Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "scientific language" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Metafory i neologizmy współczesnego języka nauk społecznych i ekonomicznych
Metaphors and neologisms in the modern language of social and economic science
Autorzy:
Parysek, Jerzy J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/694066.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
language
scientific language
metaphors
development of language
język
język naukowy
metafory
rozwój języka
Opis:
Together with the development of civilisation we observe a development of the language and not only the colloquial or literary but the language of science as well. The features of this development include, above all, metaphorisation of scientific language, borrowings from other languages (original and translated), and extension of the meaning of existing concepts. As a result, the scientific language, instead of being a tool of communication, causes more and more ambiguity, doubts and problems of interpretation. The selected examples of the changes occurring in the language of social and economic science presented in this article are intended to provoke a reflection on the on-going process which may lead, and does indeed, to many misunderstandings. Scientific language must be clear, simple, logical, concise, unambiguous and comprehensible. Only such will be capable of conveying the meaning of scientific research and investigation. This article presents the author’s point of view and may be controversial but it is also intended to provoke a discussion.
Składnikiem rozwoju cywilizacyjno-kulturowego jest ponad wszelką wątpliwość także język, i to nie tylko codzienny i literacki, ale również naukowy. Do cech tego rozwoju zaliczyć można przede wszystkim metaforyzację języka naukowego, użycie słów z języków obcych (oryginalnych lub w tłumaczeniu na język polski), wymyślanie nowych pojęć, a także rozszerzenie znaczenia istniejących. W wyniku tego procesu język naukowy, zamiast być narzędziem naukowej komunikacji, powoduje wiele niejasności, wątpliwości i problemów interpretacyjnych, przez co prowadzi do różnego rodzaju nieporozumień. Przytaczając wybrane przykłady zachodzących w języku nauk społecznych i ekonomicznych zmian, autor ma nadzieję wzbudzić refleksję nad trwającym procesem. Jest bowiem przekonany, że język naukowy musi być jasny, prosty, logiczny, zwięzły, jednoznaczny – i zrozumiały. Tylko taki jest w stanie właściwie i poprawnie oddać sens prowadzonych badań i dociekań naukowych. Jest to oczywiście prezentacja autorskiego punktu widzenia, a zatem dyskusyjnego, a być może nawet kontrowersyjnego. Ma jednak skłonić uczonych do zamyślenia nad stosowanym językiem, jego rozwojem, a w konsekwencji doprowadzić do wyhamowania tempa i korekty dokonujących się zmian. Naukowa nowomowa nie zapewne jest świadectwem wiedzy, kreatywności, nowoczesności, postępu, a być może jedynie zakamuflowanego uprawiania pseudonauki.
Źródło:
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny; 2017, 79, 3; 175-192
0035-9629
2543-9170
Pojawia się w:
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Science and Different Images of the World
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036727.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
science
language
common sense
scientific image
manifest image
Opis:
It has often been claimed in contemporary philosophy that the scientific world-view will necessarily replace the view of the world provided by common sense. It may be argued, however, that common sense holds a sort of methodological primacy over the aforementioned scientific world-view. For example, the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation entails the impossibility of establishing what a scientific theory is talking about. We can say what a scientific theory deals with only by having recourse to our ordinary language, i.e., by assuming that we know and understand in advance what we are talking about normally, in our daily life. It follows that science cannot be conceived of as a form of knowledge which is totally independent of ordinary language and, therefore, alternative to it. According to such a stance, even scientific theories stem from the universe of meanings that belong to common language. On his part Davidson, in challenging the scheme-content dualism, mentions both “a dualism of total scheme (or language) and uninterpreted content”, and “a dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content”. What we have here is a real dichotomy between these two elements, in the sense that the (conceptual) scheme is “other than” the (non-conceptual) content that is opposed to it. Now, Davidson’s rejection of the scheme-content distinction is supported by a set of arguments purporting to reject, first of all, the thesis that totally different conceptual schemes can actually exist. To put things in a very sketchy manner, he equates having a conceptual scheme with having a language, so that we face the following elements: (1) language as the organizing force; (2) what is organized, referred to as “experience”, “the stream of sensory experience”, and “physical evidence”; and, finally, (3) the failure of intertranslatability. It follows that “It is essential to this idea that there be something neutral and common that lies outside all schemes”. If this is the situation, he goes on, then we could say that conceptual schemes that are different in a radical way from each other correspond to languages that are not intertranslatable. How can we, however, make sense of a total failure of intertranslatability among languages? For sure “we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own”. Davidson’s conclusion is that if one gives up the dualism of scheme and world, he will not give up the world, but will instead be able to “re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true”. Davidson’s solution is radical, but we are bound to ask at this point what the expressions “reality” and “world” mean for him. They seem to coincide with the world of common sense which is formed by the familiar objects whose antics - as he says - make our sentences and opinions true or false. These familiar objects are tables, chairs, houses, stars, etc., just as we perceive them in our daily life. One is not entitled to ignore, however, that the current discussions on the problem of scientific realism arise because there appears to be a strong asymmetry between the commonsense view of the world and the scientific one. For instance, the table that we see with our eyes is not the same table that we “see” through the mediation of scientific instruments, and this fact is not trivial. It is rather easy to reach a high level of