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    Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8
    Tytuł:
    Problem mind-body w świetle Tomaszowej koncepcji hylemorfizmu
    Mind-body problem in the light of Aquinas’s conception of hylomorphism
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075807.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    problem umysł-ciało
    hylemorfizm
    jedność duszy i ciała
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    mind-body problem
    hylomorphism
    unity of the soul and body
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    The aim of this paper is to approach the mind- body problem in the context of philosophy of Aquinas, especially in the context of his understanding of hylomorphism. Disproportion between the issues of the philosophy of mind and Thomas's position are not to the extend which would unable us to see at the variety of questions from his perspective discussed nowadays by philosophers. On the contrary, Thomas' stance might be an attractive solution with regard to positions already fixed (established)- materialism and dualism. What follows in this paper are four issues: the problem of causative interaction between soul and body, the question of cognition of other senses, the issue of personal identity, and at least, the issue of qualia. All these questions, contemporary discussed, find their answers in Aquinas' explanation which points out the most proper understanding of human being, which is defining a human being as a person.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2018, 7; 159-176
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Realna różnica między intelektem czynnym i możnościowym w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    The Real Distinction Between Agent and Potential Intellect in Approach Thomas Aquinas
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452459.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Thomas Aquinas
    potential intellect
    agent intellect
    real distinction
    object oh intellectual cognition
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy
    intelekt czynny
    różnica realna
    przedmiot poznania intelektualnego
    Opis:
    The aim of article was to prove the existence of the real difference between active intellect and potential intellect, based on the epistemological thought of Thomas Aquinas. Although many authors suggested such a character distinction, yet no one does not try to justifying it. In this article are comments on intellects in Aristotle account, very short history – following the Aquinas - of distinguishing and separating intellects. Presented is the same understanding of the real difference between existence and essence of beings created and in this light given difference between intellects, because Aquinas, actually never spoke about it in this way. A basic element of the article is to distinguish intellects on the basis of a formal rules of their objects and distinguish them on the basis of acts, which allows to build a proper argumentation. It has been shown that between what is recognized in the potential intellect is a disproportion, which may be removed by the allocation of truly different between potential and active intellect. Between intellects there is a real difference only in the case of the human intellect, since both in God and in the angelic beings, this differentiation is not needed. The real difference between intellects is based on the difference between the act and potency or being in act and being in potency, however, are not they act and potency relative to each other, but to the cognized object. Moreover, the active intellect as being in the act, is not determined nor determining the object of cognition potential intellect, it is not the object recognized by him. Finally, if the way of cognition depends on the mode of existence, the intellectual knowledge infinity of human remains in potency, by what must be in man two intellects.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2015, 4; 63-95
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.
    Aquinas’s impediment argument for the immateriality of the intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452485.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy
    niematerialność intelektu
    poznanie intelektualne
    dusza i ciało
    Thomas Aquinas
    possible intellect
    immateriality
    intellectual cognition
    soul and body
    Opis:
    Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 77-98
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Poznanie Adama i wiedza Chrystusa a intelekt możnościowy i czynny. Ujęcie Tomasza z Akwinu
    The Cognition of Adam and Knowldege of Christ in the Context of Potential and Agent Intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078915.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy i czynny
    wiedza Chrystusa
    wiedza Adama
    Thomas Aquinas
    potential intellect
    agent intellect
    knowledge of Christ
    knowledge of Adam
    Opis:
    Thomas Aquinas anthropology is related to the description of human nature, which was established at the beginning, before original sin, as well as taking into account all its effects, and the nature that was united with God. The distinction of two intellects adopted by Aristotle - a potential and active intellect - for Aquinas was helpful in showing the unique character of the knowledge that Adam and Christ had. Adam as the one who was appointed as teacher of people, had perfect knowledge and did not have a potential intellect that would be an unwritten tablet. His potential intellect had the habits of knowledge, by which he had a perfect knowledge of everything that can be embraced in any field of cognition by the power of the first principles of knowledge. The perfection of Christ's knowledge was incomparably greater than knowledge of Adam and every other human being – it was result of unification with the Word, but not the mixing of two natures. Christ had knowledge which have blessed (saved), infused knowledge (resulting from union with the Word) and had experiential knowledge appropriate to age and time. Christ developed in knowledge and wisdom because he grew in human experience.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 123-138
