Autor: Galewicz, Włodzimierz - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Zakres sprawiedliwości wyrównawczej w etyce Arystotelesa
The Scope of Corrective Justice in Aristotle’s Ethics
Autorzy:: Galewicz, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938500.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2017
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:: Aristotle
corrective justice
ethics
Opis:: The task of corrective justice in Aristotle’s ethics is the rectification of harms or injuries resulting from voluntary or involuntary interactions between persons. However, the scope of this form of justice is not clear. In its widest conception it would include all harms done to a person against her will and without her fault. According to a narrower conception, instead, it is only an injury caused by an unjust or wrongful action that requires compensation. But in fact Aristotle distinguishes several concepts of unjust action. As a result, the narrower conception appears in various versions which are discussed in this paper.
Źródło:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 289-308
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: O Arystotelesowskiej teorii poznania praktycznego
On the Aristotelian theory of practical cognition
Autorzy:: Galewicz, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015951.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2002
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:: Arystoteles
etyka
poznanie praktyczne
intuicja
Aristotle
ethics
practical cognition
intuition
Opis:: The article contains an analysis of Aristotle's views concerning ethical cognition. The author considers, among others, the following questions: (1) Did Aristotle at all know something like, literally understood, 'cognition by feeling', that is a kind of emotional defining values or normative features; and if so, then (2) Speaking of ethical aisthêsis, did he understand this kind of emotional intuition by it? The result of considerations is that although nature and contents of ethical perception do not appear in the texts of the author of Nikomachean Ethics too clearly, it can be stated that ethical perception is not common sensual perception, but it most reminds of an observation through which certain mathematical relations and truths are defined. Practical wisdom consists more in using this kind of ethical intuition than in cognition and in use of some general truths.
Źródło:: Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 83-103
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:: Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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