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Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Zakres sprawiedliwości wyrównawczej w etyce Arystotelesa
The Scope of Corrective Justice in Aristotle’s Ethics
Autorzy:
Galewicz, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938500.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Aristotle
corrective justice
ethics
Opis:
The task of corrective justice in Aristotle’s ethics is the rectification of harms or injuries resulting from voluntary or involuntary interactions between persons. However, the scope of this form of justice is not clear. In its widest conception it would include all harms done to a person against her will and without her fault. According to a narrower conception, instead, it is only an injury caused by an unjust or wrongful action that requires compensation. But in fact Aristotle distinguishes several concepts of unjust action. As a result, the narrower conception appears in various versions which are discussed in this paper.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 289-308
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O Arystotelesowskiej teorii poznania praktycznego
On the Aristotelian theory of practical cognition
Autorzy:
Galewicz, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015951.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Arystoteles
etyka
poznanie praktyczne
intuicja
Aristotle
ethics
practical cognition
intuition
Opis:
The article contains an analysis of Aristotle's views concerning ethical cognition. The author considers, among others, the following questions: (1) Did Aristotle at all know something like, literally understood, 'cognition by feeling', that is a kind of emotional defining values or normative features; and if so, then (2) Speaking of ethical aisthêsis, did he understand this kind of emotional intuition by it? The result of considerations is that although nature and contents of ethical perception do not appear in the texts of the author of Nikomachean Ethics too clearly, it can be stated that ethical perception is not common sensual perception, but it most reminds of an observation through which certain mathematical relations and truths are defined. Practical wisdom consists more in using this kind of ethical intuition than in cognition and in use of some general truths.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 83-103
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Samowystarczalność najwyższego dobra u Platona, Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu
Self-sufficiency of the ultimate good in Plato’s, Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’ works
Autorzy:
Galewicz, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016131.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
aksjologia
Platon
Arystoteles
Tomasz z Akwinu
dobro
szczęście
axiology
Plato
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
the human good
happiness
Opis:
The subject of the article is the condition of self-sufficiency (autarchy) as the criterion of the ultimate good. This criterion first appears in Plato’s Philebus, and then it is used by Aristotle. According to the characterization of the ultimate good contained in the seventh chapter of Book I of Nicomachean E th ic s, the self-sufficient good has to be sufficient, that is it has to be a good that does not leave any unfulfilled desires, and at the same time is axiologically superior, that is surpassing all other kinds of good with its value. This condition for axiological superiority allows two interpretations: the absolutist and the relativist ones. The absolute superiority would be vested in the ultimate good if it was unsurpassable, that is if it was a good whose value cannot be increased by adding some other good to it. The relative superiority of the ultimate good only requires that it surpasses with its value every good that is completely different from it, e.g. does not comprise it as its component. A clearly relativist interpretation of the Aristotelian condition of self-sufficiency as the criterion of the ultimate good that can be achieved in human life is proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics. Although he also does not reject the concept of self-sufficient good that is not a component of a sum of goods that have an even higher value, he treats self-sufficiency understood in this absolute way as a characteristic of Go d ’s good.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 5-23
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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