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    Wyświetlanie 1-14 z 14
    Tytuł:
    Empedocles and the Other Physiologists in Aristotle’s Physics II 8
    Autorzy:
    Giardina, Giovanna R.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633456.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Presocratics
    mechanism
    physics
    teleology
    rainfall
    Aristotle
    Opis:
    In this paper I propose to show: 1) that in Phys. II 8 Aristotle takes Empedocles as a paradigm for a theoretical position common to all philosophers who preceded him: the view that materialism implies a mechanistic explanation of natural becoming; and 2) that, since Empedocles is regarded as a philosopher who clearly expresses the position of all mechanistic materialists, Aristotle builds his teleological arguments precisely to refute him. Indeed, Aristotle believes that refuting the arguments of Empedocles – the champion of mechanism – means refuting the mechanistic theory itself. In order to illustrate this point, I will discuss some passages from Phys. II 8, while also turning to consider the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s Physics. I will then endeavour to explain why in 198b19 ff. Aristotle formulates the argument of rain, which has attracted so much attention from scholars of the Physics: I will consider whether Aristotle believes that rain serves a purpose, contrary to what he claims with regard to meteorological phenomena in Meteorologica.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 13-24
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A Reply to John Dudley on Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b17–21
    A Reply to John Dudley on Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b17
    Autorzy:
    Giardina, Giovanna R.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633578.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    physics
    teleology
    end
    deliberation
    Opis:
    In this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17–21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale (2006). According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not (Arist. Ph. 196b17–18) fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17). In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance (Albany 2012), John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17) are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one.
    In this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17– 21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale (2006). According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not (Arist. Ph. 196b17–18) fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17). In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance (Albany 2012), John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17) are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 271-288
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Refutation of the Eleatic Argument in Physics I.8
    Autorzy:
    Oki, Takashi
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016409.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-13
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    the Eleatics
    the Physics
    coming to be
    change
    Opis:
    In this paper, I show that Aristotle’s refutation of the Eleatic argument in Physics I.8 is based on the idea that a thing at the starting point of coming to be is composite and is made up of what underlies and a privation. In doing so, I clarify how the concept of accidentality as used in his solution should be understood in relation to the composite nature of what comes to be. I also suggest an explanation of why Aristotle’s discussion of the Eleatic dilemma in Physics I.8, unlike his discussion in the previous chapter, is not clear.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 69-84
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Substance and Dynamics: Two Elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Nature in the Foundation of Mathematics in Physics
    Autorzy:
    Larenz, Rudolf
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507266.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017-09-30
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    dynamics
    elementary particles
    experience
    hylomorphism
    mathematics
    natural realism
    physics
    scientific realism
    substance
    Opis:
    The article aims at proposing a way of solution to the problem why mathematics is efficient in physics. Its strategy consists in, first, identifying servere reductionisms performed on physical processes in order to have them correspond to mathematics. As this makes it impossible to understand the real relationship between matter and mathematics, a necessary step on the way to an understanding is to abandon the reductionisms from the very outset. Consequently, one is faced with the need of searching for mathematical elements in nature, as if there never had been any successful mathematics in physics. And for this search, one has to rely on experience alone. To this end, the article takes its inspiration from two pillars of Aristotelian philosophy of nature, the notions of ‘substance’ and ‘dynamics’, together with a careful examination of the treasure of accumulated experience in physics. Upon this basis, the hylomorphic structure of elementary particles, which are considered to be at the basis of all material substances, is the source for the most common features of the dynamical order of material things in general. This dynamical order, in turn, is quite likely to be reflected in mathematical terms. This is a novel approach because, at present, the most common framework for dealing with the question of mathematics in physics is Scientific Realism. It addresses the question why the existent physico-mathematical theories are successful. In order to find an answer, it starts from these theories and some methodological considerations, but does not address the question of where these theories stem from. In particular, it does not consider the possibility that these theories might, at least in part, stem from the material things they are referring to. The latter approach is what is suggested here. It is that of Natural Realism, of which Aristotle is an eminent representative.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2017, 6, 3; 451-483
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Mixture and Transformation in Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione
    Autorzy:
    Zarifian, Arman
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633444.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    physics
    generation
    mixture
    elements
    Opis:
    In his works on natural sciences, primarily in the Physics, Aristotle focuses on different forms of metabolē and distinguishes movement in general from substantial change. The On generation and corruption deals with the latter. When reading this treatise, one should pay particular attention to the concept of mixture. Apart from being the subject of a specific chapter (I 10), the problem of mixture permeates the whole work. But what exactly is mixture? Is it a simple combination of small parts? Can a compound of water and wine be called mixture? If so, is this mixture and nothing more? In the course of the discussion, it is argued that the Aristotelian idea of mixis does not correspond to the concept that is usually associated with it. Rather, it is shown that mixis is fundamental for comprehending the physical world and constitutes not only the term per quem the first elements of all material bodies originate, but also plays a fundamental role in all natural sciences, particularly, in biology.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2018, 9, 1; 53-69
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Solution for Parmenides’ Inconclusive Argument in Physics I.3
    Autorzy:
    Angioni, Lucas
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016431.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-13
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    sophistical argument
    Parmenides