inter-subjective agreement among the individuals present in a room about the color, size and weight of a table, and it can also be granted that we form our beliefs in this regard by triangulating with our interlocutors and the surrounding environment. Such an agreement, however, may turn out to be problematic when we try to reconcile this vision of the world with what today science tells us about it. So, being in touch with such familiar objects as tables, chairs and stars “all the time” - as Richard Rorty adds - has a fundamental bearing only on the ontology of common sense, since our actual science shows that quite a different representation of reality can actually be provided (or, even better, it shows that those objects might not exist as men perceive them). Naturally, one can always resort to an objection of the following kind: Why should we deem the table viewed as a collection of subatomic particles more important than the table that our eyes see in daily life? After all, we can conduct our life well enough even ignoring what science claims (just like men did for many thousand years). This, however, may be judged as a serious underevaluation of the scientific enterprise. As a matter of fact, in the last centuries we are confronted not by one world-view, but by two complex images, each of which means to be a complete picture of man in the world. Wilfrid Sellars called these two perspectives, respectively, the manifest and the scientific image of man in the world. They are both intersubjective and non arbitrary. What are, however, these two images, and are they really alternative? Let us note, from the onset, that the two images we just mentioned are both idealizations in the same sense of Max Weber’s “ideal types”. This means that, in order to discover their actual presence, we need having recourse to a good deal of philosophical abstraction. In other words, they are not disclosed by mere empirical recognition. For instance, we live in the commonsense view of the world, and only a complex process of reflection makes us understand that we, as human beings, share a common view of the world, which is in turn determined by the fact that our physical structure bounds us to conceive of reality in a certain way rather than in another. Think about the importance that light, for example, has not only in daily life, but even in our philosophical conceptualization of the world. The story is complicated by the fact that each image has a history, and while the manifest image dates back to pre-history, the scientific image is constantly changing shape.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2016, 14; 14-27
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Прагматика - функционaлънaя перспектива языка
Autorzy:
Баранов, Анатолий Г.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1203918.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Opolski
Tematy:
language
functional style
scientific style
speech linguistics
text
dialogue form
extralinguistic factors
style of genre
dinamic concept of language
Opis:
The dynamie chaos theory applied to linguistics casts light on the role of Perm school of functional stylistics (M.N. Kozhina) as an odd attractor promoting the study of text in dynamics, especially the functional stylistic-semantic categories of text.It is argued here that modem situation in linguistics is shaped by the application of global context (individual cognitive system - on the personal level, and culture in all its heterogeneity - on the social level) to the mainstream research of language in use. This methodological demand is met by functional pragmatics as whole semiotics embracing all aspects of semiosis. lt ensures the blend of cognitive and interpretive models with their specific procedures in revealing the subtleties of language in use. That is exemplified in the analysis of a chunk of fictive text. Besides, we set forth the category of tonality which denotes attitudes and tones permeating discourse, in the light ofM.N. Kozhina's contribution to the field.
Źródło:
Stylistyka; 2005, 14; 75-86
1230-2287
2545-1669
Pojawia się w:
Stylistyka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Teologia fundamentalna wobec naukowości teologii
Autorzy:
Dola, Tadeusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2158267.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-11-28
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Tematy:
theology
fundamental theology
scientific character
meta-theoloogy
language
methodology
teologia
teologia fundamentalna
naukowość
metateologia
język
metoda
Opis:
Celem artykułu Teologia fundamentalna wobec naukowości teologii jest ukazanie wkładu teologii fundamentalnej w badania metateologiczne. Do zasadniczych rozważań wprowadza krótkie przedstawienie głównych etapów rozwoju teorii teologii. Pozwala ono wskazać, w którym momencie w dociekania metateologiczne włącza się teologia fundamentalna i jaki stan badań zastaje. Udział teologii fundamentalnej w tych dociekaniach zostaje zaprezentowany w dwóch punktach: badania teologicznofundamentalne w obszarze ogólnej teorii teologii oraz w obszarze teorii teologii fundamentalnej. Zarówno w jednej, jak i w drugiej dziedzinie teologia fundamentalna posiada sporo publikacji i znaczące osiągnięcia merytoryczne. Wynika to z pewnością z faktu, że wielu teologów fundamentalnych zalicza metateologię do ważnych przedmiotów swoich badań, uznając, że teologia fundamentalna bardziej niż inne dyscypliny teologiczne predestynowana jest do prowadzenia tego typu dociekań.
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the contribution of fundamental theology to meta- theological research. The main considerations are introduced by a brief presentation of the main stages of development of the theory of theology. This renders it possible to indicate at which moment fundamental theology enters the meta-theological research and to present the research in this area. The participation of fundamental theology in these investigations is presented in two parts: (1) fundamental theological research in the area of the general theory of theology and (2) in the area of the theory of fundamental theology. In both areas, fundamental theology has a good number of publications and significant substantive achievements. This is undoubtedly due to the inclusion of meta-theology by many fundamental theologians as being important subjects of their research. Important, too, is the acknowledgement that fundamental theology, more than other theological disciplines, is predestined to carry out this type of investigation. 
Źródło:
Studia Nauk Teologicznych PAN; 2022, 17; 37-55
1896-3226
2719-3101
Pojawia się w:
Studia Nauk Teologicznych PAN
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies