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Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Nowa biografia Mao
Autorzy:
Ostrowski, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2031378.pdf
Data publikacji:
1999-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 1999, II; 308-313
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wpływ polityki Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej na reformy polskiego Października 1956
The Impact of the Policy of the People’s Republic of China on the Reforms of “the Polish October” 1956
Autorzy:
Ostrowski, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2021064.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 started a brutal power struggle between different factions within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although Nikita Khrushchev, promoting some reforms, became a new Soviet leader, his position was never as strong as the position of Stalin. His report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” known as the “Secret Speech”, was in fact an element of his struggle against the enemy factions. However, the Speech did not improve the position of Khrushchev radically. First of all, it shocked the leaders of the satellite states. For the first time, communist methods were condemned not by “western revisionists”, but by the highest communist leader. For some satellite communist party leaders, the Speech was a threat to their positions based on an almost supernatural authority of the Soviet Union. For others, it was a sign that it was time to express their reformist ideas. This situation provoked factional struggles in other communist countries. In the light of these events, Mao Zedong as well as other Chinese leaders hoped that the position of China in the Communist block would strengthen and that China could even lead the block. The Russian factional struggle brought Mao Zedong both certain opportunities and threats. The criticism of a cult of personality encouraged factional struggle in the Communist Party of China. Some factions started to criticise the cult of Mao and his radical ideology and promoted an idea of collective leadership instead. Those tendencies became apparent at the first session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China held on 15–27 September 1956. On the other hand, Khrushchev needed Mao’s support because of his weak position in the party and the Soviet Block (Stalin tried to keep Mao on a short leash instead). In fact, in the beginning of Khrushchev’s era, China was officially recognised as a second communist power. In official speeches, communist leaders would use the phrase “the block led by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China”. The conflict between Moscow and its satellites allowed Mao to play a role of a mediator. It could also lead to a situation when Khrushchev would not be able to make any move in this matter without consulting it with Peking. All these circumstances led to a conflict between Peking and Moscow, which saved the Polish reforms in 1956. Basing on the “Chinese support”, the reformists won their battle for the completion of the reformist program. Khrushchev was forced to accept the new Polish leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka who was imprisoned earlier in 1950s as a right wing representative, a nationalist and the First Secretary. Russians also established a new relationship giving more independence to Poland. The conflict between the Chinese and the Soviet communists had also a great influence on the official propaganda in Poland. In the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP), anti-Stalinist movements were growing constantly from 1954. In the mid-1950s, the members of the reformist Pulawian faction in the party controlled the press and other media, and in that time China was recognised as the great power within the Communist Block that adopted much more liberal policy then the Soviet Union did.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2014, XVII; 67-102
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Droga Tajwanu do demokracji
Taiwan’s way to democracy
Autorzy:
Ostrowski, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2028945.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
Guomindang regime in Taiwan, like the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, restricted political freedoms and violated human rights for decades. However, the democratic transition in Taiwan did not result immediately in an electoral success of the opposition. At the very end of the 1980’s in Poland and in Taiwan one party regime of a Leninist party had been replaced by a multi party democratic system. Notwithstanding this essential similarity, there was a significant difference in the dynamics of these transformations. The Polish regime identified itself with the Left but the Taiwanese with the Right. In spite of the state control and intervention, Taiwanese economy had a market nature. Therefore the process of economic transformation was much less significant there then in Poland. The democratic transformation in Eastern Europe put an end to the Communist stagnant economy, but this resulted in a deep economic crisis, afterwards modest economic development was achieved. In Taiwan at the beginning the political transformation coincided with an intensive economic development, merely at the latest stage, when the opposition took the reign of power, the economic stagnation was seen. In Poland and in Republic of China in Taiwan many citizens perceived respectively the Communist and the Guomindang governments as an „alien force”. Under such circumstances, both governments undertook efforts to gain popular support, that resulted in a more or less advanced liberalisation. In Poland it was halted by a military rule, but ended with the Round Table negotiations and semi-free elections in which the Communist party lost its power, and recognised its defeat. Guomindang, on the other hand, remained in power for a decade. Its electoral successes and the defeat the Communist party in Poland, resulted from different historical circumstances and from the different system of values. In Asia (and in Taiwan) the restrictions of human rights were not perceived as very arduous. According to the Confucian traditions, the government has two essential duties: to grant well-being and education to the people. These duties were fulfilled very well by the Guomindang administration. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, restrictions of the political freedom and of civil rights were considered “ignoble” and of crucial importance, whereas economic development was considered too modest. Moreover, the local regimes served Moscow and this weakened their legitimacy. In Eastern Europe under such circumstances a victory of the opposition offered great hopes of radical improvement in standards of life and in political freedoms. In Taiwan, on the other hand, victory of the opposition could not bring radical improvements. Instead political instability could provoke an economic crisis. The limitation of human rights were not considered truly painful by the society and they were gradually removed under the control of ruling party. So, in Taiwan the process of transformation was gradual and slow, and Guomindang is still an important political force, whereas in Poland it was a rapid, revolutionary process, whereas the Communist party was dissolved and discredited. The author illustrates also to the Polish readers various details of distinct features of the transformation processes in Taiwan.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2002, V; 140-164
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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