    predication
    being
    Opis:
    I discuss the argument which Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23–32. I examine (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it to be eristic and inconclusive and (ii) the solution (lusis) that he proposes against it.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 41-67
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Hylomorphic Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics II
    Autorzy:
    Peters, Catherine
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507644.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-03-20
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    nature
    matter
    form
    hylomorphism
    teleology
    hylomorphic teleology
    Wolfgang Wieland
    chance
    final causality
    Opis:
    This study draws attention to the ordering of matter and form argued for in Aristotle’s Physics II, 8 (199a30–32). This argument for hylomorphic teleology relies on the presentation of nature earlier in Physics II, 1. In this way, it highlights the connections between chapter one’s account of nature as matter and form and chapter eight’s defense of final causality. Grounding final causality in the principles of nature reveals its central importance for Aristotle’s view of nature. To clarify the meaning of hylomorphic teleology I contrast my interpretation of Aristotle with that of Wolfgang Wieland regarding the scope and foundation of the final cause, countering his claim that chance and universal final causality are mutually exclusive. I contend that the presentation of teleology in chapter eight supports a diverse interpretation of the final cause, one that admits chance events while not sacrificing the intrinsic ordering of matter to form.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2019, 8, 1; 147-168
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Nature and necessity in Aristotle’s "Physics"
    Autorzy:
    Olesiak, Jarosław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/431143.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    ancient philosophy
    metaphisycs
    teleology
    hypothetical necessity
    nature
    physicalism
    Arystoteles
    filozofia starożytna
    metafizyka
    teleologia
    imperatyw hipotetyczny
    natura
    fizykalizm
    Opis:
    In Physics II.8 Aristotle claims that the type of necessity found in natural processes is not simple necessity as the ancient physicalists maintained, but hypothetical necessity. The article first considers the textual context within which this issue arises. Then it examines two basic elements of Aristotle’s conceptual apparatus, nature and necessity. It considers his understanding of nature as an inner source of activity and calls attention to the ontological problem of the location of this source within the very entity whose source it is. Next, it examines the various sorts of necessity that Aristotle distinguishes, identifies the sense of necessity that is at work in the ancient physicalist account of natural coming to be, and contrasts it with the hypothetical necessity he proposes. It points out that there remains the unresolved problem of Aristotle’s use in the natural domain of the simple necessity that he elsewhere explicitly reserves to the realm of the unchanging and eternal.
    Źródło:
    Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2015, 51, 1; 55-73
    0585-5470
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Philosophiae Christianae
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Method of Understanding the First Principles of Natural Things in the Physics I.1
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633502.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    method
    natural things
    principles
    universal
    particular
    epagōgē
    analysis
    Opis:
    This paper presents Aristotle’s method of understanding the first principles of natural things in the Physics I.1 and analyzes the three stages of which this method consists. In the Physics I.1, Aristotle suggests that the natural proper route which one has to follow in order to find out the first principles of natural things is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us to what is more knowable and clear by nature. In the Physics I.1, the terms καθόλου (universal) and καθ΄ ἕκαστα (particular) are not used in their usual meaning (e.g., the meaning which the same terms have in the Posterior Analytics I. 2). This paper examines the Physics I.1 in comparison with the Posterior Analytics II. 19 in order to elucidate the meaning of καθόλου in the first chapter of Aristotle’s Physics. Furthermore, it reaches the conclusion that the structure of the natural world to which we belong determines the structure and the form of our knowledge. On the one hand, natural things are composite and, on the other hand, perception is involved in the initial grasping of natural things as composites. Thus, since perceptual knowledge is more accessible to us than any other kind of knowledge it is natural to reach knowledge of simple things, i.e., of the principles, starting our inquiry with the composites.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2012, 3, 1; 31-50
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    An Ontology for the In-Between of Motion: Aristotle’s Reaction to Zeno’s Arguments
    Autorzy:
    Crubellier, Michel
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016355.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-13
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    Aristotle’s Physics
    change. continuous
    dialectic
    infinite
    motion
    ontology
    time
    Zeno of Elea
    Opis:
    This paper proposes an interpretation of Books V and VI of Aristotle’s Physics as being (at least partly) a reaction to Zeno’s four “arguments against motion” that Aristotle expounds and discusses in Phys. VI 9. On the basis of a detailed textual analysis of that chapter, I show that Zeno’s arguments rest on a frame of a priori notions such as part and whole, in contact, between, limit, etc., which Aristotle takes over in order to account for the inner structure (here called “the In-Between”) common to all facts of motion and change. That frame allows him to develop a specific ontology for that inner structure – although it exists only potentially according to the Aristotelian orthodoxy – because he needs such an ontology in order to vindicate the reality of motion and change.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 123-149
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Geneza wartości estetycznych w fizyce
    The Genesis of Aesthetic Values in Physics
    Autorzy:
    Łata, Magdalena
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2082671.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Instytut Filozofii
    Tematy:
    wartości estetyczne
    piękno
    harmonia
    pitagorejczycy
    Platon
    Arystoteles
    przeszkoda epistemologiczna
    aesthetic values
    beauty
    harmony
    Pythagoreans
    Plato
    Aristotle
    epistemological obstacle
    Opis:
    W pracach z filozofii fizyki, historii nauki, w biografiach i autobiografiach uczonych oraz w literaturze popularnonaukowej występują treści o charakterze estetycznym. Wartości estetyczne i kojarzone z nimi właściwości pełnią wielorakie funkcje we współczesnej fizyce, między innymi stanowią poza empiryczne kryteria wyboru teorii naukowych. Najczęściej pojawiającymi się wartościami estetycznymi są kategorie piękna, elegancji i harmonii. Źródła połączenia nauki i estetyki odnajdziemy w starożytnej filozofii przyrody, a dokładnie w filozofii pitagorejczyków zasymilowanej przez Platona i Arystotelesa. Aspekty filozofii pitagorejskiej dotyczące odkryć w dziedzinie akustyki i matematyki zostały połączone z wartościami estetycznymi za sprawą platońskiej triady dobro-piękno-prawda, zaś estetyka Arystotelesa związana z pitagorejskim porządkiem miary i proporcji w świecie wzmocniła to połączenie. W starożytnych poglądach pitagorejsko-platońskich odnajdziemy także przyczyny późniejszych przeszkód epistemologicznych, które uczeni łączyli z aspektami estetycznymi.
