- Tytuł:
-
Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego
Bertrand Russell’s conception of neutral monism - Autorzy:
- Jarocki, Jacek
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1622188.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2016
- Wydawca:
- Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
- Tematy:
-
neutral monism
metaphysics
mind-body problem
Bertrand Russell
consciousness
problem umysł/ciało
metafizyka
monizm neutralnym
świadomość - Opis:
- The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell’s neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell’s predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell’s own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell’s commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in The Analysis of Mind, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell’s view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.
- Źródło:
-
Analiza i Egzystencja; 2016, 33; 69-88
1734-9923
2300-7621 - Pojawia się w:
- Analiza i Egzystencja
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł