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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    Paradygmaty metafilozofii – historia i współczesność
    Paradigms of metaphilosophy – history and the present
    Autorzy:
    Wawrzynowicz, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2135650.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-06-27
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    metaphilosophy
    philosophy of philosophy
    philosophical cognition
    methodology
    history of philosophy
    Opis:
    Metaphilosophy as a research discipline is concerned with the overall metatheoretical reflection of philosophy on its own subject matter, assumptions, methodology, and goals guiding this form of human intellectual activity. The aim of this article is to present a cross-sectional analysis of the main stages in the historical development of this discipline, and offer a general characterization of the current state of research. The means to achieving this goal of study is a confrontation between two partly competitive and partly complementary paradigmatic approaches to metaphilosophical reflection which currently determine a relatively wide range of interests in this theoretically promising and heuristically fertile field of philosophical analysis.
    Źródło:
    Człowiek i Społeczeństwo; 2022, 53; 7-30
    0239-3271
    Pojawia się w:
    Człowiek i Społeczeństwo
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Historia sztuki w polu metodologii. Aktualne problemy i wyzwania
    Art History in the Field of Methodology. Current Problems and Challenges
    Autorzy:
    Czekalski, Stanisław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/32352273.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    art history
    scientific knowledge
    methodology
    theory
    philosophy of science
    structuralism
    Opis:
    At the end of the 20th century, the theory of art history shifted from the area of methodology understood as a normative field of the philosophy of science to the area of the social practice of constructing knowledge. The term “art historical methodology” itself became trivialized when its meaning was detached from the horizon of epistemology and became extremely inclusive, encompassing all methods practised in the discipline, with a method being considered to be the use of any theory as a tool of interpretation. As a consequence, the basic problem of scientific methodology, which is the critical assessment of explanatory and interpretive theories due to the value of their justification, is not addressed in the self-reflection of contemporary art history. The retreat from the rigors of methodology was related to the reception of structuralism, initiated by Ernst Gombrich in the book Art and Illusion. Popper’s model of situational logic as a method of historical explanation of works of art was transformed into a structuralist model, referring to constant rules of pictorial representation, symbolization and communication. Michael Fried and Norman Bryson formulated their own theories of invariant rules defining the necessary initial conditions for the formation and reception of pictures, so that individual works could be interpreted in terms of these rules and, as a result, confirm the general theory, which created a vicious circle. Structuralist theories did not function as hypotheses requiring critical testing, but as interpretive codes that served to read each work of art within their own conceptual system. The next step in the process of the reception of structuralism was the development of theories defining general rules that would govern the discursive practice of art history, and the detection of which at the basis of this practice would discredit or invalidate its epistemological dimension. Hayden White’s narrativism was the theory that historical discourse is subject to narrative conventions, not to the laws of logic and the rigors of methodology that serve to limit the pool of alternative explanations or interpretations. This theory was intended to justify the pluralism of equal versions of history as a politically correct idea, appropriate for a “democratic” model of knowledge. Theorists developing White’s theses in the field of art history claimed that the discursive practice of this discipline was not governed by methodological rules but by political motivations (Keith Moxey) or aesthetic principles of artwriting (David Carrier). After the phase of open denial of the dependence of the art history discourse on methodology, the theory of the discipline turned into an analysis of techniques for building this discourse, which no longer included methodological issues, as in James Elkins’ book Our Beautiful, Dry, and Distant Texts. A critical review of theories separating art history from methodology leads to the conclusion that they are untenable. It is impossible to maintain the scientific status of our discipline without respecting the principles of methodology founded in the contemporary philosophy of science.
    Źródło:
    Artium Quaestiones; 2023, 34; 293-336
    0239-202X
    Pojawia się w:
    Artium Quaestiones
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work
    Autorzy:
    Barnard, Robert
    Ulatowski, Joseph
    Weinberg, Jonathan M.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2142985.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-06-30
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Tematy:
    metaphilosophy
    experimental philosophy
    methodology
    history of analytic philosophy
    empirical philosophy
    ordinary language philosophy
    Arne Næss
    J. L. Austin
    Opis:
    The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2021, 29, 2; 77-113
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Filozofia nauki a historia nauki
    Philosophy of Science and History of Science
    Autorzy:
    WOLEŃSKI, Jan
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/520589.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Umiejętności
    Tematy:
    historia
    filozofia nauki
    metodologia
    program badawczy
    paradygmat
    history
    philosophy of science
    methodology
    research program
    paradigm
    Opis:
    Artykuł analizuje relacje pomiędzy filozofią nauki i historią nauki. Rozważane są dwa podejścia do filozofii nauki, jedno reprezentowane przez formalną metodologię nauk i drugie – przez historycznie zorientowaną teorię nauki. O ile pierwsza koncepcja traktuje historię nauki jako niezbyt istotną dla filozofi i nauki, orientacja druga uważa, że pierwsza jest kluczem do drugiej. Najlepiej wyraża to znane powiedzenie Imre Lakatosa: „Filozofia nauki bez historii nauki jest pusta, historia nauki bez filozofii nauki jest ślepa”. Artykuł bliżej rozważa koncepcje Thomasa S. Kuhna i Imre Lakatosa jako sztandarowe wersje historycznej metodologii nauki. Autor argumentuje, że są to raczej historiozoficzne wizje nauki niż historie nauki.
