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Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
O stosowalności niektórych modalnych reguł inferencji w rozumowaniach pozalogicznych
On the Application of Some Modal Rules of Inference to Non-logical Reasonings
Autorzy:
Świętorzecka, Kordula
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966821.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The presented paper takes up the attempt to analyse and specify the suspicion that some modal rules of inference are paralogical in application to non-logical reasonings (s.c. modal fallacy). The considerations have been limited to modal prepositional calculi: K and S5, which are intended to be a formal base of these non-logical reasonings - proofs of so called specific thesis on the grounds of the particular specific theories. Pointing out the properties of being permitted, being valid and being derivable in case of inferences rules and also semantical relations of point, structure, frame and inferential consequence in standard semantics of possible worlds, enables to define two kinds of paralogism: point and structural. Justification of the suspicion of modal fallacy occurrence in the case of a given inference rule, depends on pointed metalogical properties of this rule and also on what kind of the notion of paralogism is being discussed. It appears that when a given rule is paralogical only pointly (and not structurally), the sufficient condition of avoiding modal fallacy is to consider the specific axioms of the given specific theory as the sentences which are structurally true (structural truth is of course not equivalent to logical truth). If we want to treat these axioms as sentences which are pointly true, we have to eliminate pointly paralogical rules. In this case it is enough to construct such axiomatisation of calculi K and S5, in which we use the notion of modal closure (it eliminates the primitive rule of Goedel and all rules derivable from it - rules which are structurally but not pointly correct).
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2002, 10, 1; 109-138
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
LCG - logika zmian
The LCG Logic of Changes
Autorzy:
Świętorzecka, Kordula
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968507.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The subject of the presented work is the analysis of situations changeability in frame of constructed logic LCG. In the suggested interpretation, substantial change (substantial movement), which consists of the disappearing of a certain substance a1 and the coming into being of substance a2, for which a1 is an active potentia, is understood in the following manner - the elementary fact: essence a1 exists becomes fiction and a new fact arises: essence a2 exists, which is enabled by the previous one. In the language of our formalisation this "transition" from fact to fiction, which occurs in the case of the situation: essence a1 exists, described as C-change. The second component of substantial movement (or rather its situational equivalent) is the occurring of a new fact: essence a2 exists, which is possible under the condition of an earlier occurring of the fact: essence a1 exists. We describe this aspect of movement as G-change, which is an expansion of a set of formulas by a new elementary sentence and expressions in which this sentence occurs. Within the range of the LCG calculus operators C and G obtain an interpretation wider than the one which can be determined upon the basis of the Aristotelian theory of change expressed in terms of situational ontology. Semantical and syntactical characteristics of the LCG logic gives the possibility to compare it with such known calculi of changes like sentential systems of von Wright, Clifford and Wajszczyk.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2007, 15, 1; 19-46
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O modalnej naturze argumentu w. Anzelma. Uwagi do artykułu „Logika modalna a dowód ontologiczny” Andrzeja Biłata
On the Modal Nature of St. Anselm's Argument. Remarks on Andrzej Biłat's Paper Modal Logic vs Ontological Argument
Autorzy:
Świętorzecka, Kordula
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968577.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The paper examines the justification of two theses put forward in the article Modal Logic vs Ontological Argument by Andrzej Biłat: (1) the Anselmian ontological argument does not essentially engage modalities, and its force is not dependent on any specific logical modal laws (but only on classical logic); (2) the only source of modal force of the ontological proof is the Leibnizian theory of perfections. Biłat considers Hartshorne's version of the ontological proof and proposes his own formalization based on classical logic alone. We compare the presented theories and their formal background. We follow the proposed justification of Biłat's main opinion, point out its problematic (and not valid) fragments, and discuss its formal and material correctness. In conclusion, we consider the known possibilities of nontrivial application of modal logics to the analysis of St. Anselm's argument and some of its modern versions.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 1; 131-137
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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