked any further efforts to revise Belarusian historiography. For President Lukashenka, who has ruled ever since then, the Great Patriotic War was and continues to be one of the key periods defining the history of Belarus and its contemporary domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, in response to Russia’s interference in Ukraine in 2014 and Moscow’s desire to subjugate Minsk fully, the Belarusian president began playing World War II “memory card” that had hitherto been excluded from the current disputes, in order to strengthen his and his country’s own historical narrative as something separate from that of Russia.
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2021-2022, 3; 179-209
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Myth of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Communist Russian Cinema: Causes, Effects, Perspectives
Autorzy:
Tsibets, Ilya
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108325.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
Great Patriotic War
Russia
Russian cinema
ideology
politics of history
Opis:
This article is an original attempt to define the main features of the myth of the Great Patriotic War in post-Communist Russian cinema. By combining historical, cultural and film studies, the author defines the reasons for the appearance of the above-mentioned myth and its popularity, and indicates the effects of the ideologisation of an event which has been important for politics of history during the rule of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. The article will cite examples of films containing repetitive narrative elements that appear with varying intensity and regularity in the Russian political and public discourse on the Great Patriotic War. The author will also refer to how such films have been received, and will define a potential perspective for the further development of this theme.
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2021-2022, 3; 245-271
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
“…The Phrase that »History Does Not Matter to the Present Day« Was Never More Deceptive than It Is Now.” The Narrative of the Great Patriotic War in the Historians’ Assessment (Editors’ Debate) Warsaw, July 16, 2021
Autorzy:
Boćkowski, Daniel
Dąbrowski, Franciszek
Kornat, Marek
Jasina, Łukasz
Musiał, Filip
Piekarska, Anna
Wasilewski, Witold
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108335.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
politics of history
Russia
Soviet Union
Communism
World War II
Great Patriotic War
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2021-2022, 3; 9-41
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Militia and the Special Services in the Contemporary Politics of History of Belarus
Autorzy:
Laneuski, Aliaksandr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1955967.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
Republic of Belarus
politics of history
militia
KGB
Great Patriotic War
NKVD
Opis:
The fundamental direction of politics of history in Belarus under the rule of Aleksandr Lukashenko has been to maintain and cultivate the memory of the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet period. Although the Republic of Belarus remains the most faithful heir to the Soviet inheritance, over time its politics of memory has begun to shift towards the establishment and consolidation of its own history of Belarusian statehood. The last several years have more actively revealed the authorities’ new trend in the field of politics of history, which involves the creation of a heroic image for the secret service (NKVD, KGB) and the militia in the history of the Belarusian state. This tendency is characterised by a nonaggressive, but national-level, wide range of commemorative measures which are aimed at creating a myth of the KGB and the militia. Starting from the Great Patriotic War, which remains central to the Belarusian government’s politics of history, new historical heroes have begun to emerge in the form of officers of the security services. The military and intelligence services are still linked to the figure of Felix Dzerzhinsky, and the cultivation of his memory in Belarus still predominates over the commemoration of other historical figures. A number of events (including those at state level) dedicated to the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Belarusian militia and the KGB in 2017 gave a particular boost to these commemorative measures. In this article, the author will analyse the Belarusian authorities’ current politics of history in this regard by introducing readers to a variety of commemorative practices (the unveiling of monuments, official speeches, films, historical reconstructions, etc.). Moreover, attention will be drawn to the current policy in Belarus and the place within it for the special services, as well as the lack of any consideration of the Soviet past (the Stalinist repressions, Kurapaty, the NKVD, access to archives), the international aspects of Belarus’s current politics of memory (links to Russia), and the martyrological and sacral character of the memory of the KGB and militia.
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2019, 1; 219-263
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
“Death Parade” on Victory Day (Minsk, 2020)
Autorzy:
Lastouski, Aliaksei
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108327.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
Great Patriotic War
Belarus
politics of history
celebration of Victory Day
COVID-19
Opis:
Being borrowed from the Soviet historical narrative and successfully adapted to the needs of the Belarusian state, the memory of Victory in the Great Patriotic War has become the ideological basis for the authoritarian regime in Belarus. This article is aimed at addressing the celebration of the Victory Day in Minsk in 2020 and, through the analysis of this particular case, identify the main frames for the ideological image of Victory in the Belarusian authorities’ politics of history as well as the mechanisms for population involvement and ideological mobilisation. The year 2020 has become critical for Belarusian politics as for the first time since 1994, mass democratic protests challenged Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s complete control over Belarusian society.
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2021-2022, 3; 211-242
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Religion of Victory, the Cult of a Superpower. The Myth of the Great Patriotic War in the Contemporary Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
Autorzy:
Domańska, Maria
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108332.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Tematy:
Russia
the Great Patriotic War
the Victory of 1945
politics of history
the great power politics
authoritarianism
World War II
propaganda
Russian foreign policy
Opis:
The glorification of the Soviet victory over Nazism is the focal point of Russia’s politics of history and an element of the ideological offensive that aims to legitimise Russian great-power ambitions. The narrative centred on the victory has a strong religious, not to say, messianic dimension. It aims to whitewash the dark chapters of Soviet history and legitimise the wars Moscow waged after 1945. According to the contemporary neo-Soviet interpretations, these wars were always defensive and justified by external circumstances. At the same time, distinctly anti-Western rhetoric is becoming more and more perceptible in Russian propaganda. The repeated accusations of “eternal” attempts by the West to destroy Russia and destabilise the global order are intensifying. The official discourse is marked by the nostalgia for the lost empire and the “concert of powers” that was established at the Yalta conference; it also seeks to justify violence as a tool of foreign policy. Its overriding aim is to legitimise the authoritarian regime and Moscow’s contemporary strategic goals, such as the hegemony in the post-Soviet area and the reshaping of the European security architecture. The official narrative is promoted by the state institutions, the educational system, the Kremlin-controlled media outlets and a network of social organisations subsidised by the state. It is also safeguarded by the administrative and criminal law and the apparatus of repression.
Źródło:
Institute of National Remembrance Review; 2021-2022, 3; 77-125
2658-1566
Pojawia się w:
Institute of National Remembrance Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7

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