    The paper focuses on relations between philosophy of science and history of science. Two models of science are considered. The fi rst is provided by formal methodology (philosophy) of science. It assumes that (1) there exists an eff ective criterion of demarcation between science and non -science (in particular, pseudo -science); (2) science manifests itself in the same manner in all historical epochs; (3) science as a result (in particular, a system of propositions), not science as an activity, is the primary subject of philosophical investigations; (4) philosophy of science concentrates mostly on the context of justifi cation, not the context of discovery. Consequently, formal logic provides analytic devices for philosophy of science and history has a secondary importance. The second approach, the historical philosophy of science (or historicisms in the philosophy of science), denies the assumptions (1)–(4). Hence, the history of science is of the utmost importance for the philosophy of science. More specifi cally, history of science provides empirical data for the philosophy of science. As Imre Lakatos once said (it is a paraphrase of Kant) “Philosophy of science without history of science is empty, history of science without philosophy of science is blind”. According to Lakatos, a rational reconstruction of the history of science constitutes the main task of the philosophy of science. The adjective “rational” indicates here that this reconstruction must be guided by principles elaborated by philosophical refl ection. Lakatos’s own proposal in this respect is captured by his famous idea of research programs as units organizing concrete scientifi c investigations and their development. The methodology of research programs is Lakatos’s answer to Kuhn’s philosophy of science as based on the concept of the paradigm of scientifi c activity accepted by scientists in a particular period. Lakatos objected that the acceptance of paradigms is, according to Kuhn, too irrational. In fact Lakatos wanted to combine Popper’s idea of the logic of scientific discover and Kuhn’s historicism. There are several objections to historicism. Disregarding one of the standard critical observations, namely that concerning the ambiguity of the terms “research program” and “paradigm”, one can observe that the concepts of the external history of science and the internal history of science are unclear in philosophical theories of science off ered by Kuhn and Lakatos. Similar remarks apply to Paul Feyerabend’s rule “Everything goes” as admitt ing any methodology of scientific investigations. Since the representatives of historicism are almost exclusively interested in the internal history of science, they overlook the external history of science and blame it as naïve and consisting of popular stories concerning accidental circumstances related to great discoveries (Newton’s apple or killing of Archimedes). The author argues that this att itude is unjustifi ed. Clearly, any elaboration of the actual history is selective and thereby must appeal to some criteria of selection. On the other hand, too excessive use of philosophy in historical reconstruction converts history of science into historiosophy (speculative history) of science.
    Źródło:
    Prace Komisji Historii Nauki PAU; 2014, 13; 99-115
    1731-6715
    Pojawia się w:
    Prace Komisji Historii Nauki PAU
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Od gminowładztwa do monarchizmu? Późne poglądy Henryka Schmitta
    From the Rule of Commons to Monarchisms? Henryk Schmitts Late Views
    Autorzy:
    Kijek, Łukasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1944817.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Henryk Schmitt
    historiografia romantyzmu
    konfederacja barska – historiografia
    metodologia
    historiozofia
    historiography of Romantism
    Bar Confederation – historiography
    methodology
    philosophy of history
    Opis:
    Up till now Henryk Schmitt has been presented in the literature of the subject as a historian with rather stable views. The aim of the present article is to show the character of the shift in the emphasis in Schmitt's historiography that happened at the second stage of his historiographic work, especially after 1868. Introduction of a different criterion for evaluating history was a sign of the change in the way he approached the past. Apart from the ideas he borrowed from Joachim Lelewel an additional criterion appeared: that of common good, which opened the possibility of different assessments of the past than before. It was at that time that Schmitt noticed the insufficiency of the republican conception and he broadened his point of view by introducing a superior criterion of common good. From this perspective he perceived as positive the aspirations of such magnates as Adam Krasiński or the Czartoryskis, and even King Stanisław August Poniatowski, whom he had sharply criticized before. This perspective allowed the supporter of republicanism to abandon criticizing the projects directed towards monarchy. In the late period of Schmitt's work also his views about methodology changed. He had opted for the factual model of historiography, but towards the end of his life considering historical events from the point of view of the very events, going beyond the description that signified searching for some idea or some individuality under the surface; making the nation the subjects of a historian's study, were an expression of a historian's participation in the discourse of the Romantic view of history.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2009, 57, 2; 111-119
    0035-7707
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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