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Wyszukujesz frazę "economic modeling" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Assessment of the historical policy mixes for Poland using the game approach
Autorzy:
Kruś, L.
Woroniecka-Leciejewicz, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205620.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
game theory
economic modeling
policy-mix
decision analysis
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimality
Opis:
The study here presented pertains to the analysis of mutual interactions of the monetary and fiscal policies in the case of Poland. The historical policies carried out during different periods of time and their economic effects are compared with the possible strategies, obtained from the analysis of the proposed monetaryfiscal game. In the study, the methods of non-cooperative game theory are combined with macroeconomic modeling. The respective game is formulated for monetary and fiscal authorities as players. Strategies of these players refer to the respective instruments of their policies: the real interest rate and the budget deficit in relation to GDP. Payoffs include inflation and GDP growth, respectively. The payoffs are calculated using a recursive macroeconomic model estimated for the Polish economy. The model describes influences of the instruments of the monetary and fiscal policies on the state of the economy. The best response strategies, the Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are analyzed. Changes of the policies towards the more restrictive or more expansive ones and their effects in comparison to the historically applied are discussed. This is performed for two different time periods – the time of recovery after 2004 and the time of the global financial crisis after 2008.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2018, 47, 3; 277-300
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations
Autorzy:
Sokolovskyi, Dmytro B.
Sokolovska, Olena V.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/417302.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-15
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
investors
Pareto-optimality
modeling
Game Theory
Nash equilibrium
Government
economic behavior
Opis:
Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
Źródło:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe; 2015, 3; 47-70
2084-3356
Pojawia się w:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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