- Tytuł:
- Risk assessment for industrial control systems quantifying availability using mean failure cost (MFC)
- Autorzy:
-
Chen, Q.
Abercrombie, R. K.
Sheldon, F. T. - Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/91644.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2015
- Wydawca:
- Społeczna Akademia Nauk w Łodzi. Polskie Towarzystwo Sieci Neuronowych
- Tematy:
-
Industrial Control Systems
ICS
SCADA systems
industry
data acquisition
supervisory control
IT network
mean failure cost
MFC
security
risk assessment
systemy automatyki przemysłowej
systemy SCADA
przemysł
pozyskiwanie danych
sprawowanie nadzoru
sieć IT
bezpieczeństwo
ocena ryzyka - Opis:
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are commonly used in industries such as oil and natural gas, transportation, electric, water and wastewater, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, as well as discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. Originally, ICS implementations were susceptible primarily to local threats because most of their components were located in physically secure areas (i.e., ICS components were not connected to IT networks or systems). The trend toward integrating ICS systems with IT networks (e.g., efficiency and the Internet of Things) provides significantly less isolation for ICS from the outside world thus creating greater risk due to external threats. Albeit, the availability of ICS/SCADA systems is critical to assuring safety, security and profitability. Such systems form the backbone of our national cyber-physical infrastructure. Herein, we extend the concept of mean failure cost (MFC) to address quantifying availability to harmonize well with ICS security risk assessment. This new measure is based on the classic formulation of Availability combined with Mean Failure Cost (MFC). The metric offers a computational basis to estimate the availability of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of security violations or breakdowns (e.g., deliberate malicious failures).
- Źródło:
-
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research; 2015, 5, 3; 205-220
2083-2567
2449-6499 - Pojawia się w:
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł