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Wyszukujesz frazę "„tacit knowledge”" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Kategoria wiedzy niejawnej – typowe sposoby rozumienia
Tacit Knowledge – Typical Ways of Interpretation
Autorzy:
Zmyślony, Iwo
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965271.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge. Abstracts 163 Within philosophical interpretation of N. Chomsky’s generative grammar, the term refers to knowledge of linguistic universals and grammar rules. This knowledge is tacit, since it manifests only through ability to (a) recognize grammar proprieties of expressions in natural language, as well as to (b) generate and understand practically infinite number of them. According to J. Fodor it can be identified with ability to speak (making verbal utterances), hence cannot be substantially distinguished from any other forms of embodied or habitual knowledge. According to alternative interpretation this kind of tacit knowledge (a) has propositional status, (b) is innate and (c) enable all possible grammar forms to be deduced from it. Within context of cognitive psychology tacit knowledge is understood habitually, i.e. as knowledge that manifest itself only through skilful action and cannot be linguistically verbalised. This idea derives form distinction between declarative and procedural memory, inspired by G. Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Habitual knowledge is (a) completely unaware or almost unaware, (b) cannot be fully made aware nor verbalised, is (c) person-related and (d) contextspecific. Third way of understanding was proposed by Harry Collins, who has recently (2010) introduced three own types of tacit knowledge - (a) somatic, (b) relational and (c) collective. According to his idea knowledge has basically tacit character, since it circulates „throughout the universe” as physically understood information („pattern”) inscribed on different physical carries („strings”). Relational tacit knowledge can be fully verbalized and implemented in human body or any physical automaton. Somatic tacit knowledge cannot be fully verbalised, since – apart of its quasi-mechanical dimension – it also includes improvisatory (ever-adaptive) aspect of human skills, it can be however transferred to animals (like riding a bike). Collective tacit knowledge cannot be verbalised at all – it is specific exclusively to social dimension of cognitive activities (like driving a car), i.e. cannot be transferred to any sort of animals or automata. Apart of descriptive reconstruction of listed ideas, the article propose four general criteria to define an idea of tacit knowledge sensu largo. According to author’s stand, the term „tacit knowledge” designates (a) all kinds of non-propositional knowledge or unaware propositional knowledge; (b) all kinds of a priori knowledge; (c) dispositional knowledge (skills; competence); (d) knowledge conceived as information acquired by any organic system through permanent interaction with environment.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2012, 20, 3; 65-82
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tacit Mechanisms and Heuristic Theorizing: Comments on Ryszard Wójcicki’s “Is There Only One Truth? An Introduction to the Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge Acquisition”
Autorzy:
Witek, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967091.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it aims at developing a preliminary typology of subconscious, tacit mechanisms that underlie the conscious exercise of practical skills as well as the formation and functioning of conscious mental representations such as perceptual experiences, mental images, explicitly held beliefs and explanatory hypotheses. Second, it employs the typology to consider whether these tacit mechanisms can be examined and explicated by what Ryszard Wójcicki calls heuristic theorizing or heuristic reasoning, i.e., by a cognitive procedure whose job is to study one's tacit or personal knowledge. The paper consists of two sections. Section 1 outlines the general structure of what Michael Polanyi calls personal knowledge or tacit knowing. It also discusses a few examples of tacit knowing - in action, perception and cognition - and argue that they all have to be explained in terms of implicit mechanisms rather than in that of implicitly held beliefs or theories. Section 2 start with an observation that despite having the same structure, the implicit mechanisms consideration in section 1 fail to form a homogeneous class: there are mechanisms that operate on propositional representations such as tacitly held beliefs and theories, mechanisms that involve nonpropositional representations such as perceptual experiences and topographic or classificatory cognitive schemas, and mechanism whose characteristic feature is their using specific processing rules reflecting the structural properties of a given stimuli domain. In other words, it is argued that what Polanyi calls personal or tacit knowlAbstracts 161 edge may take either the form of representational states - propositional or nonpropositional - or the form of processing rules. Finally, it is demonstrated that these and similar differences are significant for understanding the role of heuristic theorizing in the acquisition and justification of objective knowledge.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2012, 20, 1; 33-44
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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