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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    BONUM SEQUITUR ESSE
    Autorzy:
    Maryniarczyk, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507693.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    good
    being
    thing
    existence
    metaphysics
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    The article discusses the connection of the good with being along three steps. First, it briefly considers the history of the word “good” to see what is hidden behind it and to what one should direct his or her thoughts and searches. Second, it looks at the beginning of inquiries on the nature and sources of the good. Three, it analyzes the originality of one of the most interesting solutions in this controversy surrounding the good, which appeared in the thirteenth century and which was contained in the short sentence, “bonum sequitur esse rei”—the good is a consequence of the existence of a thing.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3; 335-345
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Nuda jako wola
    The Boredom as the Will
    Autorzy:
    Karpiński, Maciej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1622007.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
    Tematy:
    attraction
    wanting
    thing
    satisfaction
    repulsion
    overcoming
    necessary will
    Meaning
    force (power)
    existence
    categorical will
    boredom
    will
    Opis:
    The will, widely understood, is a lack of indifference – a turn to (a wanting-desire) or from (a negative wanting, hate) some thing: an attraction or a repulsion – both in the literal meaning (a physical force) and any metaphoric meaning. As the relation between a subject and an object, the will is a specific case of the existence, that is to say a relation of the structure: A exists for B, where A, in some way, acts for B. In the case of the will, the existence-influence depends on an attraction (A exists for B as wanted-desired) or a repulsion (A exists for B as wanted in negative way, hated). The categorical will is a wanting (desire or hate) focused on some thing due to it. The instrumental will is a wanting (desire or hate) focused on some thing as an instrument for the satisfaction of the other will; it (instrumental will) occurs always together with some categorical will, which is the cause of that instrumental will. The willpower is the sum of values of advantages (with the plus sign) and disadvantages (with the minus sign) of the object on which the will is focused. The satisfaction of the will leads to the vanishing of the relation between a subject and an object, and – consequently – to the vanishing of members of that relation (by their unification, in the case when a wanting-desire is satisfied, or isolation, in the case of the satisfaction of a negative wanting, hate). The free will is a type of an accidental will, being a creative act (decision) of a subject. The unfree will may be necessary, when it must exist, or accidental, when it can, but does not has to exist. The Meaning of a concrete subject is its axiological justification, essence (proper identity), vocation and fulfillment (final aim). The boredom is a necessary and a categorical wanting-desire of the Meaning. The factors of the boredom are the power of a wanting-desire of the Meaning and the interval of time, when a wantingdesire is unsatisfied. The overcoming of the boredom is a satisfied wanting-desire of the Meaning.
    Źródło:
    Analiza i Egzystencja; 2017, 38; 109-129
    1734-9923
    2300-7621
    Pojawia się w:
    Analiza i Egzystencja
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    ONTOLOGY: UNREAL REALITY
    Autorzy:
    Jaroszyński, Piotr
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507394.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    metaphysics
    ontology
    reality
    possibility
    thing
    essence
    existence
    Aristotle
    Avicenna
    Thomas Aquinas
    Duns Scotus
    Henry of Ghent
    Francis Suarez
    Clauberg
    Edmund Husserl
    Opis:
    The article examines the difference between ontology and metaphysics. It shows that as soon as the composition of being from essence and existence is treated as purely mental or in a “reified” way (where essence and existence are independent elements), then essence as essence becomes a thing, and then simply becomes a being, or what is called reality. Both versions in which the real difference disappears or in which the road leads to “reification,” influence the treatment of essence as independent, where essence as thing fills the field of reality. However, if essence was only possibility, then (1) the reality also would be merely possible, (2) the realistic field of philosophical terminology would get curtailed, and (3) there would be no terms to maintain the difference between reality and possibility, between metaphysics and ontology.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3; 321-334
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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