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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Problem prawdy w myśli Platona
    The Problem of Truth in the Thought of Plato
    Autorzy:
    Duma, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/512472.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne Adalbertinum
    Tematy:
    truth
    Plato
    philosophy
    cognition
    Opis:
    The undertaken considerations seek for revealing that in the thought of Plato there are few different approaches to the problem of truth. They start with the epistemological aspect which was inherited by Plato from Parmenides according to which truth is a constitutive element of human cognition and knowledge, an element that is conditioned by precisely determined indicators such as universality, necessity and invariability. The important contribution of Plato in explaining the problem of truth is where he underlines its meaning in the accomplishment of human being. The natural ability for knowing truth is the most crucial expression of humanity that is why more he draws on truth more he exists.
    Źródło:
    Studia Ełckie; 2011, 13; 7-30
    1896-6896
    2353-1274
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Ełckie
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    TO KNOW OR TO THINK—THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE UNDERSTANDING OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE LIGHT OF THE STUDIES OF MIECZYSŁAW A. KRĄPIEC
    Autorzy:
    Duma, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507566.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    thinking
    cognition
    philosophy
    knowledge
    reality
    abstract
    sign
    understanding
    metaphysics
    realism
    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec
    Opis:
    The article concentrates on the specificity of philosophical cognition. Referring to Mieczysław A. Krąpiec’s study, the author proves that the process of thinking is not to be necessarily identified with the process of cognition, as in fact the former is merely a secondary phase of the latter. When identified with thinking, the philosophical cognition would undermine the very sense of cognition, which means the understanding of reality. When based on thinking alone, philosophy does not grasp real things, but operates with abstracts of being and being’s representations (concepts). As for the correctness of philosophical thinking the laws of logic, with ensuring non-contradictory operations, are sufficient enough. However, any knowledge that aspires to be philosophical has to start from really existing beings. In the next phases of cognition, such beings are grasped more and more particularly and precisely—starting from their transcendental properties and principles, then their structure and categorial properties, and finally their individual characteristics and actions. The very first act of cognition is directed to real beings, which are immediately grasped in respect of their existence and real essence. The second act of cognition deals with signs. The precedence of being in human cognition makes the philosophy charged not with a task of thinking about the world, but with the task of knowing and understanding it within possible and verifiable limits. Therefore, according to Krapiec, the very first philosophical discipline is metaphysics, which has real beings as its object. Thus, philosophical cognition should preserve its objective character, as this is the only way to guarantee its realism.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3; 277-299
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rola istnienia (bytu) w metafizycznym wyjaśnianiu rzeczywistości
    The role of existence (of being) in the metaphysical explanation of reality
    Autorzy:
    Duma, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057887.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    byt
    filozofia
    istnienie
    metafizyka
    poznanie
    rzeczywistość
    being
    philosophy
    existence
    metaphysics
    cognition
    reality
    Opis:
    In the article, the author shows the le¬gitimacy of the maximalist approach in the philosophical explanation of reality. He refers to the existential aspect of be¬ing which, in his opinion, defines the right direction of searching for the ulti¬mate foundations of reality itself and hu¬man cognition. Of course, it is not about the ultimacy in the sense of unequivo¬cally pointing to the „substrate” of real¬ity, but more about the cognitive ap¬proach itself, which opens the philosopher to what reality is as fully as possible. He begins his considerations with an outline of a contemporary view of reality and then takes up the problem of the philosophical explanation of real¬ity, the philosophy of being, and the metaphysics of existence. In conclusion, he notes the main elements of a realistic interpretation of reality. The proposed elucidations are very general, but they point to those dimensions of reality, without which the understanding of the latter becomes a pure hypothesis.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 95-113
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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