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Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Understanding, Expression and Unwelcome Logic
Autorzy:
Holub, Štěpán
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1796970.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
mechanism
Gödel’s theorem
Turing machine
hermeneutics
Opis:
In this paper I will attempt to explain why the controversy surrounding the alleged refutation of Mechanism by Gödel’s theorem is continuing even after its unanimous refutation by logicians. I will argue that the philosophical point its proponents want to establish is a necessary gap between the intended meaning and its formulation. Such a gap is the main tenet of philosophical hermeneutics. While Gödel’s theorem does not disprove Mechanism, it is nevertheless an important illustration of the hermeneutic principle. The ongoing misunderstanding is therefore based in a distinction between a metalogical illustration of a crucial feature of human understanding, and a logically precise, but wrong claim. The main reason for the confusion is the fact that in order to make the claim logically precise, it must be transformed in a way which destroys its informal value. Part of this transformation is a clear distinction between the Turing Machine as a mathematical object and a machine as a physical device.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2020, 34, 1; 183-202
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Can a Robot Be Grateful? Beyond Logic, Towards Religion
Autorzy:
Krajewski, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451269.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-12-28
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
computer science
robot
Gödel’s theorem
digitalization
Pythagoreanism
context
Church’s Thesis
philosophy of dialogue
gratitude
prayer
Opis:
Philosophy should seriously take into account the presence of computers. Computer enthusiasts point towards a new Pythagoreanism, a far reaching generalization of logical or mathematical views of the world. Most of us try to retain a belief in the permanence of human superiority over robots. To justify this superiority, Gödel’s theorem has been invoked, but it can be demonstrated that this is not sufficient. Other attempts are based on the scope and fullness of our perception and feelings. Yet the fact is that more and more can be computer simulated. In order to secure human superiority over robots, reference to the realm of human relations and attitudes seems more promising. Insights provided by philosophy of dialogue can help. They suggest an ultimate extension of the Turing test. In addition, it seems that in order to justify the belief in human superiority one must rely on the individual experiences that indicate a realm that is not merely subjective. It makes sense to call it religious.
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2018, 2, 4(6); 4-13
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On the Anti-Mechanist Arguments Based on Gödel’s Theorem
Autorzy:
Krajewski, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1796977.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
Gödel’s theorem
mechanism
Lucas’s argument
Penrose’s argument
computationalism
mind
consistency
algorithm
artificial intelligence
natural number
Opis:
The alleged proof of the non-mechanical, or non-computational, character of the human mind based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is revisited. Its history is reviewed. The proof, also known as the Lucas argument and the Penrose argument, is refuted. It is claimed, following Gödel himself and other leading logicians, that antimechanism is not implied by Gödel’s theorems alone. The present paper sets out this refutation in its strongest form, demonstrating general theorems implying the inconsistency of Lucas’s arithmetic and the semantic inadequacy of Penrose’s arithmetic. On the other hand, the limitations to our capacity for mechanizing or programming the mind are also indicated, together with two other corollaries of Gödel’s theorems: that we cannot prove that we are consistent (Gödel’s Unknowability Thesis), and that we cannot fully describe our notion of a natural number.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2020, 34, 1; 9-56
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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