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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    El debate en torno al ‘argumento del intellectus essentiae’ y la ‘distinción real’ entre la esencia y el ser en el De ente et essentia de Tomás de Aquino
    The Debate on the ‘Intellectus Essentiae Argument’ and the ‘Real Distinction’ between Essence and Being in the De Ente et Essentia by Thomas Aquinas
    Autorzy:
    Ocampo, Fernanda
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507308.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-06-30
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    Thomas Aquinas
    real distinction
    intellectus essentiae argument
    De ente et essentia
    essence
    being
    metaphysics
    Thomism
    Opis:
    The so-called ‘intellectus essentiae argument’ has constituted one of the resources of some 13th century authors, to establish the ‘real distinction’ between essence and being in every creature. This argument is also present in Aquinas’ De Ente et Essentia, a work in which, the philosopher is believed to have tried to demonstrate the ‘real distinction or composition’ as well. Now, it is precisely the meaning and scope of this argument regarding the demonstration of the ‘real distinction’ in Thomas’ argumentation that has been object of recent debate among specialists. In this sense, we intend in this article to first expose the argument in the context of the work to which it belongs, then concentrate on the opinions of the different commentators, and finally outline our conclusions based on the interpretations we consider the most accurate.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2018, 7, 2; 237-261
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    El oscurecimiento del ser y su sustitución por la existencia
    The Obscuring of Esse and Its Substitution by Existence
    Autorzy:
    Marenghi, Claudio
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507422.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-03-20
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    being
    essence
    existence
    entity
    real distinction
    essentialism
    existentialism
    Thomas Aquinas
    Etienne Gilson
    Martin Heidegger
    ser
    esencia
    existencia
    ente
    distinción real
    esencialismo
    existencialismo
    Tomás de Aquino
    Opis:
    The question of the real distinction between esse and essence in being constitutes the core of Thomistic ontology. While there is a primacy of esse over essence, such as that of the founding over the founded, one must neglect neither of these aspects in the analysis of the act-potency transcendental relationship that links them. Through a brief historical journey—from the years following the death of St. Thomas Aquinas to the present—the author tries to show the way in which the notion of esse has been gradually distorted and obscured by the notion of essence, and then replaced by the notion of existence.
    La cuestión de la distinción real entre el ‘ser’ y la ‘esencia’ en el seno del ‘ente’ constituye el corazón de la ontología tomista. Si bien hay una primacía del ser sobre la esencia, como la de lo fundante sobre lo fundado, no se deben descuidar en los análisis ambos aspectos y la relación trascendental actopotencial que los vincula. En el presente escrito pretendemos mostrar, a través de un escueto recorrido histórico, el modo en que la noción fundamental del ‘ser’ tomista ha sido paulatinamente distorsionada y oscurecida por la noción fundamental de ‘esencia’, hasta llegar a ser sustituida por la noción misma de ‘existencia’. Para ello, nos remontaremos a lo ocurrido en los años siguientes a la muerte del Aquinate, cuando esta cuestión pasó a ser discutida por sus discípulos, pasando luego revista por los autores más significativos que han tratado el tema en la modernidad y en la contemporaneidad filosófica.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2019, 8, 1; 113-146
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Realna różnica między intelektem czynnym i możnościowym w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    The Real Distinction Between Agent and Potential Intellect in Approach Thomas Aquinas
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452459.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Thomas Aquinas
    potential intellect
    agent intellect
    real distinction
    object oh intellectual cognition
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy
    intelekt czynny
    różnica realna
    przedmiot poznania intelektualnego
    Opis:
    The aim of article was to prove the existence of the real difference between active intellect and potential intellect, based on the epistemological thought of Thomas Aquinas. Although many authors suggested such a character distinction, yet no one does not try to justifying it. In this article are comments on intellects in Aristotle account, very short history – following the Aquinas - of distinguishing and separating intellects. Presented is the same understanding of the real difference between existence and essence of beings created and in this light given difference between intellects, because Aquinas, actually never spoke about it in this way. A basic element of the article is to distinguish intellects on the basis of a formal rules of their objects and distinguish them on the basis of acts, which allows to build a proper argumentation. It has been shown that between what is recognized in the potential intellect is a disproportion, which may be removed by the allocation of truly different between potential and active intellect. Between intellects there is a real difference only in the case of the human intellect, since both in God and in the angelic beings, this differentiation is not needed. The real difference between intellects is based on the difference between the act and potency or being in act and being in potency, however, are not they act and potency relative to each other, but to the cognized object. Moreover, the active intellect as being in the act, is not determined nor determining the object of cognition potential intellect, it is not the object recognized by him. Finally, if the way of cognition depends on the mode of existence, the intellectual knowledge infinity of human remains in potency, by what must be in man two intellects.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2015, 4; 63-95
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Flexibility of Thomistic Metaphysical Principles: Byzantine Thomists, Personalist Thomists, and Jacques Maritain
    Autorzy:
    Spencer, Mark K.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2138109.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-09-26
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    thomism
    Thomas Aquinas
    Gregory Palamas
    Karol Wojtyła
    Jacques Maritain
    divine action
    divine simplicity
    essence-energies distinction
    subjectivity
    personalism
    metaphysics
    real and rational distinctions
    Opis:
    Thomistic metaphysics has been challenged on the grounds that its principles are inconsistent with our experiences of divine action and of our own subjectivity. Challenges of this sort have been raised by Eastern Christian thinkers in the school of Gregory Palamas and by contemporary Personalists; they propose alternative metaphysics to explain these experiences. Against these objections and against those Thomists who hold that ThomasAquinas’ claims exclude Byzantine and Personalist metaphysics, I argue that Thomas’ metaphysical principles already have “flexibility” built into them, such that they can accommodate ways that reality is given in experience, which Thomas did not consider. I argue for this claim using the work of Byzantine and Personalist Thomists, and especially of Jacques Maritain, who outlines several ways in which Thomistic metaphysical principles can be expanded to explain experiences that he did not consider.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2022, 11, 3; 445-470
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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