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Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
The European system of financial supervision – regulatory impact assessment
Autorzy:
Szpringer, Mariusz
Szpringer, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/565664.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-10-10
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
European banking union
European Central Bank
Single Supervisory Mechanism
Single Resolution Mechanism
European Stability Mechanism Meroni, doctrine
regulatory impact assessment
Opis:
Complexity and uncertainty in the application of the regulations of the European system of financial supervision are due to the fact that its particular elements were implemented over a period of time. First, it was a system of European financial supervision authorities i.e. the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), whose main objective was to coordinate national actions. Then there were established the European Banking Union, including the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which constitutes also a part of the system of support for endangered banks. Legal interpretation problems are a result of differences in the scope of competences of these entities. For example, there is uncertainty whether the regulations refer to the eurozone or the whole European Union and if they refer to banks only or to other financial institutions as well. An analysis of the SSM, the SRM or the ESM does not always offer a clear answer to questions such as: who, when and using what tools should act; when, for example, the ECB may and should correct the decisions of national supervisors; what is the role of the ESRB, if we take account of the enhanced competences of the ECB in the banking union; if and when banks may question supervisory decisions concerning, for example, establishing a buffer or classifying an institution as SIFI, etc. Similarly, the role of the EBA or the ESM is unclear in the context of the establishment of the banking union, the SSM, the SRM, the ESM and the delegation of power of the ECB and the European Commission to regulatory agencies (Meroni doctrine) or the practice of establishing regulatory agencies outside the bounds of the treaty (Pringle doctrine). Therefore the regulatory landscape in this context requires impact assessment.
Źródło:
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics; 2017, 2(8); 84-104
2353-6845
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Europejski model nadzoru finansowego – kierunki rozwoju
The European model of financial supervision. Main developments
Autorzy:
Szpringer, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2216103.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Kancelaria Sejmu. Biuro Analiz Sejmowych
Tematy:
European Banking Union
European Central Bank
single supervisory mechanism
single resolution mechanism
european stability mechanism
Meroni, Romano and Pringle doctrine
Opis:
The complexity and uncertainty in the application of the European system of financial supervision is due to the fact that its particular concepts were implemented at different times. First, it was the system of European financial supervisors (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA), which was primarily aimed at coordination of national activities. Then, the European Banking Union was established, comprised of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which must also be seen in the context of assistance to troubled banks. Difficulties of interpretation are further compounded by a lack of consistency in approach to the institutions subject to examination. Should they include only the euro zone, or the whole EU, only the banks or other institutions as well? If you take into account the SSM, SRM or ESM, it is often not very clear who and when should act what tools should be applied, For example, when the ECB may, and should, correct decisions of national supervisors and what, in the context of increasing involvement of the ECB in the banking union, is the role of the ESRB; whether and when banks can possibly challenge decisions eg. on establishing a capital buffer or inclusion on the SIFI list, etc. Also unclear is the role of the EBA and ESMA in the context of the creation of a banking union, SSM, SRM and ESM and delegation of regulatory powers of ECB and the Commission to regulatory agencies (Meroni doctrine) or creation of regulatory agencies beyond the Treaty (Pringle doctrine).
Źródło:
Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS; 2016, 1(49); 9-43
1896-9852
2082-064X
Pojawia się w:
Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Causes of the outbreak of the eurozone crises: the role of the USA and the European Central Bank monetary polic
Autorzy:
Białek, Natalia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/599513.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania z siedzibą w Rzeszowie
Tematy:
global financial crisis
monetary policy
monetary union
eurozone
European Central Bank
Stability and Growth Pact
euro crisis
fiscal union
Opis:
This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions—the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank—were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.
Źródło:
Finansowy Kwartalnik Internetowy e-Finanse; 2015, 11, 2; 47-63
1734-039X
Pojawia się w:
Finansowy Kwartalnik Internetowy e-Finanse
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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