    In works on the philosophy of physics, the history of science, in biographies and autobiographies of scientists, and in popular science literature, there is aesthetic content. Aesthetic values and associated properties have multiple functions in modern physics including non-empirical criteria for selecting scientific theories. The most common aesthetic values are the categories of beauty, elegance and harmony. The sources of the connection between science and aesthetics can be found in the ancient philosophy of nature, particulary in the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, assimilated by Plato and Aristotle. The aspects of Pythagorean philosophy regarding the discoveries in acoustics and mathematics were linked to aesthetic values through the Platonic good-beauty-truth triad, while Aristotle's aesthetics of the Pythagorean order of measure and proportion in the world strengthened this connection. In the ancient Pythagorean-Platonic views we also find the causes of the later epistemological obstacles which scholars associated with aesthetic aspects.
    Źródło:
    Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy; 2021, 18; 163-187
    2299-0356
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)
    Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)
    Autorzy:
    Volpe, Enrico
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633475.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    Physics
    Parmenides
    Melissus
    Eleatism
    Opis:
    The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.
    The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 149-166
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Form, essence and matter in Aquinas’ early work De ente et essentia. Notes to the metaphysical foundation of Aquinas’ psychology
    Autorzy:
    Slováček, Petr
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/426593.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
    Tematy:
    matter
    form
    esse/essentia distinction
    physics
    metaphysics
    Thomas Aquinas
    Avicenna
    Aristotle
    soul
    human being
    Opis:
    The article analyzes the role of matter (materia prima) in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, from both the systematic and historicalphilosophical aspect. It shows that Arab tradition (Avicenna and Averroes) and its interpreters from the first half of the 13ᵗʰ century played an important and very complex role in his reception of philosophical tools derived from Aristotle. The article also presents the process by which Aquinas was able to unite hylomorphism with the metaphysical theory of real distinction esse/essentia, which paved the way for a non-dualistic conception of man.
    Źródło:
    Logos i Ethos; 2015, 2(39); 59-95
    0867-8308
    Pojawia się w:
    Logos i Ethos
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Batalia „szklanej rury”. Współzawodnictwo „starego” i „nowego” w debacie wokół doświadczeń z próżnią z 1647 roku
    Battle of the „glass pipe”. Struggle between the „old” and „new” in the debate around experiments with vacuum dating to 1647
    Autorzy:
    Kołos, Anna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1041658.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    the history of science
    Old-Polish literature
    vacuum
    physics
    the philosophy of nature
    the 17th century
    Aristotle
    Valeriano Magni
    Opis:
    The article addresses the issue of one of the more intense and captivating European scientific disputes, likewise common to Poland, in the era of the seventeenth-century transformation of knowledge formation, which centered around the possibility of the existence of vacuum, and which culminated in 1647. The fundamental aim of the article comes down to an attempt to determine a position in the scientific-cognitive debate, from which the pro and anti-Polish and European representatives of The Republic of Letters (Respublica literaria)  could voice their opinions. In the course of the analysis of the mid-seventeenth century scientific discourse, the reflections of Valeriano Magni, Torricelli, Jan Brożek, Wojciech Wijuk Kojałowicz, Blaise Pascal, Giovanni Elefantuzzi, Jacob Pierius, and Pierre Guiffart are subjected to close scrutiny. From the perspective of contextualism in the history of science, experiments demonstrating the existence of vacuum are perceived as anomalies that fall into the crisis of normal science, largely based on Aristotle’s physics. The conflict between the old and the new is not, however, presented as a battle of progression with epigonism, but merely as a contest between opposing individual views and the concept of science, which before the formation of the new paradigm was accompanied by ambiguous verification criteria.
    Źródło:
    Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Literacka; 2017, 31; 167-190
    1233-8680
    2450-4947
    Pojawia się w:
    Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Literacka
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-14 z 14

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