Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "Andrzejewski, Adam" wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Struktura estetycznego doświadczenia codzienności
The Structure of Everyday Aesthetic Experience
Autorzy:
Andrzejewski, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967234.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
In the project of everyday aesthetics all elements of daily life, such as sunset, cooking one’s favourite dish, or sitting in a comfortable chair, are a subject of philosophical reflection. According to the proponents of the project (e.g. Yuriko Saito, Sherry Irvin, Ted Leddy), these activities and objects, despite their commonness, have a profoundly aesthetic character. The main goal of this paper is to present and analyze a general structure of the central category of everyday aesthetics - the concept of aesthetic experience. The paper consists of three sections. First, I outline two common understandings of everyday aesthetic experience, introduced by Saito and Irvin. It is shown that despite their novelty they appear to be rather confusing. A major doubt is that they do not clearly show how to distinguish aesthetic pleasures from non-aesthetic pleasures (Irvin) or everyday aesthetic experience from other daily experiences (Saito). As a result, the concept of everyday aesthetic experience turns out to be too broad, and thus it lacks explanatory power. Second, I argue that the categories used by Saito and Irvin to describe everyday aesthetics, although immensely helpful, are not sufficient to capture all phenomena of ordinary life. It is because they only apply to some of the properties which can be recognized as aesthetic in everyday life (e.g. “dirty”), but they say nothing about the very structure of the experience. Therefore, I put forward definitions of certain properties which, in my opinion, adequately describe and individualize experiences characteristic of everyday aesthetics. These are: contingency, repetition, and permeability. Finally, it is highlighted how a reconsidered concept of everyday experience matter to the issues outside the realm of aesthetics. It is revealed that the crucial feature of everyday aesthetic experience is its ambivalence. Our immersion into society, current affairs, and complex relations with other agents force us to make decisions all the time. Each everyday aesthetic judgement requires decision(s) which may be followed by serious consequences (e.g. in socio-economical life). Thus I would contend that judgements in everyday aesthetics are “decision-making” (contrary to tradition ally understood aesthetic judgements, which do not require, necessarily, any action in the outer world). In perceiving common things as objects eliciting aesthetic experience, we are always asked to choose which dimension (a set of meanings) of particular experience is crucial for us. The structure of everyday aesthetic experience, as defined above, explains and justifies what we often call (following Saito) “the power of the aesthetic”.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 3; 125-135
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kryteria identyczności a procedury indywidualizacyjne
Criteria of Identity and Procedures of Individuation
Autorzy:
Andrzejewski, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968257.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The main subject of the article is a critical analysis of the functions of the criteria of identity. The author presents a methodological stance called criterialism which claims that the criteria of identity play an important role and have a vast application in both science and philosophy. A set of arguments is presented then to show a polemic stance that the criteria of identity are not responsible for individuation. The author nevertheless acknowledges a positive function of the criteria of identity, which is stated under the name of ontological clarification.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2009, 17, 4; 23-33
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem zmiany a identyczność numeryczna
The Problem of Change and Numerical Identity
Autorzy:
Andrzejewski, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966708.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
In the paper, classical assumptions of the problem of change are presented and analyzed. The author considers following assumptions which make theses about: (i) identity and persistence through time; (ii) a conceptual change; (iii) intrinsic properties; and (iv) the Leibniz's Law. In the light of the analyses, it is shown that the problem of change does not have substantial nature and therefore cannot be treated as legitimization of the theories of persistence. Finally, the author acknowledges a relationship between the rethought matter of change and the theories of persistence.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 2; 123-133
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Spory rzeczowe i słowne
Substantial and Verbal Disputes
Autorzy:
Andrzejewski, Adam
Brożek, Anna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967198.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The main subject of the paper is to present the criteria which help us to establish whether a given ontological controversy (or even a whole dispute) is substantial or merely verbal. Metaphysics is often perceived as a discipline composed of endless disputes with no glimpse of hope for solution. This fact makes many philosophers claim that ontology is nothing more than matter of linguistic choice. In this paper, we argue that there exist certain methodological tools which enable us to establish whether particular ontological disagreement is substantial or merely verbal. However, as we emphasize, the scope of application of these tools is limited to strictly defined cases. At first, we clarify the general background for an occurrence of ontological controversy. Assume that a controversy occurs between the person A and the person B iff: (a) A uses language LA, and B uses language LB (we do not decide what is the relation between those two languages and especially - if they are identical, or not); (b) in both languages there is a sentence ‘S’ (c) A accepts the sentence ‘S’ and person B rejects the sentence ‘S’ (d) A aims at making person B accept the sentence ‘S’ and person B aims at making person A reject the sentence ‘S’. Having defined the above, we formulate and justify following definitions: [SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)-(d) occurred. If the controversy between A and B is substantial, then: there are two different sentences S1 and S2 of the language L, such that a translation of S from the language LA into L is S1 and the translation S from LB into L is S2. [VERBAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)-(d) occurred. If the controversy between A and B is verbal, then: there is a sentence S3 of the language L that both the translation of S from the language LA as well as the translation of S from the language LB into L is S3. [SEEMINGLY SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)- (d) occurred. A controversy between A and B is seemingly substantial when A and B are sure that the controversy between them is substantial but it is merely verbal. In the above definitions, the concept of language L occurs. We assume that it is a quasi-universal language to which every sentence of LA and every sentence of LB may be translated. We focus on how to recognize the language L, scil., how to establish the rules of translation of an ontological term of LA to another ontological term in LB. The proposed idea is that such a quasi-universal language L may be (re-)constructed only if A and B share the same pragmatic and/or cognitive attitudes (they want to solve a considerably similar set of problems within theirs ontologies). Then, it is highlighted how the presented conception of types of ontological controversies may be applied to the analysis of some ontological controversies, in particular, the debate between endurantism and perdurantism. The goal is achieved in two steps. Firstly, we use the required presuppositions of the language L in order to compare endurantism and perdurantism. Then, the following ontological concepts from these ontologies are discussed: „a thing of a common experience”, „part” and „ontological sum”. In consequence of the analysis, the serious affinity between endurantism and perdurantism is revealed. That is, the main differences between those ontologies are revealed as merely verbal. This fact is elicited by conceptual analysis which may be - to some extent - useful in process of defining whether (or not) some ontological disagreement is genuine or not.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2012, 20, 4; 31-44
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies