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Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
THE GOOD AS THE MOTIVE OF HUMAN ACTION ACCORDING TO MIECZYSŁAW ALBERT KRĄPIEC
Autorzy:
Kunat, Natalia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507302.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
metaphysics
good
action
motive
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
Opis:
In this article the authoress has presented the understanding of the good as the motive for human action on the basis of the position of M. A. Krąpiec. At the beginning, the authoress has concentrated on an analysis of the fact of action, which includes three major factors: the end, the exemplar, and the efficient cause. The good-end here performs the most essential function. The good-end is the motive due to which action has come into existence rather than not. That “which throws” man “out of passivity” to action is described as the motive that appears as the good. In the next part of the article, the good is presented as a fundamental transcendental property of being. The connection of being with the good shows that the world that surrounds us is a world of goods, that is, of beings ordered to the will of a maker or of the Creator. The transcendental good thus understood constitutes the foundation for all action. In the final part of the article, an analysis is made of the functions that are shown by the good that constitutes the motive for action. The first of these functions is the cognitive apprehension of the good understood in the context of the end—the motive of action. At the end, the domains of goods are listed, in which the ontic good, which is a transcendental property of being, plays the most important role.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3; 155-166
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
EXISTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LANGUAGE OF METAPHYSICS
Autorzy:
Kunat, Natalia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507276.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-06-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
language
metaphysics
realism
existential judgement
transcendentals
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
Stanisław Kamiński
Opis:
The article presents the existential determinants of the language of metaphysics primarily on the basis of the philosophical stances adopted by Stanisław Kamiński and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. Realistic philosophy, which focuses principally on the problem of being, uses the language of metaphysics, which helps in understanding reality in itself. Moreover, the article analyses the structure of the language of metaphysics as well as the existential elements constituting its specificity, i.e., among other things, existential judgement and transcendentals.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2015, 4, 2; 117-130
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
TO KNOW OR TO THINK—THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE UNDERSTANDING OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE LIGHT OF THE STUDIES OF MIECZYSŁAW A. KRĄPIEC
Autorzy:
Duma, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507566.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
thinking
cognition
philosophy
knowledge
reality
abstract
sign
understanding
metaphysics
realism
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
Opis:
The article concentrates on the specificity of philosophical cognition. Referring to Mieczysław A. Krąpiec’s study, the author proves that the process of thinking is not to be necessarily identified with the process of cognition, as in fact the former is merely a secondary phase of the latter. When identified with thinking, the philosophical cognition would undermine the very sense of cognition, which means the understanding of reality. When based on thinking alone, philosophy does not grasp real things, but operates with abstracts of being and being’s representations (concepts). As for the correctness of philosophical thinking the laws of logic, with ensuring non-contradictory operations, are sufficient enough. However, any knowledge that aspires to be philosophical has to start from really existing beings. In the next phases of cognition, such beings are grasped more and more particularly and precisely—starting from their transcendental properties and principles, then their structure and categorial properties, and finally their individual characteristics and actions. The very first act of cognition is directed to real beings, which are immediately grasped in respect of their existence and real essence. The second act of cognition deals with signs. The precedence of being in human cognition makes the philosophy charged not with a task of thinking about the world, but with the task of knowing and understanding it within possible and verifiable limits. Therefore, according to Krapiec, the very first philosophical discipline is metaphysics, which has real beings as its object. Thus, philosophical cognition should preserve its objective character, as this is the only way to guarantee its realism.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3; 277-299
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Krąpiec on the Specificity of Man
Autorzy:
Ugwuanyi, Faustinus I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507584.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-03-20
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
man
human being
human person
specificity of man
anthropology
metaphysics
animal rationale
animal culturale
animal sociale
homo faber
homo religiosus
Opis:
The author presents selected insights offered by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P., about the specificity of man. He starts with making a methodological remark about the correlation between Krąpiec’s anthropology and metaphysics. Then, he tries to grasp essentials in Krąpiec’s interpretation of attributes traditionally indicated as defining man alone, namely animal rationale, animal culturale, animal sociale, homo faber, and homo religiosus. Finally, he concludes that, although all these attributes aptly describe the specificity of man, they all are reducible to the fact that man is a person.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2019, 8, 1; 169-180
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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