Temat: rule-following - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Gödel, Wittgenstein and the Sensibility of Platonism
Autorzy:: Poręba, Marcin
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1357900.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-06-30
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:: concepts
Gödel
intuition
mathematics
Platonism
realism
rule-following
Wittgenstein
Opis:: The paper presents an interpretation of Platonism, the seeds of which can be found in the writings of Gödel and Wittgenstein. Although it is widely accepted that Wittgenstein is an anti-Platonist the author points to some striking affinities between Gödel’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of mathematical concepts and the role of feeling and intuition in mathematics. A version of Platonism emerging from these considerations combines realism with respect to concepts with a view of concepts as accessible to feeling and able to guide our behavior through feeling.
Źródło:: Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2021, 5, 1; 108-125
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:: Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Meaning under the threat of paradox on two fronts
Autorzy:: Ramirez Calle, Olga
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1621531.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:: Rule-Following
Paradox
Family Resemblance
Wittgenstein
Kripke
Przestrzeganie reguł
paradoks
podobieństwo rodzinne
Opis:: The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem of the ‘under-determination of meaning’, and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the threat is a pervasive one challenged.
Źródło:: Analiza i Egzystencja; 2020, 50; 5-17
1734-9923
2300-7621
Pojawia się w:: Analiza i Egzystencja
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem
Wittgenstein: From Ethics to Blind Rule-Following and Back Again
Autorzy:: Nowak, Ewa
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781452.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2018
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:: Wittgenstein
ethics
pragmatism
blind rule-following
considered and deliberated judgment
Discourse Ethics
Habermas
Lind
Kohlberg
Tomasello
Gehlen
Bloor
Brożek
Opis:: The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence.
Źródło:: Ethics in Progress; 2018, 9, 2; 131-161
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:: Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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