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    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
    Tytuł:
    Po co matematykom Jan Jakub Rousseau?
    Why do mathematicians need Jean-Jacques Rousseau?
    Autorzy:
    Kalinowska, Alina
    Stański, Adam
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1388538.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-09-30
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Gdański. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
    Tematy:
    Game Theory
    Competitive game
    Cooperative games
    Nash equilibrium
    Pareto efficiency
    Opis:
    One day, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was known mainly as a philosopher and a pedagogue, told a deer hunting story. In doing so, he managed to play a small role in the development of the branch of maths called ‘game theory’. Later his story was converted into a game. Initially game theory was used to explain exchange in the field of economics. Over time, the mathematical modeling was found to be useful in the social sciences. A game theory describes diverse and cognizant participants forced to make decisions. In regards to the game based on cooperation, a choice is at the same time a dilemma. It can be viewed as a moral or philosophical predicament and in addition it gives as an inside into the human psyche and behaviour. Game theory has the potential to offer an attractive mathematical model, useful in analyzing social interactions. Though currently unappreciated by pedagogy, it has the potential to be successfully used in pedagogical studies analyzing conflict of interest of all participants in an educational process.
    Źródło:
    Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji; 2015, 30, 3; 121-125
    1734-1582
    2451-2230
    Pojawia się w:
    Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations
    Autorzy:
    Sokolovskyi, Dmytro B.
    Sokolovska, Olena V.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/417302.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-09-15
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    investors
    Pareto-optimality
    modeling
    Game Theory
    Nash equilibrium
    Government
    economic behavior
    Opis:
    Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
    Źródło:
    Management and Business Administration. Central Europe; 2015, 3; 47-70
    2084-3356
    Pojawia się w:
    Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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