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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    TWO YEARS OF EUROMAIDAN AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS
    Autorzy:
    Volovoj, Vadim
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/483792.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu i Przedsiębiorczości w Ostrowcu Świętokrzyskim
    Tematy:
    Ukraine
    Euromaidan
    Donbass separatists
    Russia
    the United States
    “hawks“
    “ruled chaos theory“
    Europe
    Minsk deal
    Opis:
    Question of the future of Ukraine is globally important and requires answer before it is closed in order to be ready for final result. Ukrainian crisis has an internal and external dimension. First part of the article analyzes the consequences of Euromaidan. Two years is a period of time, which makes possible some preliminary conclusions about the development of Ukraine. It can be said that political and economic system of the country is deteriorating. At the same time disappointment of the people about the course of the state is growing. Therefore theory of expectations and reality discrepancy can be applied to predict the future of the today’s political regime in Kiev. The conclusion is that next social explosion (revolution) in Ukraine is highly possible in a short term, because unacceptable gap between expectations of Ukrainians and reality they live in has almost reached critical margin. Still situation in the country is strongly dependent on the position of two big external actors – the West (the United States and the European Union) and Russia. On the one hand, they stabilize the conflict – the West helps the government of Petro Poroshenko to survive politically and economically and manages social protest potential in the state; Russia supports separatists of Donbass, but holds them from further military aggression, accentuating implementation of Minsk deal. On the other hand, Ukraine definitely is a hostage of “great geopolitical game“ between Washington, Brussels and Moscow and is not a subject, but object in it. Strategic perspective of the Ukrainian crisis will depend on Russia‘s ability to survive economically and make the West believe it is better to retreat in Ukraine, on the American so called “hawks“ perception of this ability and on the damage they and the EU are ready to suffer from the Russian side. Supposed additional value of the article is that it tries to conceptualize (also theoretically) the current national and foreign situation of Ukraine and propose prognostic framework (the main variables) to predict its future.
    Źródło:
    Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem; 2015, 2(5); 25-37
    2353-6306
    Pojawia się w:
    Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The European Union in the Mirror of the Ukrainian Crisis (2013–2014)
    Autorzy:
    Szeptycki, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2091806.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-06-25
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych
    Tematy:
    Ukraine
    European Union
    association agreement
    Euromaidan
    annexation of Crimea
    war in Donbas
    Opis:
    In November 2013, largely under the pressure of Russia, the Ukrainian authorities decided not to sign the association agreement with the European Union (EU). Such decision led to massive social protests in Ukraine, and ultimately to a major political crisis. In February the president Victor Yanukovych was overthrown. In counter-reaction the Russian Federation invaded the Ukrainian Crimea and launched a proxy war in the Eastern Ukraine. If the strength of the pro-European protests was an opportunity for the European Union, the recent developments in Ukraine has also pointed out some weaknesses of the EU policy towards its Eastern neighbourhood. First, EU has been unable to present an association offer which would be truly attractive and reliable for the postSoviet Ukraine in the period of deep economic crisis. Second, the Ukrainian crisis has shown that EU is unable to react quickly and decisively to challenges rising in its neighbourhood. Third, the European Union remains unwilling to engage into open confrontation with the Russian Federation over the common neighbourhood, which is due both to the role of Russia as EU political and economic partner and the specificity of the EU power in international relations. Within this context the EU diplomacy was replaced by the most influent member states, which are highly interested in the EU cooperation with Russia and/or Ukraine.
    Źródło:
    Stosunki Międzynarodowe - International Relations; 2015, 51, 1; 107-125
    0209-0961
    Pojawia się w:
    Stosunki Międzynarodowe - International Relations
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie po Euromajdanie.
    Impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Polish – Ukrainian relations.
    Autorzy:
    Bonusiak, Włodzimierz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/506276.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
    Tematy:
    Euromaidan
    Verkhovna Rada Ukraine
    act inspection pro bandera
    politices Poland
    perspective
    Opis:
    Since condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a „strategic partnership” policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn’t hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fighters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for ”Przegląd” and “Nie”). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by “Przegląd” – “How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?” – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, “Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest”. In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very difficult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven’t obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki “the prestige of Poland as a supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems”. Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that “the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity”. In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.
    Źródło:
    Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2015, 2; 131-140
    1733-2680
    2451-0610
    Pojawia się w:
    Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Ukraińska Cerkiew Prawosławna wobec Euromajdanu 2013 – 2014
    Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Euromaidan 2013 – 2014
    Autorzy:
    Kozyrska, Antonina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1944994.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-06-30
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
    Tematy:
    Euromajdan
    kryzys polityczny na Ukrainie 2013 – 2014
    Ukraińska Cerkiew Prawosławna (Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego)
    związki wyznaniowe w  procesach politycznych
    religia i polityka
    Euromaidan
    the political crisis in Ukraine 2013 – 2014
    the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate
    religious groups in the political process
    religion and politics
    Opis:
    Artykuł prezentuje stanowisko Ukraińskiej Cerkwi Prawosławnej (Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego) wobec Euromajdanu na Ukrainie na przełomie 2013/2014 r. Kościół ten zajął pozycję neutralną, w odróżnieniu od niektórych innych związków wyznaniowych, zwłaszcza tak zwanych Kościołów narodowych, które poparły protestujących. Jego oficjalne stanowisko wyrażało się w apelach do zachowania pokoju, porządku społecznego, integralności terytorialnej i jedności narodu, potępienia przemocy, nawoływania stron konfliktu do rozpoczęcia i kontynuacji dialogu. W artykule szczegółowo przeanalizowano przyczyny i skutki stanowiska Cerkwi.
    The paper presents the reaction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) to Euromaidan in the Ukraine at the turn of 2013 – 2014. The Church has not taken a clear univocal position, unlike some other religious groups, especially the so-called national Churches. Its official position was confined to general calls for preserving peace and public order, territorial integrity and unity of the people, condemnation of violence, calling for participants of the conflict to begin and continue the dialogue. The causes and consequences of the position taken by the Church are analyzed in detail.
    Źródło:
    Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne; 2016, 50; 46-63
    1505-2192
    Pojawia się w:
    Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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