- Tytuł:
-
Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game
Mądrość zespołowa a równowaga bayesowska w grach sieciowych - Autorzy:
- Matsuhisa, Takashi
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953385.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2018
- Wydawca:
- Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
- Tematy:
-
bayesian routing game
common-knowledge
conjecture
expected delay equilibrium
expected price of anarchy
information partition
nash
equilibrium
rational expectations equilibrium
social costs
tworzenie partnerstwa
gra dynamiczne
równowaga nash
problem
stopowania - Opis:
- In this paper we investigate equilibriums in the Bayesian routing problem of the network game introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999).We treat epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium of social costs function in the network game. It highlights the role of common-knowledge on the users' individual conjectures on the others' selections of channels in the network game. Especially two notions of equilibria are presented in the Bayesian extension of the network game; expected delay equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium. The former equilibrium is given such as each user minimizes own expectations of delay, and the latter is given as he/she maximizes own expectations of a social costs. We show that the equilibria have the properties: If all users commonly know them, then the former equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium in the based KP-model and the latter equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium for social costs in the network game. Further we introduce the extended notions of price of anarchy in the Bayesian network game for rational expectations equilibriums for social costs, named the expected price of anarchy and the common-knowledge price of anarchy. We will examine the relationship among the two extended price of anarchy and the classical notion of price of anarchy introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou(1999).
- Źródło:
-
Mathematica Applicanda; 2018, 46, 2
1730-2668
2299-4009 - Pojawia się w:
- Mathematica Applicanda
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł