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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Methodological pluralism in economics
    Autorzy:
    Wojciechowska, Renata
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/580518.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
    Tematy:
    methodology of economics
    philosophy of economics
    metaeconomics
    test method
    methodological pluralism
    Opis:
    The purpose of the paper is to analyse the issue of a test method in economics. It calls for the necessity of adopting a methodological approach that will be flexible and cognitively inspiring, which is a prerequisite to establishing the foundations for economics, its development and effectiveness in clarifying social and economic phenomena. Currently believed to be a complex (both theoretical and empirical), and inductive-deductive science, economics fails to possess binding methodological arrangements. Therefore, when looking for good solutions, scholars propose universal pluralism, which lets them expand the research apparatus within defined, yet not tightly logical structures.
    Źródło:
    Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu; 2017, 489; 474-482
    1899-3192
    Pojawia się w:
    Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Value-free paradise is lost. Economists could learn from artists
    Wolny od wartości raj został utracony. Ekonomiści mogli uczyć się od artystów
    Autorzy:
    Ostapiuk, Aleksander
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2028231.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Tematy:
    philosophy of science
    methodology of economics
    value-free economics
    Max Weber
    Opis:
    Despite the conclusions from the contemporary philosophy of science, many economists cherish the ideal of positive science. Therefore, value-free economics is still the central paradigm in economics. The first aim of the paper is to investigate economics’ axiomatic assumptions from an epistemological perspective. The critical analysis of the literature shows that the positive-normative dichotomy is exaggerated. Moreover, value-free economics is based on normative foundations that have a negative impact on individuals and society. The paper’s second aim is to show that economics’ normativity is not a problem because the discussion concerning values is possible and unavoidable. In this context, Weber and other methodologists are investigated. The conclusion of the paper is that science can thrive without strict methodological rules thanks to institutional mechanisms. Therefore, economists could learn from artists who accept the world without absolute rules. This perspective opens the possibility for methodological pluralism and normative approaches.
    Źródło:
    Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2020, 23, 4; 7-33
    1899-2226
    2353-4869
    Pojawia się w:
    Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O realistyczności założeń, falsyfikowalności hipotez i innych modernistycznych mitach współczesnej ekonomii
    The realism of assumptions, falsifiability of hypotheses and other modernist myths of contemporary economics
    Autorzy:
    Scheuer, Bartosz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/434729.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
    Tematy:
    methodology of economics
    philosophy of science
    economic crisis
    ontological realism
    modernism
    Opis:
    In the face of the global economic crisis, there are many opinions according to which economics as a science needs major rebuilding. Usually, it is emphasized that it should not be developed by involving the construction of formal, mathematical models but that there is a need to improve the “realisticness” of analysis. Based on the analysis of a dispute between P. Krugman and J.H. Cochrane it can be said that the arguments which appear during the debate on the crisis are not new and confusingly similar to those that already appeared in the 30s and 70s of the last century. It should also be noted that both: the supporters of “realisticness” of economic analysis, as well as representatives of the mainstream formalism treat this crisis as a confirmation of the correctness of their theories and evidence of the weakness of the concepts proposed by their opponents. The article is placed in relation to the thesis that all the arguments that have emerged in the debate on the state of the economic theory after the crisis, contrary to appearances, do not bring anything new to the economic discourse and cannot lead to any solutions of the theoretical dispute, because all arguments are based on the same philosophical foundations. In other words it can be said that the basic problem of modern economics should not be considered as a weakness of theory, but as a weakness of philosophy common to all participants of the discourse. First of all, in fact, the arguments coming from both sides of the dispute seem to assume that the ultimate and decisive test of any theory is its confrontation with experience, the “facts”, whereby the test is perceived in terms of the correspondence theory of truth. This means that both: economists, whose views on the nature of the theory are similar to those presented by P. Krugman, as well as their opponents, who, like J.H. Cochrane recognize that any theoretical concepts should meet fairly strict formal requirements and finally take the form of (usually mathematicised) model, assume that carrying out such a test is possible firstly, and secondly, that it boils down to a comparison of propositions that make up the model/theory (assumptions and predictions, or only prediction) with the reality whose components are independent of theory and processes of cognition.
    Źródło:
    Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu; 2013, 4 (25); 64-76
    2080-5977
    Pojawia się w:
    Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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