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Intelekt bierny a intelekt możnościowy w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    Passive intellect and potential intellect according to St. Thomas Aquinas
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452457.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt bierny
    intelekt możnościowy
    perypatetycka tradycja epistemologiczna
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    passive intellect
    potential intellect
    peripatetic epistemological tradition
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    The article is an attempt to respond the following questions: is there a difference between operations of potential and passive intellect? Could one call the potential intellect passive intellect? Are there any questions, statements or opinions in the history of philosophy which separate potential from passive intellect? The passivity of potential intellect is not a problem here, because its nature and its act is to be in the state of potency towards ist object. The subject of analysis tends to define teechnical terms "intellectus passivus" and to reach philosophical implications resulting from it.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2012, 1; 65-84
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy poznanie jest wyższe niż miłość? Uzasadnienie wyższości intelektu nad wolą w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu
    Is cognition better than love? Justification of intellect’s superiority over will in Thomas Aquinas’ account
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452475.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt
    wola
    miłość
    poznanie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intellect
    will
    love
    cognition
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    Thomas Aquinas in his works sympathizes with the priority and thus superiority of intellect over will definitely. Presenting various ways of arguing he intends to point out the perfection of intellect, which becomes perfect in its act of cognition, it assures the proper action of will. Because of its object – truth about reality – as well as final and formal causation intellect moves will which aims to good. Only in the situation of such an object of intellect, which somehow exceeds human cognition potencies, will could acquire superiority over cognition. Thus a man only in an act of love of God is able to love by will that, which he cannot cognize. In other cases, particularly in case of natural cognition of sensual reality, in which man grasps an essence, cognition always goes before volition. Stressing superiority of intellect over will is not a matter of introducing into the consideration of their mutual relations additional topic. It is crucial problem, which allows proper understanding issue of freedom in Aquinas’ account.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2014, 3; 75-97
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego
    Truth about intellect. Understanding of possible and agent intellect in the thought of Mieczysław Gogacz
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452563.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt możnościowy
    intelekt czynny
    dusza i ciało
    jednostkowienie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    Mieczysław Gogacz
    possible intellect
    agent intellect
    soul and body
    individuation
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 75-89
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Poznanie niewyraźne Boga ("cognitio confusa") – Tomasz z Akwinu i Kartezjusz
    Confused cognition of God ("cognitio confusa") – St. Thomas Aquinas and Descartes
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452593.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    Kartezjusz
    poznanie niewyraźne
    naturalne poznanie Boga
    poznanie Boga przez łaskę
    poznanie Boga w chwale
    Thomas Aquinas
    Descartes
    unclear cognition
    natural knowledge of God
    knowledge of God by grace
    knowledge of God in glory
    Opis:
    A man has a natural need for cognition of causes, particularly when he perceives reality, which is an effect of someone’s action. Aristotle, when describing a philosopher (the wise man), emphasizes that he’s a person, who has knowledge about all things (as far as possible) and cognitions of things, which are difficult to cognire and also knows causes, which are cognizable at most. But whether it’s possible recognition of causes and the paradigm of realistic philosophy nowadays, when we inherit principles of Cartesian Philosophy in our mindset and culture? When is everything unclear, inaccurate or mysterious regard as false? And when only mathematical clearness preserves state of knowledge and certainty? Therefore the problem of unclear cognition is so significant. This issue was prepared by St. Thomas Aquinas, who on that basis considered question of cognition of God. Descartes, however, completely negated this kind of cognition and built ‘boundary sign’ for the truth of the cognition. It seems that reinstatement of the right place of confused cognition and its protection in philosophy is possible inasmuch as it is still possible cognition of reality, i.e. cognition of thing-in-itself. A wonderment (admiration), which was the beginning of philosophy (because it express confused cognition of world) in post-Cartesian paradigm of reflection is unconvincing – the essence of the philosophy is purely and simply clear thinking. But emphasize the role of confused cognition is not a recognition it as sufficient and only way to perfect knowledge. Emphasizing confused knowledge is an objection to the thesis of the possession of only excellent knowledge and in the act, and objection to the claims that deny the potentiality and potency of knowing reality. If so, there would be no compromise statement that for the beliver the existence of God is obvious and for non-beliver non-existence of God is equally obvious.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 137-153
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8

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