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Wyszukujesz frazę "Pawlikowski, Tomasz" wg kryterium: Autor


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Tytuł:
Poznawalność bytu. Parmenides i św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Cognoscibility of Being. Case of Parmenides and St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Pawlikowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452395.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
byt
poznawalność bytu
metafizyka
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Parmenides
being
cognoscibility of being
metaphysics
St. Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
According to Parmenides, the only acceptable way of philosophy as true cognition is research of being. The philosophical tradition had taken this track. St. Thomas Aquinas had very little information about Parmenidean ontology, but shared his focus on being as the object of knowledge. However, they had a different understanding of being. Philosopher of Elea claimed that everything is one monistic being. Therefore, every act of cognition has the same object – being. There is only being. Non-being is nothing. It doesn’t exist, so it isn’t cognizable. Moreover, the knowledge of being and being itself are the same. As a consequence, Parmenides described entity in identification to the mind and recognized the essence of being as truth. Therefore, his ontology is called “a veridical conception of being”. According to Aquinas, being is pluralistic. There are many types of entities, minds and truths. The core of every being is act of existence. The truth is property of singular beings or judgements. Thomas metaphysics is existential. The truth, that is here identified with adequation of thing and intellect, and cognoscibility of beings, is interpreted as the consequence of existence. Being, truth and cognoscibility are different things. In comparison with Parmenides, Thomas seems to be more faithful to the “way of being”. He characterizes being as existing and avoids a specific paradox that is inability to define the truth in a classical way, assuming her identity with the entity.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 31-54
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem subsystencji w "Logice" Marcina Śmigleckiego
The problem of Subsistence in "The Logic" of Marcin Śmiglecki
Autorzy:
Pawlikowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452510.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Marcin Śmiglecki
the second scholasticism
subsistence
substance
being
druga scholastyka
subsystencja
substancja
byt
Opis:
Marcin Śmiglecki (1564-1618) was one of the most famous Polish representatives of the second scholastics. His work Logica, originally published in Ingolstadt (1618), was followed by three times published at Oxford (1634, 1638 and 1658).This work includes a series of logical and metaphysical problems, issue of subsistence among them the. This issue belongs to the metaphysical problematics of the substance and is associated with the concept of being. An outline of the issues of subsistence, which we find in The Logic (1618), is very important, because in the earlier lectures in Vilnius (1586/1587), our thinker barely mentioned it. The problem was discussed in the Christian tradition. On the manner its consideration influenced mainly views of Boethius (c. 480-525), who understood the subsistence as a substance take on the aspect of independent existence. This idea developed St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1275) in accordance with its metaphysics of existence. The concept of subsistence meant for him independence in existence understood as the act of being. Generally, the second scholasticism, which was founded on the tradition of “pure” Aristotelianism, marginalized this question. We find this expressed in the views of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), who claimed that “to subsist” means only one of many properties of the substance and that does not matter for the theory of being. However, for Śmiglecki, the concept of subsistence was essentially important. In the field of contingent beings it enabled him to positive statement the substance as being able to exist by itself. It was a generally valid definition of subsistence, especially referring to substances created. In this meaning “the subsistence” marked the independent existence, not inherent in the substrate. In the second and the crucial meaning, the subsistence is characterized by independence from any cause. This is the case of God’s Substance, Existence itself by itself. It seems that the great advantage of the concept of subsistence in Śmiglecki’s theory was that it allowed to accurately distinguish between substance created and the uncreated. The solution of this difficult problem was made possible by drawing attention to the existential aspect of being. Aquinas’ theory of being suggested this solution, but in the period of second scholasticism Aristotelian metaphysics was favorited. Thomistic accents were probable the cause that Śmiglecki’s Logic was initially negatively censured in Roma (1615). This is the fact, in his fundamental work our author walked away from some interpretations introduced by F. Suárez and masters of Jesuits school, but finally that gave great effects.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 305-328
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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