Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

English (EN)·Polski (PL)·Yкраїнський (UK)
Przejdź do strony domowej biblioteki Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa Link otwiera się w nowym oknie Logo biblioteki Prolib Integro - strona głównaCentralna Biblioteka Wojskowa

Wyszukujesz frazę "Odrowąż-." wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola

  Lista filtrów
Wyrównaj
    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth
    Autorzy:
    Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966791.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011-12-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    In the paper I describe John MacFarlane’s version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski’s (1900) and Kokoszynska’s (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think - just as Haack does (see 2011) - that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According to him only the view which postulates double-indexed (to contexts of utterance and to contexts of assessments) truth is able to explain disagreement in subjective domains and contradicting intuitions about the truth-value of future-contingents.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 4; 43-53
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy "identyfikacje teoretyczne" są koniecznymi prawdami aposteriorycznymi?
    Are Theoretical Identifications Necessary A Posteriori Truths?
    Autorzy:
    Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964166.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2006-06-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    As it is well known, Kripke has argued that theoretical identifications (such as „Water is H2O”, „Cats are animals”, „Heat is the motion of molecules”) are statements which if true are examples of the necessary a posteriori. In this paper we will show that all these claims can be challenged. First of all, not all of the statements that Kripke mentions are identity statements. Second, Kripke justifies their necessity by arguing that they contain rigid designators. The problem is that the notion of rigid designation has not been defined by him for general terms and it is not obvious how it should be defined. Moreover, it seems that even if we assume that the terms „water” and „H2O” are rigid, their rigidity does not suffice to establish that the statement „Water is H2O” is necessary. Third, it might be argued that „Water is H2O” is not even true, because the claim that water is H2O leads to the claim that water vapor is H2O and snow is H2O, which in turn leads to the absurd conclusion that snow is water vapor. Fifth, terms such as „water” are indeterminate and the precise borders of their extensions have to be fixed by stipulation, which casts some doubt upon the claim that statements such as „Water is H2O” are a posteriori.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2006, 14, 2; 147-163
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rzeczywista możliwość czy możliwe urzeczywistnienie? (dialog o pragmatycznej koncepcji nieostrości)
    A Real Possibility or Possible Realization?
    Autorzy:
    Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna
    Tałasiewicz, Mieszko
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909966.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2005-09-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 3; 95-114
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy wiedza jest zależna od kontekstu? Kontekstualizm a inwariantyzm praktyczny
    Is Knowledge Context-Sensitive? Contextualism vs Interest-Relative Invariantism
    Autorzy:
    Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Joanna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968262.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009-12-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    Semantic contextualism claims that sentences ascribing knowledge or lack thereof (sentences like "S knows that p" and "S doesn't know that p") are context dependent: they express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. "Knows that" is either indexical or elliptical and refers to different relations in different circumstances. Invariantism argues in turn that the knowing relation is just one and the proposition expressed by a given knowledge ascription does not depend on context. A special case of invariantism is interest-relative invariantism proposed recently by Jason Stanley. According to |R| knowledge is conceptually linked to practical interests. Whether or not true beliefs count as knowledge depends on the costs of being wrong; on the stakes in a given situation (I may know that the bank will be open on Saturday if I have no important business to be done in the bank; if however I have an impending bill coming due I will not count as knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday even though my evidence as regard bank opening hours has not changed). It is argued in the paper that the difference between various contexts in which knowledge ascriptions are made is not a difference in stakes. Moreover knowledge has to be distinguished from willingness to be sure. One may know something but not be sure about it and may be sure about something but not to know it. The higher the stakes the more sure one usually wants to be, but the height of the stakes does not have such an impact on knowledge.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2009, 17, 4; 95-104
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

      Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies