Temat: Personal identity - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection
Autorzy:: Olson, Eric T.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791263.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-03-18
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:: Swinburne
personal identity
immortality
Opis:: Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.
Źródło:: Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2021, 69, 1; 89-101
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:: Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: The Revival of Substance Dualism
Autorzy:: Robinson, Howard
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791257.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-03-18
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:: Swinburne
dualism
personal identity
epiphenomenalism
Opis:: I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.
Źródło:: Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2021, 69, 1; 33-43
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:: Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity
Autorzy:: Schwenkler, John
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791259.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-03-18
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:: Swinburne
dualism
personal identity
imaginary cases
Opis:: A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalyzable.
Źródło:: Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2021, 69, 1; 57-65
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:: Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity
Autorzy:: Snowdon, Paul
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791255.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-03-18
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:: Swinburne
physicalism
entailments
privileged access
personal identity
Simple View
Reductionist View
Opis:: In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.
Źródło:: Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2021, 69, 1; 11-21
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:: Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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