Temat: Gödel - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Remarks on the Gödelian Anti-Mechanist Arguments
Autorzy:: Raatikainen, Panu
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1796974.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:: Gödel
incompleteness
mechanism
Opis:: Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attention are discussed.
Źródło:: Studia Semiotyczne; 2020, 34, 1; 267-278
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:: Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Gödel, Wittgenstein and the Sensibility of Platonism
Autorzy:: Poręba, Marcin
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1357900.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-06-30
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:: concepts
Gödel
intuition
mathematics
Platonism
realism
rule-following
Wittgenstein
Opis:: The paper presents an interpretation of Platonism, the seeds of which can be found in the writings of Gödel and Wittgenstein. Although it is widely accepted that Wittgenstein is an anti-Platonist the author points to some striking affinities between Gödel’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of mathematical concepts and the role of feeling and intuition in mathematics. A version of Platonism emerging from these considerations combines realism with respect to concepts with a view of concepts as accessible to feeling and able to guide our behavior through feeling.
Źródło:: Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2021, 5, 1; 108-125
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:: Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Diagonal Anti-Mechanist Arguments
Autorzy:: Kashtan, David
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1796972.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:: mechanism
mind
computability
incompleteness theorems
computation-al theory of mind
the cogito
diagonal arguments
Gödel
Descartes
Tarski
Turing
Chomsky
Opis:: Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is sometimes said to refute mechanism about the mind. §1 contains a discussion of mechanism. We look into its origins, motivations and commitments, both in general and with regard to the human mind, and ask about the place of modern computers and modern cognitive science within the general mechanistic paradigm. In §2 we give a sharp formulation of a mechanistic thesis about the mind in terms of the mathematical notion of computability. We present the argument from Gödel’s theorem against mechanism in terms of this formulation and raise two objections, one of which is known but is here given a more precise formulation, and the other is new and based on the discussion in §1.
Źródło:: Studia Semiotyczne; 2020, 34, 1; 203-232
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:: Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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