Temat: Donald Davidson - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Metafory w nauce
Metaphors in Science
Autorzy:: Czarnocka, Małgorzata
Mazurek, Mariusz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/577428.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2012
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:: metafora
podobieństwo
Max Black
Rom Harré
Thomas S. Kuhn
Donald Davidson
metaphor
similarity
Opis:: We analyze critically the most important contemporary conceptions of metaphors in science, i.e., those proposed by Max Black, Rom Harré, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Donald Davidson. We also present an alternative view on the metaphor essence. This view states that a metaphor is the conclusion of deductive reasoning; its premises are a description of the secondary object of the metaphor and the thesis on similarity between the secondary and primary objects. The metaphorical character is created by referring in the metaphor exposition to the whole reasoning and to its usual elliptic character.
Źródło:: Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa; 2012, 48, 1 (191); 5-26
0044-1619
Pojawia się w:: Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Matafora jako marzenie języka. Koncepcja metafory Donalda Davidsona
Metaphor is the dreamwork of language… some remarks concerning Donald Davidsons concept of metaphor
Autorzy:: Filipczuk, Magdalena
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/956050.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2016
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:: Donald Davidson
metaphor
language
metaphoric meaning
metaphor’s effect
koncepcja metafory
metaforyczne znaczenie
użycie
działanie metafory
porównanie
Opis:: In his article What metaphors means Donald Davidson points out that there is an "error and confusion" in claiming "that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning". Metaphor has no special meaning, says Davidson and gives a number of arguments to support his controversial thesis. "If a metaphor has a special cognitive content, why should it be so difficult or impossible to set it out?" – he asks rhetorically. Davidson makes many remarks about the effects of a metaphor; he shows that metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use and denies that the metaphorical sentences have any special cognitive content. "For a metaphor says only what shows on its face – usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth... given in the literal meaning of the words". In the first part of my paper, I analyse Davidson’s concept of metaphor in terms of his own assumptions. First, I argue that Davidson narrows the commonsense use of “meaning”, which is much wider than he makes it out to be. Secondly, if metaphors belong exclusively to the domain of use, it is only when language is used in a peculiar, untypical way (drawing our attention to the paradoxical coincidence of words within metaphor) that a sentence can be considered metaphorical. If so, all we do is violate the everyday use of language, or even modify its rules, and let the context influence the meaning of words within the metaphor. We don't make those words mean something other than they usually mean. The last part of my paper deals with Davidson's claim that interpretation is the work of imagination and creation. I argue that the understanding of metaphor has a dynamic structure. If metaphorical sentences say something with suggestive indefiniteness, it is because metaphor is a kind of task that lies before a reader or a listener, a variant of ancient gnome. It is true that it is all about the effect but usually the effect is not instantaneous. Following Coleridge, I view understanding in terms of growth. It leads an individual to undertake an attempt to grasp certain objective truths. What we notice thanks to extraordinary metaphors in literature and philosophy is that they illuminate us somehow. Our task is then to express this effect in language. Therefore, contrary to what Davidson claims, the possibility of multiple interpretations do not necessarily question the objective cognitive content of a metaphor.
Źródło:: IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2016, 28/1; 217-243
0860-4487
Pojawia się w:: IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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