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    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    Hedonistyczny wątek w platońskim Fedonie – Uproszczenie Olimpiodora
    Hedonistic Motif in Plato’s Phaedo – Olympiodorus’ Simplification
    Autorzy:
    Pacewicz, Artur
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938387.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Neoplatonism
    Plato
    Olympiodorus
    hedonism
    Phaedo
    Opis:
    While the aim of the present paper is to analyze Olympiodorus’ commentary to Plato’s Phaedo, particular attention will be paid here to the role of hēdonē. The first part of the text presents the four conceptions of the pleasure that can be found in Plato’s dialogue. Although pleasure does not play the most prominent role either in the Plato’s dialogue or in the Neoplatonic commentary, Olympiodorus’ attitude to this issue reveals an important change and difference between the philosophical views of Plato and those of Olympiodorus. The latter does not seem to discern the possibility that pleasure can have its spiritual dimension (which Plato regards as possible). Thus, the experience of hēdonē is reduced solely to the sphere of the senses and even in this area its role needs to be minimized: in this form it has to be carefully measured and controled. Furthermore, Olympiodorus does not see that so-called hedonistic calculus: whilst it is not strictly speaking connected with virtuous actions, it still can have some significance for the the philosopher’s life.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2014, 5, 1; 199-212
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Olympiodorus and Damascius on the Philosopher’s Practice of Dying in Plato’s Phaedo
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633492.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Plato
    Phaedo
    Neoplatonism
    death
    soul
    purification
    separation
    Opis:
    This paper presents Olympiodorus’ and Damascius’ explanations of the philosopher’s practice of dying in Plato’s Phaedo. It also includes a presentation of Ammonius’ exegesis of the practice of death (meletē thanatou). The Neoplatonic commentators discern two kinds of death, the bodily or physical death and the voluntary death. Olympiodorus suggests that bodily death is only an image of voluntary death and cannot be recognized as an original death, because original death presupposes the preparation for death and the constant effort for the purification of the soul during the philosopher’s life-time. Only preparation for death and purification can ensure the complete separation of the soul from the body. Relative to this distinction is that between apothnēskein and tethnanai; these infinitives denote the dual meaning of death: death as an event or a process and death as a state. Our study examines thoroughly the subtle distinctions made by Olympiodorus and Damascius and offers a comparative analysis of the two definitions of death as well as that of purification. It reaches the conclusion that apothnēskein is a necessary condition of tethnanai, i.e. of a definitive release and parting of the soul from the body. On the other hand, the process of eventual purification, a notion which betrays the religious character of purification, can be identified with apothnēskein, which is the practice of dying by the true philosopher. Finally, our study also emphasizes and explains the difference between the voluntary philosophical death and the voluntary unphilosophical suicide; the latter guaranteeing only bodily or physical death.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2014, 5, 1; 177-198
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    „Fedon” Mosesa Mendelssohna i jego recepcja w Polsce
    „Phaedo” by Moses Mendelssohn and its Polish reception
    Autorzy:
    Mróz, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2043866.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Phaedo
    Plato
    Moses Mendelssohn
    Jakub Tugendhold
    immortality of the soul
    Opis:
    The paper discusses Moses Mendelssohn’s work Phaedo and its Polish translation which was published in 1829 by Jakub Tugendhold. Although this book did not exert impact on Polish philosophy, Tugendhold, the translator, aimed to use Mendelssohn’s biography and his Phaedo as an instructive example for those representatives of Jewish community who wanted to free themselves from isolation and undergo social and economic, though not religious, assimilation into their Polish and Christian surrounding. Moreover, the author briefly compares Plato’s and Mendelssohn’s Phaedos.
    Źródło:
    Człowiek i Społeczeństwo; 2021, 52; 197-210
    0239-3271
    Pojawia się w:
    Człowiek i Społeczeństwo
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part One
    Autorzy:
    Mazzara, Giuseppe
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633548.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    the argument by affinity
    the final argument
    analogy
    metaxy
    oikeios logos
    definition
    eidos
    idea
    logic of the contrarys
    Opis:
    The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine what Plato alludes to. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study has been divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and its opposites as well as the opposites of opposites.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2019, 10, 1; 13-44
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Forms as Causes in De Generatione et Corruptione II 9. A Reading Based on Philoponus’ Exegesis
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633462.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    Plato
    De Generatione et Corruptione
    Phaedo
    criticism
    Forms
    causes
    efficient cause
    Opis:
    In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation and corruption into two groups: i) those which offered an explanation by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philoponus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aristotle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the secondary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s thinking, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristotelian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 123-148
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Platone e Antistene nel Fedone: una lettura in controluce.
    Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part Two
    Autorzy:
    Mazzara, Giuseppe
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1178753.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-12-23
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    the argument by affinity
    the final argument
    analogy
    metaxy
    oikeios logos
    definition
    eidos
    idea
    the logic of contraries
    Opis:
    The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2020, 11, 1; 33-66
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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